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Abstract
In this thesis, we evaluate the use of incentives offered beyond a contract com-
pared with those within a contract to motivate supplier investment in restoration
capability, which can serve as a signal of reciprocity. In the first chapter, we ana-
lytically examine to what extent a Direct incentive, which is paid by the manufac-
turer unconditionally prior to disruption, differs from an Indirect incentive, which is
promised to be paid when a disruption occurs in a dyadic supply chain. We specify
the conditions under which the two types of incentive are economically equivalent
for both a manufacturer and a supplier. More importantly, we derive a ratio of
investment amount to incentive value as a proxy of supplier reciprocity towards in-
centives offered by the manufacturer. Our analytical results indicate that reciprocal
concern drives higher investment amount per unit incentive under Direct incentive
than under Indirect incentive. The results further suggest that the manufacturer
should always offer a Direct incentive as long as it is economically equivalent to an
Indirect one, and should do so particularly when an ambiguous prospect for recovery
outcomes is anticipated with less optimism.
The following chapter examines supplier reciprocal behaviour towards manu-
facturer incentives in a laboratory setting. The experimental study confirms prior
analytical results that a Direct incentive can induce stronger reciprocal responses as
opposed to an Indirect incentive. We reveal that the offer of a Direct incentive par-
ticularly strengthens suppliers reciprocal behaviour in long-term relationships. This
result provides evidence for a synergy by coupling Direct incentives with long-term
relationships. Furthermore, we observe that subjects decisions in repeated game
conditions are associated with learning behaviours, in which the selfish motive of
maximising their own benefits can be restrained when they repeatedly interact.
iv
In the third chapter, we evaluate the moderating effects of perceived relational
factors on the relationship between manufacturer incentives and observed supplier
investments in the experiment. A post-experiment survey was developed to capture
individual differences in subjects perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationship. We
provide evidence that a supplier’s investment decision towards its manufacturer’s
incentive offered is moderated by self-perception and felt obligation of the relation-
ship. The underlying determinants of the perceived relational factors are explored.
We suggest that ambiguity and other-regarding preferences are associated with self-
perception; whereas, perpetrator justice sensitivity is related to the felt obligation
for reciprocity in the buyer-supplier relationship.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Background
Supply chains have become ever more vulnerable due to the compound factor of
the changing business environment (Wagner and Neshat 2012, Peck 2005). The risks
associated with supply disruptions exist in every cycle of a supply chain, and thus
the vulnerability of any one point in the supply chain could lead to the failure of
the entire supply-chain network. As Hendricks and Singhal (2005, 2003) illustrate,
supply-chain disruption can have detrimental economic effects on firm performance
in both the short- and long-term. Taking the worlds top-five significant disruptions
of 2017 (Khan and Perez 2017) as an example, Table 1.1 reveals that unforeseen and
unexpected disruptions lead firms to take a long time to recover.
Table 1.1: Top 5 most significant disruption events in 2017 (Khan and Perez 2017)
Disruption Event Location Recovery Length
Late Winter Storm United States 23 weeks
Laredo Border Closing United States, Mexico 24 weeks
Hurricane Harvey United States 17 weeks
Hurricane Irma United States 33 weeks
Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico 23 weeks
1
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The disruptions caused by either natural or manmade events may cause insuffi-
cient production capacity, which affects firms’ resilience and responsiveness in supply
chains (Tomlin 2006, Wagner and Bode 2006). For instance, in December 2018, the
world’s leading semiconductor chip maker, ASML, suffered the delay of deliveries
due to a fire at its supplier Prodrive. The fire accident destroyed part of Prodrive’s
production capacity and some inventories. To help Prodrive recovering from the
disruption as soon as possible, ASML decided to actively support and work with
Prodrive to restart production. Similarly, a shortage of chip resin caused by the
Japan earthquake in 2011 led Mitsubishi Gas Chemical (MGC), the world’s largest
producer of bismaleimide-triazine (BT) resin, to halt its production at two plants.
The insufficient supply capacity caused delays for almost 50% of global businesses
in smartphone assembly and handset chip production. However, since MGC’s BT
resin was custom fitted to the chip produced by manufacturing firms, switching sup-
pliers meant that the manufacturing firms would have had to change their product
design, resulting in long delays to restore capacity (Hille 2011). The limited flexi-
bility of specific assets may increase the potential risk that the existing supplier is
encouraged to be opportunistic by delaying production restoration. Another classic
example was a fire at the Philips microchip plant in 2000, which led to a challenge
for Nokia to find an alternative supplier for one of its key components. Nokia and
Philips worked together to restore production capacity so that shipment disruptions
to customers of Nokia were avoided (Latour 2001). Therefore, from the cases above,
cooperating with the existing supplier to restore capacity, instead of switching to
alternative suppliers, may provide effective solutions to disruption recovery in many
circumstances.
In recent years, an increasing number of researchers have highlighted the impor-
tance of investment in restoration capability due to its effectiveness in the improve-
ment of responsiveness to disruption recovery (Nooraie and Parast 2016, Craighead
et al. 2007). However, there exists a problem for which the supplier may fail to
make a sufficient effort to restore the production capacity in the presence of supply
chain disruption. To address this problem, it is important for the manufacturing
firm to consider the use of incentives to efficiently motivate the supplier’s restoration
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investment. In the past, much attention has been paid to the design of incentive
contracts to motivate a supplier’s capability investment in supply chains (Davis and
Leider 2015, Tomlin 2003, Cachon and Lariviere 2001). It is generally agreed that a
well-designed complete contract can provide a safeguard to reduce the supplier’s op-
portunistic behaviour when a manufacturer makes decisions that benefit themselves
(Woolthuis et al. 2005, Lyons and Mehta 1997, Williamson 1985). However, due to
human-bound rationality, it is not possible to involve all aspects of transactions in
a contract, particularly in an uncertain supply-chain environment (Grossman and
Hart 1986). Thus, incentive misalignment is likely to occur when a contract is
incomplete, such that the supplier could behave opportunistically out of concern
for their own interest and thereby cause failure in supply-chain coordination and
efficiency.
1.2 Motivation of the Research
According to traditional economics, most analytical models assume that people
are rational and make decisions that maximise their own benefits. However, when
there exist social interactions, individuals’ rationality is most often limited by their
cognitive bias or emotions (Kahneman 2003, Kaufman 1999). Experimental eco-
nomics provides a well-established methodological foundation for investigating how
social interaction influences human behaviour (Camerer 2011, Camerer et al. 2011,
Frey and Meier 2004, Ga¨chter et al. 2004). In the past two decades, an increasing
number of researchers have integrated the theories and methodologies of behavioural
economics with supply chain management. In particular, the aspect of supply chain
contracting mechanisms has been widely studied. Several scholars have showed that
enforceable contracts in laboratory settings fail to perform consistently with theoret-
ical predictions due to human factors (Katok and Pavlov 2013, Katok and Wu 2009,
Ho and Zhang 2008, Lim and Ho 2007). For example, Katok and Pavlov (2013)
found that human subjects fail to be incentivised when the coordinating contracts
are offered without concerns for fairness. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) revealed that
people make decisions not only out of concern for their own material payoffs, but
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also care about the payoffs of the other party.
The above-mentioned studies in Behavioural operations management (BOM)
have highlighted the importance of social preferences, such as fairness and reciprocity
in supply chain decisions under contractual incentives. However, much less attention
has been paid to relational incentives beyond contractual requirements in supply
chains. Under the condition that one party in a relationship has the feeling having
no control, that party is more likely to exhibit prosocial behaviour when interacting
with the other party (Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Thus, in a supply-chain context,
when a manufacturer voluntarily offers an unconditional incentive, a supplier who
feels it has no control is more likely to reciprocate in response to the manufacturer’s
generous action. In this thesis, we are motivated to specifically focus on two types
of relational incentives (Direct vs. Indirect) that aim to induce suppliers’ reciprocal
responses in restoration investment. The Direct incentive that prepaid before a
disruption occurs is beyond a contract setting, which is viewed as an unconditional or
voluntary action. The Indirect incentive that pre-committed on a relational contract
is only realised after a disruption occurs. We draw upon motivation crowding theory
and propose that Direct incentive mechanism is a more efficient tool to intrinsically
motivate a supplier to invest more.
In a supply-chain relationship, it is possible that the supplier fails to meet their
commitments so that the manufacturer may suffer great losses, especially when a
disruption occurs. Under an incomplete contract, the cooperative relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and the supplier plays an important role in motivating the
supplier’s investment in capacity restoration, which helps to hedge against supply-
chain disruption risks and free-riding problems (Beer et al. 2017, Taylor and Plam-
beck 2007b). It is likely that the maintenance of an on-going long-term relationship
between both supply-chain parties can provide a solid foundation for strengthen-
ing cooperation and coordination in supply chains. As documented by previous
research, the stability of a relationship indicates the potential for reciprocity in
supply-chain transactions (Beer et al. 2017, O¨zer et al. 2014, Wu 2013). Out of con-
cern for reciprocity, the supplier is more willing to invest in restoration capability
depending on the manufacturer’s offered incentive and, consequently, behave less
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opportunistically.
When faced with a disruption, there are uncertainties regarding the consequences
of disruption recovery. According to Ellsberg (1961), the probabilities of recovery
outcomes in supply chains can be either known (i.e. risk) or unknown (i.e. am-
biguity). In an ambiguous environment, the supplier, as the follower, is likely to
increase the exposure to risks arising from opportunism. As a result, the under-
standing of the supplier’s reciprocal behaviour in uncertainty is particularly impor-
tant for unforeseen disruptions. Existing studies in behavioural economics provide
evidence that most people prefer risky prospects with known probabilities over am-
biguous prospects with unknown probabilities (Milliken 1987, Ellsberg 1961). Thus,
in supply-chain relationships, supply-chain parties may regard the risky and ambigu-
ous uncertainty differently, and, consequently, make different choices and express
various levels of preference.
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis extends research on incentive mechanisms which is based on motiva-
tion crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001). In social psychology, reciprocity, as an
intrinsic motivation, is viewed as the driver of human decisions (Falk et al. 1999). A
widespread body of previous literature has placed more emphasis on the role of ex-
ternal incentives in crowding out (i.e.undermining) intrinsic motivation (Lane 1991,
Deci and Ryan 1985, Lepper et al. 1973, Deci 1971). However, most efforts to date
have focused on the effect of external incentives in enhancing intrinsic motivation
(Frey and Jegen 2001, Ryan and Deci 2000, Frey 1997a). These studies provide
evidence that external incentives can induce higher intrinsic motivation if they are
voluntarily offered with less controlling. By comparing external incentives based on
their types of commitment (i.e. unconditional versus conditional), this study pro-
vides interesting insights into the circumstances under which the incentives offered
can motivate stronger reciprocal responses. More importantly, the role of incentive
mechanisms is highlighted in the context of supply-chain disruptions.
Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing BOM literature by incorpo-
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rating theories of social preferences in behavioural economics and psychology into
studies of behavioural operations. As documented by Fehr and Fischbacher (2002),
social preferences involve preferences for fairness, reciprocity and altruism. To date,
the role of the preference for fairness in supply-chain relationships has been exten-
sively discussed in the field of BOM; however, the preference for reciprocity, which
may also play a role in supply-chain cooperation, has received relatively little at-
tention. This study advances the existing research by specifically focusing on the
preference for reciprocity in operations management. The existence of reciprocity
enables the exchange parties to build on-going relationships as well as reducing the
opportunistic behaviour. Our study combines transaction cost theory (Williamson
1979, 1985), which emphasises the potential risk for opportunism under uncertainty,
with social exchange theory (Emerson 1976), which dominates the existing theoret-
ical explanation on the embeddedness of reciprocity in social interactions between
exchange parties, to develop our theoretical framework.
Building on these theories, we hold that long-term exchange relationships are im-
portant to achieve a better understanding of supplier reciprocal behaviour, particu-
larly towards the choice of incentive types by manufacturers. However, a relationship-
building process that involves human interaction is difficult to explain using analyt-
ical models. Thus, our experimental study broadens the views of the preference for
reciprocity in exchange relationships through an incentive-investment game. Our
results have highlighted the importance of combining long-term relationships and
Direct incentives offered prior to disruption by manufacturers to enhance supplier
reciprocity. Second, in our survey-based study, we advance the existing research
on supply-chain relationships by examining perceived relational factors based upon
self-perception and the felt obligations to understand the moderating effects of
relationship-based perceptions on reciprocal behaviour. Holding that perceptions of
buyer-supplier relationships are significant for a better understanding of reciprocity,
we also explore the underlying factors associated with relationship perceptions.
Methodologically, this study innovates to provide an overview of modelling-,
experimental- and survey-based research. This study advances the modelling of
reciprocity that follows incentive mechanisms in supply chain settings by taking
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a two-step approach. Most research on reciprocity model draws attention to the
consequences of reciprocity (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Our model provides evidence to distinguish between a supplier’s propensity for reci-
procity and reciprocal behaviour in response to the incentive offered by a manufac-
turer. The first step of our modelling process involves the propensity for reciprocity,
which is measured by the probability of a decision to invest; while the second step
refers to the extent of reciprocity, which is derived from the ratio of investment
amount to incentive value. Notably, the derived ratio provides the basis for the
measurement of actual reciprocal behaviour under different treatments in our labo-
ratory study.
In our experimental study, we contribute to the existing research on the exper-
imental design by bridging the gap between endogenous and exogenous decision-
variables. In fact, decision-making is a process of selection. This study extends
the existing research by investigating the effects of incentive type that viewed as the
endogenous variable on decision making, which allows subjects to freely choose their
choice with no control. In addition, most existing studies in BOM emphasise using
experimental approaches to test whether human social behaviour deviates from the
theoretical model that follows the assumption that people are self-interested. Al-
though experimental studies have improved the internal validity of results, they have
failed to find evidence for outcomes caused by the subjects’ own perceptions. To
date, few studies have focused on the link between survey and experimental measures
of reciprocity in supply-chain relationships. Generally, survey-based methods are ef-
fective tools used to gather subjective data, including subjects’ general attitudes,
perceptions, beliefs and feelings. In a buyer-supplier relationship, it is important to
know each party’s perception of the relationship. The combination of experiment-
and survey-based measures can advance the understanding of the extent to which
survey-measured relationship perceptions correlate with experiment-measured recip-
rocal behaviour in supply-chain relationships.
In practice, supply-chain disruption is unforeseen and complex. This study high-
lights that the maintenance of long-term relationships plays a key role in strengthen-
ing supplier reciprocity in capacity investment and, thus, may reduce the potential
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risk for free riding when facing disruption risks. It is worthwhile to note that the
benefits for long-term relationships are more prominent when coupling the long-
term cooperative supply-chain relationships with the offer of unconditional incen-
tives prior to a disruption. In addition, we observe that players are motivated to
adjust strategies in repeated interactions. The long-term relationship-building pro-
cess can motivate the counterpart to restrain their selfish motive of maximising their
own benefits. Psychologically, people differ in their perceptions and cognitive pro-
cesses. Our post-experiment survey provides evidence that each party’s relationship
perceptions impact decision-making when they interact. In supply-chain disruption,
the understanding of buyer-supplier relationships from a perceptual point of view
can help decision-makers make decisions that better motivate their counterpart’s
prosocial behaviour and thereby improve supply-chain resiliency and responsiveness.
1.4 Research Overview
In this thesis, we aim to study how the use of efficient incentive mechanisms
can motivate the supplier’s investment in restoration capability with the concern
for reciprocity. To address this research question, we are motivated to provide a
more thorough and comprehensive understanding about the supplier’s restoration
investment towards the incentive offered by using model-based, experimental and
survey-based approaches. Chapter 1 gives a general introduction of the whole thesis.
A brief review of the key theories most relevant to this thesis is provided: trans-
action cost economics theory (Williamson 1979), social exchange theory (Emerson
1976, Blau 1968), motivation crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001), and theory
of decision under uncertainty (Ellsberg 1961). A detailed explanation of theory re-
lating to the modelling or hypotheses development in each of the three studies is
provided in the following chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). In Chapter 2 (study 1),
we develop analytical model to evaluate the manufacturer’s decision between the
prepaid financial incentive before and the promised price incentive after a disrup-
tion, in which the two alternatives are equally valued. Also, we further incorporate
uncertainty about the future recovery outcomes (i.e. risk vs. ambiguity) into the
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supplier’s reciprocal responses to the incentive offered by the manufacturer, partic-
ularly across different beliefs about the outcomes. In this model-based study, we
aim to answer the following research questions:
1. Given the two incentives are equally valued, which incentive mechanism can
induce the supplier’s higher investment amount per unit incentive with the
concern for reciprocity?
2. How does the uncertainty about the future recovery outcomes (risk vs. ambigu-
ity) affect the supplier’s reciprocity across different beliefs about the recovery
outcomes?
Our basic model assumes that the expected payoffs for both types of incen-
tives are equally valued, which is a strict condition in the theoretical modelling.
However, in reality, people’s decisions may be various rely upon different expected
payoffs. Also, reciprocity that drives supply chain partners’ decisions and behaviour
is fundamentally affected by the repeated interaction, which cannot be well-captured
by model-based study. We therefore conduct an experiment study and investigate
whether the supplier’s reciprocity through repeated interaction deviates from that
under one-shot interaction. Since humans do not always act rationally, they may
make choices deviates from the traditional model of rational behaviour and thereby
lead to different payoffs. In a laboratory environment, we relax the assumption that
the expected payoffs are equal valued for both incentives. Chapter 3 (study 2) exper-
imentally provides new insights into the factors influencing supplier reciprocity from
both endogenous and exogenous perspectives. Specifically, the endogenous variable
refers to the type of incentive offered that is voluntarily chosen by subjects; whereas,
the exogenous variable involves the type of relationship and uncertainty that are ma-
nipulated by experimenters. In this study, we aim to address the following research
questions:
1. How do different types of incentive (Direct vs. Indirect) affect decisions on
incentive value by the manufacturer and investment amount by the supplier?
2. How do different types of relationships (one-shot vs. repeated interactions),
and those of uncertainties about future recovery outcome (risk vs. ambiguity)
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affect supply chain partners’ decisions and reciprocal behaviour under Direct
and Indirect incentives?
In the experimental study, we manipulate the relationship and uncertainty condi-
tions. Since individuals differ in their perceptions, the differences between subjects
in the groups may lead to different results. Thus, we further implement a post-
experimental survey to capture the subjects’ individual differences in the perceptions
of the partner relationship. Chapter 4 (study 3) discusses the factors influencing
the perceptions of relationships held between supply chain parties and examines the
moderating role of perceived relational factors in the relationship between the man-
ufacturer’s incentive and the supplier’s investment decisions, which are measured in
the study 2. In this chapter, we try to answer the following questions:
1. What are the determinants of the perceived relational factors?
2. How do the perceived relational factors affect the supplier’s reciprocal re-
sponses to the incentive by its manufacturer?
Figure 1.1 shows the overall framework of the three studies in this thesis.
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Figure 1.1: Overall framework of thesis
Chapter 2
The Modelling of Reciprocity
towards Incentives for Supply
Capacity Restoration
2.1 Introduction
A supply chain disruption is mostly unpredictable and occurred with detrimen-
tal economic effects. The shortage of supply caused by either external or internal
disruption events would lead to the upstream suppliers halting production at plant,
and subsequently delay their manufacturers’ businesses. As a result, investments in
supply chain restoration capability beforehand play an important role in enabling
firms to be more resilient and responsive to disruptions (Nooraie and Parast 2016,
Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009, Baiman and Rajan 2002). To ensure restoration ca-
pacity, the common strategy used by manufacturers is either seeking an alternative
supplier or working with the existing supplier via offering an incentive to induce
the supplier’s investment. Evidence from practice suggests that working with the
existing supplier to restore capacity instead of seeking an alternative supplier may
provide more effective solutions to disruption recover (Hille 2011, Latour 2001).
In high demand conditions, manufacturing firms’ operations to some extent risk
suppliers’ capacity constraints as a result of disruption events. Thus, the suppliers
are expected to proactively exert their efforts in investing in restoration capability
12
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to mitigate the disruption risks. To better motivate the suppliers to do so, manu-
facturers should put an emphasis on offering an effecient incentive mechanism. In
previous studies, there are two main streams of incentive mechanisms available to
deal with supply chain problems: (1) formal (i.e. rule-based) incentive contract;
and (2) informal (i.e. relational-based) incentive contract (Cachon and Lariviere
2001, Tomlin 2003, Taylor and Plambeck 2007a,b). It is generally agreed that a
well-designed complete contract can provide a safeguard to reduce the opportunistic
behaviour when a manufacturer makes decisions that benefit its supplier (Woolthuis
et al. 2005, Lyons and Mehta 1997, Williamson 1985). However, due to human-
bound rationality, it is not possible to specify all aspects of conditions in a contract,
particularly in an uncertain supply chain environment (Grossman and Hart 1986).
In this case, a formal contract alone may lead to incentive misalignment and thus be
insufficient to motivate supplier’s cooperation to restoration capability investment.
More recently, a growing number of scholars have shed some light on relational
mechanism, which is viewed as a complement for formal contract (Lu et al. 2015,
Poppo and Zenger 2002). The relational mechanism emphasises collaborative be-
haviour in long-term relationships through repeated interactions, especially in an
uncertain environment (Klein et al. 2007, Macneil 1980a). Drawing from social
exchange theory, the repeated interactions that help to reinforce cooperation can
motivate the supplier to merit the buyer’s relational incentives with stronger re-
ciprocal responses (Kanagaretnam et al. 2010, Heide and John 1992, Blau 1964).
Since an exchange party may not completely follow the norm of reciprocity during
repeated transactions, the social exchange built on reciprocity should be remaining
conditioned by the formal contract. Thus, the combination of relational incentives
and formal contracts is crucial to encourage greater cooperation than relational or
formal contracting in isolation under uncertain circumstances.
The traditional economic theory assumes that people are self-interested and make
rational choices aimed at maximizing their own interests. In view of this, suppliers
are more likely to behave opportunistically and free ride on the external incentive
offered by manufacturers when a formal contract is incomplete. Recent literature
on relational contracting in supply chain management places more emphasis on the
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form of an incentive on price/quantity promise in repeated interactions, which is
viewed as an alternative solution to mitigating problems arising from opportunism
(Taylor and Plambeck 2007a,b). However, much less attention has been paid to
relational-based supply chain decisions beyond contractual requirements. Despite
the fact that relational-based contracting mechanisms embed social considerations
(e.g. reciprocity) and repeated interactions in improving supply chain efficiency, they
remain conditional incentives on informal contracts that involve binding orders.
In the context of supply chain disruption, these contracting mechanisms are effec-
tive only if a disruption occurs and the supplier is able to restore its supply pipeline.
In other words, although these incentives are pre-committed, the benefits of such
incentives ex post are delayed until a disruption event has occurred. A previous
study by Povel and Raith (2004) provides evidence that ex post incentive mecha-
nisms fail to work in reality especially when firms operate under financial stress. We
therefore argue that suppliers who are financially constrained are unwilling to coop-
erate and are under-invest in capacity restoration. In the discipline of psychology,
some research, such as Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Kreps (1997), Frey (1997c) that is
underpinned by motivation crowding theory has highlighted the importance of un-
conditional or voluntary incentives offered by one party in a relationship in inducing
stronger reciprocal responses from the other party. Therefore, we propose a rela-
tional incentive beyond the contract setting, in which an unconditional or voluntary
incentive that signals more prosocial action enhances supplier’s intrinsic motivation
on capacity restoration investment.
To do so, this paper specifically looks at two types of incentives offered by the
manufacturer with the aim of inducing supplier’s restoration capability investment.
In line with the research in economics, our study defines the incentives in terms of
two dimensions: form and timing of realization (Benhabib et al. 2010, Frederick et al.
2002, Shafir et al. 1993, Baker et al. 1988). In particular, we investigate two forms of
incentive: prepaid financial incentive vs. promised price incentive. We consider the
timing of incentive realization to be either before or after a disruption. We term the
prepaid financial incentive before the disruption ‘Direct incentive’ and the promised
price incentive that becomes effective only if disruption occurs ‘Indirect incentive’.
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The Direct incentive is not just a financial commitment, but also a mechanism to
better induce the supplier’s intrinsic motivation of reciprocity in investment deci-
sions. Such incentive has been empirically studied and proved to be effective in the
mail survey context (Hager et al. 2003, Church 1993). The promise-based Indirect
incentive is closely related to Hu et al. (2013), which examines the buyer’s promised
wholesale price and/or order quantity contract incentives to motivate the supplier’s
investments. We aim to evaluate the manufacturer’s choice between the financial
incentive paid upfront and the promised price incentive implemented conditionally
after the disruption, in which the two alternatives are equally valued. Further to
that, we also investigate the effects of uncertainty about the future recovery out-
comes, risk vs. ambiguity, on the supplier’s reciprocity towards the manufacturer’s
incentive offered, in particular, across different beliefs about the recovery outcomes.
Our research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
we draw on social exchange theory, and extend it by combining with motivation
crowding theory and theory of decision under uncertainty to gain new insights into
the design of effective incentive mechanisms with the concern of suppliers’ reciprocal
responses. Second, this study advances the existing literature on the modelling of
reciprocity by examining the supplier’s intention-based reciprocity towards the man-
ufacturer’s incentives for restoration investment under a strong condition that the
economic motivation underlying consequence-based reciprocity has been addressed.
Based upon this premise, we employ a two-step approach to the modelling of the
supplier’s reciprocal behaviour: the first step establishes the supplier’s propensity
for reciprocity, which follows Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and McCabe et al. (2003).
The second step evaluates the extent of reciprocity, which takes into account the
effects of both incentive type and disruption uncertainties. Our results show that
the Direct incentive is viable and consequently induces higher extent of reciprocity,
given that the supplier’s propensity to invest under Direct incentive is no less than
that of Indirect incentive. Third, we incorporate different expectations/beliefs into
the probabilities of future recovery outcomes, which can be categorized as known
and unknown, corresponding to risky and ambiguous recovery outcomes. The re-
sults reveal that the supplier assigns a higher value of investment per unit incentive
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received, particularly when an ambiguous prospect for recovery outcome is antici-
pated with less optimism. By doing so, we contribute to a greater clarity and better
understanding of supplier reciprocity towards incentives offered in investing capacity
restoration under disruption uncertainties.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 comprises the
literature review by consolidating the related theoretical and empirical research that
underpins our study. In Section 2.3, we describe the model and present analytical
findings. Our numerical results are reported in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we
conclude by summarising the key findings and stating the limitations of the study.
2.2 Literature Review
Social exchange theory primarily focuces on on voluntary aspects of an inter-
organisational exchange, which emphasises value co-creation through on-going and
cooperative relationships (Emerson 1976, Blau 1964). The fundamental underneath
the cooperative relationship are human’s social concerns for reciprocity, in which in-
dividuals are more willing to reward a kind action but punish an unkind one (Berg
et al. 1995, Fehr et al. 1993, Emerson 1976, Blau 1964). In a supply chain exchange,
social concerns for reciprocity play an important role in influencing supply chain
partners’ behaviour and decisions (Wu et al. 2014, Zhao et al. 2008). A growing num-
ber of studies in behavioural operations management provide evidence that social
preferences for reciprocity have significant effects on supply chain performance (Ho
et al. 2014, Katok and Pavlov 2013, Loch and Wu 2008). Reciprocity, as the funda-
mental to human’s relationship, drives cooperative behaviour which is largely condi-
tioned on the others’ actions (Riolo et al. 2001, Trivers 1971). Fehr and Fischbacher
(2004) indicate that individuals increase their own contributions if the contribution
of others increases. Ahmed (2011) considers an investment game, in which the ex-
change party is willing to exhibit stronger reciprocity when a more generous value
is offered by its counterparty. The existing literature on reciprocity define the term
in two classifications: consequence-based and intention-based (Falk and Fischbacher
2006, Cooper and Kagel 2016). The consequence-based reciprocity emphasises peo-
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ple’s reciprocal behaviour as being shaped by distributional outcomes (Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999), while several other studies show that sec-
ond movers who reciprocate more are relying on first movers’ actions that signal a
more kind intention (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004,
McCabe et al. 2003). It is important that the intention-based reciprocity can not
be studied alone without taking account of distributional outcomes (Falk and Fis-
chbacher 2006). However, it has been relatively under-researched. Previous studies
on consequence-based reciprocity places more emphasis on the fair distribution of
payoffs between two parties. However, the fair distribution of payoffs is problem-
atic in supply chain settings since in reality all supply chain parties aim to seek
profit maximisation (Liu and Papageorgiou 2018). In our modelling, the economic
motivation underlying consequence-based reciprocity should not be dismissed. We
therefore capture the intention-driven reciprocity given the ultimate expected pay-
offs that are valued with equality under the two incentive mechanisms.
In the context of incentive contracting, Levin (2003), Poppo and Zenger (2002),
Macaulay (1963) have highlighted the role of relational incentives as a complement
to the formal contracts . More recently, a growing body of literature on the sup-
ply chain contracting has begun to place more emphasis on the role of relational
incentive mechanisms which involve promised incentives in supply chain capacity
investment (Davis and Leider 2015, Hu et al. 2013, Taylor and Plambeck 2007a,b).
This stream of the literature examines the design of an efficient contract, aimed
at incentivising the supplier to invest in capacity to build supply chain flexibility
and resilience against the changing environment. Hu et al. (2013) consider the
use of promised premium-price incentive by firms to encourage suppliers’ restora-
tion capacity investments in the presence of supply chain disruption. Taylor and
Plambeck (2007a) compare the supply chain performance under both price-only and
price-and-quantity promises which are incentivised to induce suppliers’ capacity in-
vestment. In a related research, Taylor and Plambeck (2007b) propose a simpler
relational contract which allows for the conditions in which the supplier’s capacity
investment cannot be directly monitored. Tomlin (2003) investigates the relation-
ship between firm commitment and supplier capacity when the capacity investments
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are under the unenforceable compliance regime. Baker et al. (2002) document that
relational incentives that involve repeated interactions in a supply chain relationship
can reinforce long-term cooperation and accordingly motivate capacity investment.
Although these relational contracts that are pre-committed ease some shortages in
formal contracting, they are in essence the ex post incentives and remain have the
ex post binding effect under a controlled environment. Povel and Raith (2004),
for instance, has argued that the ex post pre-committed incentives would limit the
firm’s investment behaviour when a firm faces financial constraints. As documented
by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2001), incentives on contracts are less efficient for reciprocity-
based voluntary cooperation that drives a successful long-term relationship (Fehr
and Ga¨chter 2001). Previous experimental studies provide evidence that people
who are driven by reciprocity are likely to contribute more toward a more generous
incentive under a purely voluntary cooperation (Fehr and Falk 2002, Fischbacher
et al. 2001, Fehr et al. 1997).
On the bright side, some other studies provide empirical evidence that incentives
in non-contracting settings may encourage the other party’s stronger reciprocal re-
sponses to one’s prosocial behaviour. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) shows an agent in
a two-stage principal-agent game is better motivated and behave more reciprocally
when a principal signals a prosocial behaviour without any enforcement. A trust
game experiment by McCabe et al. (2003) shows that agents are more willing to
exhibit their reciprocal intention towards principals’ unconditional offers, as com-
pared to conditional ones. Principals offering incentives in non-contractible settings
may induce agents to invest more to reciprocate the principals’ prosocial behaviour.
Similarly, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) in their study suggests that agents ex-
ert more effort and are more proactive in an unconditional situation as compared to
a conditional one. Previous research in the social psychology literature have placed
more emphasis on the role of external incentives in crowding out (i.e.undermining)
intrinsic motivation by drawing from Motivation Crowding Theory (Deci and Ryan
1985, Lepper et al. 1973, Deci 1971). However, most efforts to date have focused
on the effects of external incentives in enhancing intrinsic motivation (Frey and Je-
gen 2001, Ryan and Deci 2000, Frey 1997a). These studies provide evidence that
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external incentives can induce higher intrinsic motivation if they are voluntarily of-
fered with less controlling. Further, the timing of incentive is also crucial to the
design of incentive mechanisms. Several studies document that incentives offered
ex-ante have a positive impact on the contracting parties (Hu et al. 2013, Roider
2006). The proactive ex-ante actions in building restoration capability are of great
help to improve the responsiveness to the recovery (Craighead et al. 2007, Tomlin
2006). Therefore, this paper draws upon these studies by examining whether the
unconditional ex-ante incentive, which serves a signal of a more prosocial behaviour,
motivates a supplier’s stronger reciprocal response, which leads to higher investment
in capacity restoration as against disruption uncertainties.
In making investment decisions on capacity restoration under disruption uncer-
tainties, suppliers will also have to have a view about future recovery outcomes that
could be either risky or ambiguous(Hult et al. 2010, Blackhurst* et al. 2005). The
risk condition in general is related to events that have known probabilities whereas
the ambiguity condition refers to unknown probabilities as regards to future recov-
ery outcomes (Milliken 1987, Ellsberg 1961). Ellsberg (1961) shows that people are
more averse to decisions under ambiguity than under risk conditions. The existing
literature on supply chain disruptions distinguishes between internal and external
factors that influence supply chain disruptions (Wu et al. 2006, Kleindorfer and
Saad 2005). The probabilities for recovery outcomes may be more likely to be es-
timated when a disruption is caused by internal risks, whereas remain ambiguous
upon investment decision when it is caused by external environmental factors (Wu
et al. 2006). Evidence from studies in cognition suggests that beliefs about the
likelihood of future events under either ambiguous or risky situation may influence
the probability distributions and thereby people’s behavioural preference (Pulford
2009). People with positive expectation about future outcomes (optimism) may
behave differently from someone who expects the negative outcomes (pessimism)
(Einhorn and Hogarth 1985). An ambiguity avoider’s attitude towards the success-
ful chance of an event tends to be worse for the ambiguous prospect that allows more
pessimistic (Curley et al. 1986). By saying that, optimists and alike are more likely
to exhibit ambiguity seeking behavior for the ambiguous prospect with positively
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framed scenario (Bier and Connell 1994). We therefore examine the extent to which
a supplier’s beliefs about future recovery outcomes effect on its reciprocal response
to incentive conditions described above.
2.3 The Model
We consider a two-echelon decentralised supply chain channel with a single sup-
plier who produces units under a regular wholesale contract (q1, w1). That is, the
manufacturer places a regular order q1 at wholesale price w1 when there is no dis-
ruption. However, when disruption occurs, the manufacturer orders q2 units at the
post-disruption wholesale price w2 per unit, w2 ≥ w1, q2 ≥ q1. In our base setting,
the manufacturer as a quantity determiner and the supplier as a price maker aim to
maximise their own expected payoff, and thus we derive wi and qi for i = 1, 2 to be
parameters in determining incentive values and investment amount. Furthermore,
we assume that the maximum market scale faced by the manufacturer moves from
M1 to M2, M2 ≥M1. The status of a supply chain i is assumed to be with either no
disruption (i = 1) or disruption (i = 2) (Hu et al. 2013, Gu¨mu¨s et al. 2012, Gurnani
and Shi 2006). For simplicity, we assume that under Normal and Disrupted status
the manufacturer has a linear market demand
qi = Mi − pi. (2.3.1)
The probability of a supply chain disruption β follows U [0,1]. The supplier
can fulfil the manufacturer’s order with no disruption and will lose all capacity
otherwise. In the case of disruptions, with restored capacity, the supplier produces
at unit production cost c2 > 0 (c2 ≥ c1). The manufacturer charges market price p2
per unit when disruption occurs and p1 otherwise (p2 ≥ p1).
In the face of disruption uncertainties, the manufacturer considers the use of
incentives either ‘Direct’ or ‘Indirect’ to induce the supplier’s investment in restora-
tion capability, along with the initial regular contract. The ‘Direct incentive’ ID
is paid upfront prior to disruption. By contrast, the promised ‘Indirect incentive’
II takes effect after a disruption occurs in the form of the revised wholesale price,
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and/or order quantity. Following the initial incentive decision by the manufacturer,
the supplier needs to decide whether or not to invest in restoration capability devel-
opment before any disruption occurs with investment F > 0. If the supplier invests,
there are three possible disruption recovery outcomes: full recovery, partial recovery,
and no recovery. If the supplier does not invest, we assume that it will be incapable
of recovering from disruption following Hu et al. (2013), Gu¨mu¨s et al. (2012). The
manufacturer’s payoff upon disruption is conditioned on the supplier’s investment
decision. In the case that the supplier does not invest, the manufacturer will suffer
a loss L.
Figure 2.1: Determinants of Supplier Investment Decision
Figure 2.1 illustrates what core elements lead to a change in the probability of
recovery outcomes, and how the change occurs. To a large extent, the probability
of each possible recovery outcome depends on the unforeseen nature of disruption
and the manufacturer’s initial belief as to the uncertainty about future recovery.
As aforementioned, the probabilities of recovery outcomes are categorised into two
dimensions: (1) risk; (2) ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961). With the risk prospect, the
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disruption that caused by internal factors enables the probability of recovery out-
comes largely to be estimated/known with certainty. However, with the ambiguity
prospect, both supply chain parties have vague information about the probability
of each recovery outcome in particular when the disruption results from external
environmental factors. Thus, the probability, in this case, is unknown/ambiguous
with uncertainty.
Drawing from the theory of decision under uncertainty (Ramsey 1931), individ-
uals’ future decisions may be affected by their beliefs about the future uncertain
events. In other words, the probabilities of disruption recovery outcomes can be
further updated based on both supply chain parties’ subjective beliefs about recov-
ery degree. To assess the probability of each recovery outcome more accurately, we
therefore incorporate the subjective beliefs about the disruption recovery outcomes
into the objective factors influencing recovery from disruptions.
In this study, we consider four types of beliefs for both types of recovery prob-
abilities: optimistic, pessimistic, most likely and neutral. Any belief held by the
manufacturer has been shared with its supplier. More specifically, optimism implies
a strong initial belief in full recovery outcome that the probability of full recovery is
greater than that of partial or no recovery. By contrast, pessimists believe the dis-
ruption would be completely not recovered and thus the probability of no recovery
dominates that of the other two recovery outcomes. In ‘most likely’ scenario, the
manufacturer holds a view that the disruption is most likely to be partially recov-
ered, meaning that the probability of partial recovery is greater than the other two.
Furthermore, ‘neutral belief’ indicates that the three types of recovery outcomes are
perceived to be occurred equally likely.
Moreover, the supplier’s investment decision that followed by the manufacturer’s
incentive offered suggests that the type of incentive offered intuitively also has an
impact on the supplier’s investment in restoration capability. In view of this, we
capture both the probability of recovery outcomes and the type of incentive offered
to examine the supplier’s reciprocal behaviour when making an investment decision.
We consider how do the above-mentioned determinants that are either objective
or subjective interact to determine the supplier’s restoration capability investment.
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Following Berger et al. (2004), we employ a decision tree approach to visualise the
decision process in the presence of disruption risks.
Figure 2.2: The decision tree from the manufacturer’s perspective
Starting from the end node of the Decision Tree (see Figure 2.2), the manufac-
turer’s expected payoffs of each possible recovery outcome resulted from working
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with the existing supplier are respectively given by pibi for Direct incentive and pi
b′
i
for Indirect incentive. The probability of each recovery outcome given the supplier’s
restoration investment is denoted by µi for both Direct and Indirect incentives.
i = 1, 2, 3 represents full, partial and no recovery, respectively. The total expected
payoff for each type of incentive is the weighted sum of each recovery outcome by
the probability of recovery. Here we use piDE and pi
I
E to denote the expected payoff
with risky certainty, respectively, under Direct and Indirect incentive.
piDE =
N∑
i=1
µipi
b
i , pi
I
E =
N∑
i=1
µipi
b′
i (2.3.2)
In the Direct incentive condition, the expected payoff of each disruption recovery
outcome is

pib1 = (p2 − w1)q1 full recovery
pib2 = θ(p2 − w1)q1 (0 < θ < 1) partial recovery
pib3 = −(p2 − w1)q1 no recovery
θ denotes the proportion of recovery from disruptions. Likewise, in the Indirect
incentive context, the wholesale price w1 and the order quantity q1 are substituted
by w2 and q2, respectively, from the above weighted profit functions. The expected
payoff is calculated in the same way as shown above.
Given post-disruption wholesale price w2, we first find the manufacturer’s best
response q∗2 under the Indirect incentive condition. The manufacturer chooses q2 to
maximise his payoff ΠIm under Indirect incentive and then we can have the optimal
order quantity q∗2 =
M2−w2
2
. Next, given the manufacturer’s best response q∗2 , the
supplier maximises ΠIs and we get w
∗
2 =
M2+c2
2
. Similarly, the equilibrium solutions
for regular order quantity q∗1 and wholesale price w
∗
1 are given as
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q∗1 =
M1 − w1
2
w∗1 =
M1 + c1
2
Thus when substitute the above solutions into (1) we have the following result:
Lemma 1 If w1 ≤ w2 and q1 ≤ q2, there exists the optimal response in which the
manufacturer places the order quantity q∗i (wi) =
Mi−wi
2
at the price w∗i =
Mi+ci
2
and
determines the market price p∗i =
Mi+wi
2
, for i = 1, 2.
Remarks.
As aforementioned, we construct two relational incentive mechanisms in the pres-
ence of supply chain disruption: (1) unconditional; (2) unconditional. For the first
type, an Direct incentive payment ID is provided along with the initial regular order
(q1, w1). For the latter one, the manufacturer promises to complete the incentive con-
tract (q2, w2) only when the disruption has occurred. In other words, if there is any
disruption, the manufacturer in fact offers Direct incentive that relevant to the ini-
tial regular contract (q1, w1) whereas Indirect incentive that related to the promised
incentive contract (q2, w2). Following backwards induction, Lemma 1 indicates that
the manufacturer finds the equilibrium to the order quantity and wholesale price for
both normal and disrupted status are specifically solved in the same way.
The focus of this study is to investigate the two types of incentives that are used
to induce the supplier’s capability investments, with the concern for reciprocity.
The Direct incentive is meaningful only if there is any disruption otherwise this will
become a sunk cost. By contrast, the Indirect incentive is expected to be realised
as promised after a disruption occurs and thus will have no effect without any dis-
ruption. The analysis that refers to the manufacturer’s Indirect incentive value II
is shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The Indirect incentive value is given by the supplier’s payoff difference
between the normal and the disrupted status, where
II = w∗2q
∗
2 − w∗1q∗1 (2.3.3)
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Remarks.
In a Indirect incentive setting, the manufacturer only commits to increase the
wholesale price and/or order quantity if disruption occurs. In view of this, the In-
direct incentive simply associates with the change of wholesale price and/or order
quantity. As we assumed, the post-disruption wholesale price w2 and order quantity
q2 meets w1 ≤ w2, q1 ≤ q2 respectively. Thus, the Indirect incentive value II is
implicitly equal to an increase in the manufacturer’s payment to the supplier when
disruption occurs. In other words, the manufacturer’s Indirect incentive value is,
in fact, equivalent to the supplier’s revenue surplus. Lemma 2 suggests that the
incentive value offered by the manufacturer under Indirect incentive in the presence
of disruption is constant across all types of beliefs about the probability of recovery
outcomes. Based on the optimal solutions shown in Lemma 1, we can compare the
manufacturer’s total expected payoff under Direct incentive with that under Indi-
rect incentive. The following lemma shows the condition under which the Direct
incentive outperforms the conditional one.
Lemma 3 The manufacturer is better off when offering Direct incentive as com-
pared to Indirect incentive, that is, ΠDm > Π
I
m, if:
0 < ID < β[αD(
N∑
i=1
µipi
b
i − L)− αI(
N∑
i=1
µipi
b′
i − L)] ≡ IˆD (2.3.4)
Accounting for the type of incentive with the known probability of each outcome
(i.e. risky prospect), we can first derive the threshold of Direct incentive ID. As
shown in the Decision Tree, the manufacturer’s expected payoff is denoted by ΠDm
and ΠIm under the unconditional and Indirect incentives respectively, where
ΠDm = α
DΠD1 + (1− αD)ΠD2 − ID (2.3.5)
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ΠIm = α
IΠI1 + (1− αI)ΠI2 (2.3.6)
From the manufacturer perspective, we have the upper threshold of Direct in-
centive IˆD as given in (4) when we let ΠDm = Π
I
m.
Remarks.
The above Inequality (2.3.4) shows the conditions in which Direct incentive is
financially viable when the two options are equally valued. If the incentive value
ID is below the threshold IˆD, the manufacturer would choose to offer the Direct
incentive. The manufacturer can randomize the Direct incentive value, following
the range [0, IˆD]. Specifically, the probability of disruption, the probability of the
supplier’s decision to invest, loss resulted from the decision to not invest and the
manufacturer’s expected payoff of disruption recovery together determine the range
for incentive value. Furthermore, it is noted that the propensity for reciprocity plays
a vital role at the beginning of a cooperation. In a cooperative buyer-supplier re-
lationship, it provides the fundamental motive for suppliers’ decisions to invest in
restoration capability and thus becomes a prerequisite for the extent of reciprocity
towards manufacturers’ prosocial behaviour. The probabilities of supplier’s deci-
sion to invest, i.e. αD and αI, are assumed to reflect the supplier’s propensity for
reciprocity under unconditional and Indirect incentives respectively. According to
(2.3.4), the upper value IˆD must need to satisfy IˆD > 0. Accordingly, we have the
following relationship between αD and αI :
αD
αI
>
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i − L∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i − L
(2.3.7)
To satisfy ID > 0, if αD > αI, no matter what the absolute size of expected payoff∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i and
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i but only that the comparative ratio of the two expected
payoffs, either
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i
or
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i
, is required to be less than α
D
αI
. By contrast, if
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αD < αI, it requires to satisfy
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i <
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i for I
D > 0. Further, based on
Lemma 1 and 3, we compare the upper threshold IˆD with II, the relative threshold
ratio Θ can be written as:
Θ =
β[αD(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i − L)− αI(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i − L)]
II
If Θ < 1, then the manufacturer can offer a smaller amount of ID than II given
the equivalent expected payoffs for the two types of incentive. Here we see that the
loss value L matters to the ratio Θ. The following lemma shows how the manu-
facturer’s loss L resulting from the supplier’s decision to not invest influences the
difference in incentive value between the two types of incentive.
Lemma 4 When offers of unconditional and conditional invectives are economi-
cally equivalent for the manufacturer, Direct incentive value offered prior to disrup-
tion is smaller as compared to Indirect incentive value offered post-disruption, that
is, IˆD < IˆI when L satisfies the following:
(a) if αD > αI, then
β(αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i−αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i )−II
β(αD−αI) < L < 0;
(b) if αD < αI, then
αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i −αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i
αI−αD < L < 0;
(c) if αD = αI, then the loss value L has no effect on Θ.
Remarks.
According to (2.3.7), the supplier’s propensity for reciprocity is largely deter-
mined by the manufacturer’s weighted expected payoff of recovery outcomes. A
comparison of incentive value under Direct and Indirect incentive depends on the
loss suffered by the manufacturer when the supplier does not invest. For a given
wholesale price, order quantity and the probability of each recovery outcome, the
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loss value L is calibrated by the supplier’s propensity for reciprocity under Direct
and Indirect incentive. The upper loss value is required to be less than 0 and the
lower bound is greatly dependent on the supplier’s propensity. When αD > αI, L
shifts upwards as the probability of disruption β and the difference between αD and
αI increases. Here, β needs to satisfy β < I
I
αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i−αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i
. When αD < αI,
the loss value L is regardless of β but being influenced by the value of αD and αI.
Likewise, L increases with the difference between the two values. On the other hand,
L is associated with the supplier’s decision to invest. From backwards induction, a
large amount of loss would result in a lower payoff so that the supplier will choose
to not invest in restoration capability.
As shown in Supplier’s Decision Tree (see Figure 2.3), a supplier only involves
one-stage decision as to whether or not invest in restoration capability under Direct
and Indirect incentive.
In our assumption, if the supplier’s investment takes place, the investment amount
F then is considered to be a sunk cost. If the supplier does not invest in restora-
tion capability, he/she will suffer opportunity loss upon disruption. The supplier’s
expected payoff under Direct and Indirect incentives is, respectively, shown as in
(2.3.8) and (2.3.9). We denote the supplier’s expected payoffs by adding prime as
superscript based on the notations of the manufacturer’s expected payoff.
ΠDs = max[Π
D′
1 − FD + λID,ΠD
′
2 + I
D] (2.3.8)
ΠIs = max[Π
I′
1 − F I,ΠI
′
2 ] (2.3.9)
As aforementioned, both the manufacturer and the supplier hold common be-
liefs about the likelihood of each recovery outcome. The probability of disruption
recovery outcome can be either risky (known) or ambiguous (unknown). When we
take the uncertainty under each type of incentive into consideration, the thresholds
of λ and δ can be obtained. Here we can establish the following definition.
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Figure 2.3: The decision tree from the supplier’s perspective
Definition 1 Let λ be the reciprocity loading factor induced by Direct incentive
and δ induced by ambiguous uncertainty. The combined effect of Direct incentive
and ambiguous uncertainty on reciprocity has a loading scaler λ+ δ + λδ.
Remarks.
As the main focus of our study is the modelling of the supplier’s reciprocity
in restoration capability. The reciprocity scaler is defined in two dimensions: (1)
incentive type (2) uncertainty type about future recovery outcomes.
We first set the reciprocity scaler associated with Indirect incentive and risky
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certainty to 1 saying the supplier is not motivated to exhibit reciprocity towards
the manufacturer’s reactive action with known probability of recovery prospects.
According to Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Direct incentive that indicates a more
kind action can reinforce reciprocity. The supplier may be intrinsically motivated to
invest more towards an Direct incentive. Accordingly, when the likelihood of future
recovery outcomes is known, we amplify the intrinsic value of Direct incentive to λID
if the supplier invests in restoration capability. Here, λ is the reciprocity scaler in
relation to the supplier’s reciprocal concern in Direct incentive. Following Ellsberg
(1961), people are more likely to be ambiguity averse when the future outcome is
uncertain. An ambiguity-averse person would rather choose a known probability of
future outcomes over the one with an unknown probability. Accordingly, we assigned
an unknown probability of recovery degree to δµi for Indirect incentive (0 < δ < 1).
Here δ indicates the reciprocal concern associated with ambiguous uncertainty under
Indirect incentive with the decision to invest.
When Direct incentive meets ambiguous uncertainty, the simple sum of two
scalers does not capture the whole reciprocal effect. As a more prosocial action is
taken under ambiguous uncertainty, this may lead to synergy effects that contribute
to the reinforcement of reciprocity. Generally, the synergy effect occurs when two
or more units produces the joint value greater than the sum of their individual
values (Tanriverdi 2006, Cao and Zhang 2011). Thus, in our study, we define the
synergies between Direct incentive and ambiguous uncertainty as the additional ef-
fect produced by the integration of Direct incentive with environmental uncertainty
beyond the value added by the individual units. Accordingly, we measure the ef-
fect of unknown recovery probability under Direct incentive using the product of
λδ. Overall, the combined effect of Direct incentive and ambiguous uncertainty on
reciprocity creates value greater than the sum of Direct incentive and ambiguous
uncertainty and thus we define the reciprocity loading factor on the Direct incentive
and ambiguity synergy as λ+ δ + λδ.
There exist four types of outcomes regarding the supplier’s investment decision.
We use F I and F I
′
denote the risky and ambiguous outcomes under Indirect incentive
while FD and FD
′
denote those under Direct incentive.
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0 < FD < β(
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i − L) + (λ− 1)ID (2.3.10)
0 < FD
′
< β(λδ
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i − L) + (λ+ δ − 1)ID (2.3.11)
0 < F I < β(
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i − L) (2.3.12)
0 < F I
′
< β(δ
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i − L) (2.3.13)
As mentioned in the introduction, the supplier’s investment induced per unit of
incentive offered is regarded as a proxy of reciprocity. The ratio of the supplier’s
investment to the incentive offered by the manufacturer under Direct incentive with
risky prospect is given by F
D
ID
, while that under Indirect incentive is given by F
I
II
.
Similarly, with an ambiguous prospect, the ratio is given by F
D′
ID
under Direct incen-
tive while F
I′
II
under Indirect incentive. It is clear that F
I
II
> F
I′
II
since the reciprocity
loading factor δ shrinks the upper value of F I
′
. Thus, under Indirect incentive, com-
pared with ambiguous uncertainty, the supplier’s extent of reciprocity is higher when
the probability of recovery is known with certainty. Let ID = II, we then compare
FD
′
ID
and F
I′
II
. From the manufacturer perspective, we look at the condition under
which ID < II. From the supplier perspective, here we aim to specifically look at the
supplier’s investment amount under Direct and Indirect incentives with ambiguity
when ID = II. It suggests that F
D′
ID
> F
I′
II
can be satisfied if the condition that
meets FD
′
> F I
′
can be derived.
Theorem 1 When supplier reciprocity for ambiguous uncertainty loading factor
δ satisfies the relationship
δ ≡ (1− λ)I
D
β(λ
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i ) + I
D
< δ < 1 (2.3.14)
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then the supplier exhibits higher reciprocity under Direct incentive with unknown
probability for recovery outcomes, as compared to Indirect incentive condition.
Remarks.
Theorem 1 illustrates the supplier’s extent of reciprocity towards the uncertainty
with the probabilities of recovery outcomes. We denote δ as the ambiguity dimension
reciprocity. It captures the impact of ambiguous outcomes on supplier’s reciprocity
towards an uncertain future. As shown in (2.3.13), the upper value of supplier’s
investment under Indirect incentive shifts downwards due to the effect of ambiguous
uncertainty. In Theorem 1, we find the condition under which the Direct incentive
induces higher reciprocity than Indirect incentive when the probability of recovery
is ambiguous. We derive that there exists δ satisfying F
D′
ID
> F
I′
II
. From (2.3.14), we
see that, to some extent, δ depends on the value of λ. It is clear that δ needs to
meet 0 < δ < 1. As such, we can derive an upper bound of λ shown as follows.
λ <
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i − ID
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i
(2.3.15)
Likewise, in the situation that the probability of recovery is risky, to compare
FD
ID
and F
I
II
by letting ID = II , we have the following result:
λ >
β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i )
ID
+ 1 (2.3.16)
The following theorem illustrates our findings on the effect of incentive type on
the supplier’s reciprocity.
Theorem 2 When supplier reciprocity for incentive type parameter λ satisfies
the relationship
2.3. The Model 34
β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i )
ID
+ 1 < λ <
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i − ID
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i
(2.3.17)
then the supplier exhibits higher reciprocity under Direct incentive with known prob-
ability for recovery outcomes, as compared to Indirect incentive condition.
Remarks.
Theorem 2 shows the supplier’s extent of reciprocity towards the manufacturer’s
incentive offered. The ratio per se represents the supplier’s reciprocity under each
type of incentive. As indicated in Definition 1, λ denote the incentive type dimen-
sion reciprocity and measures how the type of incentive influences the supplier’s
reciprocity in investment decisions. The decision to invest under each type of incen-
tive reflects the supplier’s underlying intentions for reciprocity. Specifically, a higher
probability of supplier’s investment in restoration capability signals a stronger in-
tention to reciprocate. In the absence of intentions, the supplier is less likely to
invest. From the view of incentive type, Direct incentive signals good intentions
which imply a larger extent for reciprocity. To sum up, the supplier is sufficiently
intrinsic motivated to invest in restoration capability when the unconditional Direct
incentive is offered. As indicated in (2.3.17), we derive that there exists λ satisfying
FD
ID
> F
I
II
. Our underlying assumption that λ > 1 supports the situation where the
incentive type reciprocity loading factor amplifies the Direct incentive value.
Theorem 3 Under Direct incentive, the value of either F
D
ID
or F
D′
ID
is not affected
by the probability of disruption. However, under Indirect incentive, the value of ei-
ther F
I
II
or F
I′
II
linearly increases with the probability of disruption.
Remarks.
According to (2.3.10), we can derive the ratio of Fˆ
D
IˆD
is equal to
β(
∑N
i=1 µipi
s
i−L)
IˆD
+
(λ − 1). Based on Lemma 3, the incentive value ID depends on the probability
of β. Here, it is clear see that the ratio of Fˆ
D
IˆD
is independent of the probability
of disruption β. Similarly, the same result applies to the ratio of Fˆ
D′
IˆD
. Thus it
suggests that the supplier’s decision to invest is not influenced by the probability of
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disruption if the manufacturer chooses to offer Direct incentive. As for the choice of
Indirect incentive, the supplier’s investment amount is relevant to β but the Indirect
incentive value is not the case. Consequently, we see that ratio of either Fˆ
I
IˆI
or Fˆ
I′
IˆI
is dependent upon the probability of disruption. To sum up, the supplier does not
pay much attention to the probability of disruption in their investment decision if
a Direct incentive is offered. Rather, the supplier focuses more on the disruption
probability for restoration capability investment if the Indirect incentive is offered.
2.4 Numerical Analysis and Discussion
In this section, we conduct numerical analysis to investigate to what extent
the probability of disruption and the belief as to recovery outcomes affect our key
variables (i.e.F, I, F/I) for risky and ambiguous prospects, respectively, under Direct
and Indirect incentives. Parameters are assigned based on our assumptions as stated
in our model and with reference to Hu et al. (2013). We let M1 = 50, M2 = 51,
c1 = 0, c2 = 1, θ = 0.5, λ = 3, δ = 5, L = −1. For simplicity, we let p1 = p2,
q1 = q2. We mainly focus on how the change of wholesale price influences both
the manufacturer and the supplier’s decisions. Given the equilibrium solution for
the decentralised supply chain, we can then obtain p1 = p2 = 37.5, q1 = q2 = 13,
w1 = 25, w2 = 26.
Furthermore, we use the values in Table 2.1 as a baseline for the probabilities of
recovery outcomes (µi) under Direct and Indirect incentives across the four differ-
ent types of beliefs and those in Table 2.2 as the supplier’s probability of decision
to invest (αD, αI). The probability of disruption β takes values from 0 to 1 with
increments of 0.05.
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Table 2.1: Probability of disruption recovery outcomes across four beliefs
Full Recovery
(µ1)
Partial Recovery
(µ2)
No Recovery
(µ3)
Pessimistic 0.05 0.05 0.90
Optimistic 0.90 0.05 0.05
Most Likely 0.25 0.5 0.25
Neutral 0.333 0.333 0.333
Table 2.2: A baseline for probability of investment for Direct and Indirect incentive
across four beliefs
Direct Incentive
(αD)
Indirect Incentive
(αI)
Pessimistic 0.10 0.10
Optimistic 0.80 0.80
Most Likely 0.60 0.60
Neutral 0.50 0.50
2.4.1 Numerical Analysis with respect to Disruption Prob-
ability and Initial belief
Figure 2.4 illustrates that the Direct incentive value varies against the disrup-
tion probability and the beliefs in recovery outcomes, whereas the Indirect incentive
value remains constant across all the cases as we set the wholesale price and order
quantity as parameters in this study. Under each type of belief, the Direct incentive
value linearly increases in the probability of disruption. Notably, the optimistic be-
lief generates the highest upper value of Direct incentive when the two options are
economically equivalent for the manufacturer. By contrast, the pessimistic attitude
is not economically viable. In this situation, the values of Direct incentive and sup-
plier investment are both negative. Hence we exclude this scenario from this part
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of our analysis.
Figure 2.4: Incentive value across belief scenarios against β
Figure 2.5 shows how the supplier’s investment in restoration capability is af-
fected by both the beliefs about the disruption recovery outcomes and the probability
of disruption. The trend for the supplier’s investment amount against the probabil-
ity of disruption is identical to that for the manufacturer’s incentive value as shown
in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.5: Supplier investment amount across belief scenarios against β
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It is clear that the supplier provides the highest upper bound of investment
amount when the belief about recovery degree is optimistic regardless of the incen-
tive type and the uncertainty about future recovery outcomes. Interestingly, in each
of the three scenarios, the supplier is more inclined to invest more when the manu-
facturer offers the Direct incentive with the ambiguous (i.e.unknown) probability of
recovery outcomes. On the other hand, the Indirect incentive with ambiguous prob-
ability of recovery outcomes gives the lowest investment amount. The amount falls
in the middle with risky (i.e. known) probability of recovery degree. For the risky
prospect, we specifically find that the difference in the investment amount between
Direct and Indirect incentives is significantly small.
Figure 2.6: The ratio of investment amount to incentive value across belief scenarios
against β
Figure 2.6 displays the ratio of the amount of investment required per unit of
incentive received across the three belief scenarios. Clearly, this is a result of what
we observed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Note that the ratio in each scenario is kept
at a constant level with Direct incentive for both risky and ambiguous prospects.
It implies that the investment-incentive ratio is independent of the probability of
disruption no matter what the future belief is. Conversely, the pattern under the
Indirect incentive yields a mirror image of the above. Notably, we observe that
the investment-incentive ratio under Indirect incentive is relevant to the probability
of disruption. As the probability of disruption increases, the ratio for each belief
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scenario increases.
As indicated in (2.3.7), the relative values of αD and αI are obtained when ID
becomes viable (i.e. ID ≥ 0). However, it is not obvious that to what extent the
relative values vary satisfying ID ≥ 0. Given the initial parameter settings, we per-
form a sensitivity analysis of ID with respect to αD and αI, aiming at finding the
thresholds (α¯D, α¯I) satisfying ID ≥ 0. αD and αI are changing by ±10% based on
the value given in Table 2.2. As can be seen in Figure 2.7, the plotted trend lines
illustrate that the relative values of the thresholds (α¯D, α¯I) for ID ≥ 0 under each
type of belief about future recovery outcome do not vary and are very close to 1 for
our settings.
2.4. Numerical Analysis and Discussion 40
(a) Optimistic Scenario (b) Most Likely Scenario
(c) Neutral Scenario
Figure 2.7: Different cases of αD and αI obtained when ID ≥ 0 across different
beliefs about recovery degree
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2.4.2 Discussion
In this study, we initial compare two incentive mechanisms, Direct vs. Indirect,
in inducing supplier’s restoration capability investment with the concern for reci-
procity. First, our results suggest that Direct incentive that signals a more prosocial
behaviour is more likely to intrinsically motivate the supplier’s reciprocity. That is,
the supplier is likely to be motivated to invest more in building restoration capa-
bility towards the manufacturer’s generous offer. Consequently, responsiveness and
success of disruption recoveries can be improved. The theoretical foundation for the
effects of Direct incentive on supplier’s reciprocal behaviour is based on Motivation
Crowding Theory (Frey 1997b). This theory highlights that, under certain condi-
tions, the use of price incentive mechanism decreases individuals’ motivation to act
and thus crowds out intrinsic motivation to reciprocate. However, in the condi-
tion that the incentive is voluntarily offered, our findings provide evidence that the
upfront prepaid incentive that makes suppliers feel of giving more voluntary to per-
form can enhance intrinsic motivated reciprocity as compared to the promise-based
price/quantity incentive.
Second, this study takes a two-step approach to the modelling of the supplier’s
reciprocity. In the first step, our findings show that the propensity for reciprocity
largely depends on the sizes of the wholesale price, order quantity as well as the loss
value for Direct incentive to be economically viable. However, in the second step, we
show that under Direct incentive greater propensity is not necessarily a prerequisite
for a higher extent of reciprocity, which is measured by the ratio of the supplier’s
investment to the incentive value offered by the manufacturer. Given that the
supplier’s propensity for reciprocity under Direct incentive is not far less than that
under Indirect incentive, the extent of reciprocity is higher under Direct incentive
as compared to Indirect incentive across scenarios in our numerical settings. Our
results echo the argument put forward by Frey and Jegen (2001) that Direct incentive
strengthens the supplier’s intrinsic motivation such that a stronger reciprocity is
reinforced.
Third, drawing from traditional principal-agent theory (Fleisher 1991), each
party in a contractual relationship has their own motive of profit maximisation.
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This may lead to an agency problem, in which the manufacturer (principal) seeks
to minimise the agency costs, for example, by offering generous incentive to induce
investment by the supplier (agent), whereas the supplier aims to maximise its own
profit and accordingly makes a minimum effort in restoration investment. Conse-
quently, the moral hazard problem (e.g. free riding) will occur. However, our result
shows that, due to the existence of reciprocity, the supplier is elicited to invest more
when an incentive is offered upfront by the manufacturer, which aligns earlier find-
ings by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). This result
suggests that, in the presence of disruption, an incentive prepaid upfront is more
efficient than a promise-based contract incentive when the supplier has the sense of
strong reciprocity. In doing so, the supplier’s intrinsic motivation to invest will be
raised.
Next, we investigate the impacts of different types of uncertainty about future
recovery outcomes (i.e. risk vs. ambiguity) on supplier reciprocity for both Direct
and Indirect incentives. When an ambiguity exists, the majority of people are
ambiguity averse (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985) such that the expected payoffs of
future recovery outcomes will be discounted in anticipating an ambiguous future.
Thus suppliers should exhibit lower levels of reciprocity in ambiguity than in risk
for both Direct and Indirect incentives. However, our study shows a contradictory
finding. In the absence of the beliefs about future recovery outcomes, under Direct
incentive with ambiguous uncertainty, the supplier becomes less ambiguity averse
and is willing to exhibit stronger reciprocity to build restoration capability. Here
Direct incentive implies a positive signal while the ambiguity implies the opposite
one. Our finding suggests that the relative size of the two contrary effects determines
the supplier’s extent of reciprocity. Specifically, the size of the effect of Direct
incentive is more salient than that of ambiguity on supplier reciprocity. The supplier
with reciprocal concern is more willing to merit the prosocial behaviour displayed by
the manufacturer when the future recovery outcomes are ambiguous. Hence, under
Direct incentive, a higher level of reciprocity is more likely to be reinforced with
ambiguous uncertainty. Conversely, Indirect incentive that signals a less prosocial
action makes the supplier less appreciative of the incentive offered for the ambiguous
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prospect, and therefore elicits more ambiguity averse decisions.
Finally, we take account of beliefs about the probabilities for future recovery
outcomes. Due to the fact that the pessimistic belief is not economically viable, we
mainly focus on discussing optimistic, most likely and neutral scenarios. Further,
we note that the results for most likely and neutral scenarios are very close (see
Fig.2.2-2.5), and thus we classify these two beliefs in the same category, namely less
optimistic scenario. The common view is that individuals with higher optimism are
less ambiguity averse (see, for example, Pulford (2009), Bier and Connell (1994)).
Interestingly, our results show that, under Direct incentive, suppliers with optimistic
beliefs become more ambiguity averse and exhibit the lowest reciprocity as compared
to those with lower optimism (i.e. most likely and neutral beliefs). In contrast, an
opposite case applies to Indirect incentive, which supports the common view. One
of the explanation might be as follows. When belief is shared, in the optimistic
scenario, the positive future recovery outcomes in general are more likely to take
place, in particular when a more prosocial action is taken. The kindness exhibited
from the offer of Direct incentive in the optimistic scenario is not as strong as that
in less optimistic ones.
2.5 Conclusions and Future Research
In summary, we use a stylized model to analyse the role of the incentives specified
beyond a contract mechanism as against within the relational contract to motivate
suppliers’ investment in disruption recovery. More specifically, we consider two types
of incentive offered by the manufacturer: unconditional (prepaid) and conditional
(promise-based) with risky and ambiguous prospects of future recovery outcomes
across various beliefs. We provide analytical results which show that the use of
Direct incentive leads to an outcome for the manufacturer that is at least as good
as that where Indirect incentive is applied. In particular, we derive a ratio of the
supplier’s investment amount to the manufacturer’s incentive value under the two
types of incentive, which demonstrates the existence of supplier reciprocity towards
unconditional generosity exhibited in the manufacturer’s Direct incentive. Further-
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more, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate how the supplier’s propensity
for reciprocity changes with the incentive value offered by the manufacturer. Our
analytical result indicates that the extent of supplier reciprocity in Direct incentive
is greater than Indirect incentive when the supplier’s propensity to reciprocate in
Direct incentive is not far less than that in Indirect incentive. Our findings imply
that free-riding and opportunistic behaviour associated with the supplier investment
in building recovery capability may be alleviated when we take explicit account of
supplier reciprocity into concern. The manufacturer should always offer Direct in-
centive as long as it is economically equivalent to the alternative, and should do so
particularly when an ambiguous prospect for recovery outcomes is anticipated with
less optimism.
In practice, managers from partner organisations need to jointly exert restoration
effort to enable firms to be more resilient and responsive to disruptions. From the
managerial perspective, this study provides insights into the conditions under which
the design of incentive mechanisms can motivate stronger reciprocal responses by
comparing relational incentives based on their types of commitments (unconditional
vs. conditional). Since people are emotionally driven by their social concerns when
making decisions in repeated exchanges, the manufacturing firms should incorpo-
rate supplier’s response with the concern for reciprocity into the design of incentive
mechanisms. We propose that, when the expected payoffs are equally valued to each
incentive, firms should consider a prepaid incentive before disruption which raises
the social value and promotes cooperative relationship for motivating the suppliers’
capability investment. By taking the proactive action, the supplier’s restoration
investment will be well motivated. In addition, evidence from the analytical results
of our model suggests that the use of Direct incentive mechanism is efficient partic-
ularly when an ambiguous probability of disruption recovery is anticipated with the
less optimistic shared belief about future recovery outcomes. From the supplier’s
perspective, the Direct incentive allows the supplier to alleviate financial constraints
and thereby free up its cash stuck in restoration capability investment. On the other
hand, the prepaid incentive before disruption serves as a signal of trust. Using this
incentive mechanism, suppliers are more likely to engage in a long-term relationship
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that embeds reciprocity. In brief, supply chain partners must be well prepared for
restoration capacity before a disruption has occurred. It requires both manufacturer
and supplier to work together to build restoration capability in a proactive manner.
The manufacturer should draw attention to the importance of a prepaid incentive
before the disruption in motivating its supplier’s investment that involves the norm
of reciprocity, in particular under an uncertain environment. The supplier should
positively exhibit reciprocal response to its manufacturer’s proactive action, which
can help to deal with financial stress. Importantly, an understanding of the sup-
plier’s reciprocal concern underlying a good cooperative relationship would be the
key to a successful and timely recovery from disruptions.
Nonetheless, our study has a number of limitations. First of all, in our parameter
settings, we assumed that market demand is deterministic, the future study could
conduct with a stochastic demand to examine how the uncertainty of order quantity
influences decisions for both the manufacturer and the supplier. In our numerical
analysis, for simplicity, we assumed that market price and order quantity, respec-
tively, does not change prior to and after disruptions. This assumption can be easily
relaxed in future study. Furthermore, our research focused on the linear wholesale
price contract. An alternative type of promise-based contract could be considered
in future research. Second, we considered the ratio of investment amount per unit
incentive offered as the proxy for reciprocity and treat the likelihood of investment
as given. A possible extension of this research would be to investigate to what ex-
tent this explicit assumption can be relaxed. Finally, this paper does not explicitly
model the manufacturer-supplier relationship. It is reasonable to conjecture that
both the length and depth of such a relationship would affect the level of reciprocity
exerted by the supplier. This can be best examined in a laboratory setting.
Chapter 3
Reciprocity in an
Incentive-Investment Game:
A Laboratory Study
3.1 Introduction
One of the most crucial aspects of managing disruption risk is to build up restora-
tion capability beforehand and accordingly enable firms to be more resilient and
responsive when a disruption occurs (Hu et al. 2013, Ambulkar et al. 2015). To
mitigate disruption risks, supply chain parties should jointly make considerable ef-
forts in restoration capability investment. In a exchange relationship, the repeated
interactions that driven by social concerns are important to motivate both parties
to concern about benefits to the other (Emerson 1976, Blau 1964). Thus, to induce
the supply chain party to engage in prosocial behaviour, incentive mechanisms that
involve social considerations are important to consider.
In Chapter 2, we have documented two streams of incentive mechanisms to ad-
dress supply chain disruption problems: (1) standard incentive contracts (Davis
and Leider 2015, Cachon 2003, Tomlin 2003); and (2) relational incentive contracts
(Taylor and Plambeck 2007a,b). Due to the fact that suppliers’ responses to dis-
ruptions may be not easy to specify in a traditional transaction-based contract, in-
stead a relation-based contract may be adopted more widely (Taylor and Plambeck
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2007a, Simatupang et al. 2002, Dyer and Singh 1998). In particular, a relation-based
contract may greatly enhance collaboration, mitigate opportunistic behaviour from
suppliers and also encourage their joint effort in hedging against disruption risks. A
study by Beer et al. (2017) highlights that a proactive mechanism beyond contract-
ing can be viewed as a stronger signal of trustworthiness that underlies reciprocity
as compared to a contractual mechanism.
In this study, we distinguish between incentive mechanisms based on conditional
and unconditional motivations. In line with incentive research in economics, the
two identified incentive mechanisms are defined in terms of two dimensions: form
of incentive and timing of incentive (Benhabib et al. 2010, Frederick et al. 2002,
Baker et al. 1988, Shafir et al. 1993). We categorise the types of incentive into:
(1) prepaid financial incentive (i.e. unconditional); (2) promised price incentive
(i.e.conditional). The timing of incentive is considered to be either before- or after
a disruption. We term the financial incentive prepaid before the disruption ‘Direct’
incentive and the promised price incentive that becomes effective only if disruption
occurs ‘Indirect’ incentive. The ‘Direct incentive’ is not just a financial commitment,
but also a mechanism that signals manufacturers’ prosocial behaviour. It can better
induce the supplier’s intrinsic motivation of reciprocity in investment decisions. The
‘Indirect incentive’ is closely related to notions of incentive as described in Hu et al.
(2013), which examines the buyer’s promised wholesale price and/or order quantity
contract incentives in motivating the supplier’s investments. In our research, we
view the type of incentive as a decision variable that may endogenously influence
suppliers’ reciprocal behaviour.
This study presents an experimental investigation of how different types of in-
centives affect decisions on incentive value that motivates reciprocal behaviour for
manufacturers and investment amount that signals reciprocity for suppliers. Reci-
procity as a social norm is most often induced by generous behaviours that can lead
to voluntary cooperation (Fehr et al. 1997). It is in general identified as fundamen-
tal to social relations, with the implication that people are willing to reward kind
actions (positive) and to punish unkind ones (negative).
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The existing literature on social psychology provides evidence that people who
engage in prosocial behaviour are more likely to shape a propensity to reciprocate
based upon the generous behaviour of others (Weber et al. 2004, Perugini et al.
2003). In this study, Direct incentive as a more generous offer may be more likely
to elicit a supplier’s propensity for reciprocity that embedded in his decision to
invest in restoration capability, as compared to Indirect incentive. In other words,
the supplier may be more willing to opt to invest if the manufacturer’s actions
regarding incentives are perceived as kind. Depending on the propensity to invest,
the supplier further makes a decision on investment amount which serves as the
extent of reciprocity. We measure the extent of reciprocity using the return rate of
investment amount to total amount available to invest which includes the incentive
value received, following Kanagaretnam et al. (2010).
In addition, we also identify the exogenous treatment variables that affect the
behaviour of both the manufacturer and supplier. To protect against supply chain
disruptions, a key mitigation strategy for supply chain members is through effec-
tive collaboration with their partners (Braunscheidel and Suresh 2009, Christopher
and Peck 2004). In view of this, long-term relationship building is crucial to en-
hance collaboration in a supply chain. With strong long-term buyer-supplier re-
lationships, transaction costs can be reduced and suppliers’ responsiveness can be
achieved (Nyaga et al. 2010, Shin et al. 2000, Carr and Pearson 1999). Furthermore,
the long-term relationship commitments can better encourage supply chain partners
to invest jointly in their supply chain performance improvement initiatives (Cooper
et al. 1997). Consequently, opportunism will be limited.
Although a large amount of evidence suggests that the long-term buyer-supplier
relationships have been devoted to supply chain cooperation and collaboration, little
has explored the behavioural motives underlying the buyer-supplier relationship in
a supply chain setting. Research on evolutionary biology provides a root that the
underlying rationale behind people’s concern for reciprocity is closely related to long-
term cooperative relationships (Riolo et al. 2001, Trivers 1971). In other words,
the stability of the relationship between supply chain partners is more likely to
motivate supplier reciprocal behaviour. A previous study by Dyer and Ouchi (1993)
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provide consistent evidence that long-term relationships can greatly contribute to the
reinforcement of reciprocity. As a result, such relationships that underly reciprocal
interactions may make supply partners feel free from obligatory regulations/duties
and thus mean they are willing to do more in managing supply chain disruption
risks. Therefore, another focus of this study is to experimentally investigate whether
and how different types of relationship, one-shot vs. repeated interactions, affect
supply chain partners’ decisions and reciprocal behaviour in restoration capability
investment under Direct and Indirect incentives.
Most research on supply chain management has emphasised the importance of
environmental uncertainty about future events that exist in disruption risks (Tse
et al. 2016, Wu and Pagell 2011, Ellis et al. 2010, Yu et al. 2009). They provide
evidence that environmental uncertainty characterised as unexpected changes to
businesses has a significant impact on supply chain disruption. Thus, in the pres-
ence of a disruption, the probabilities for future recovery outcomes that involve
uncertainty may be of importance in supply chain partners’ decisions on restoration
capability investment. Broadly speaking, the probabilities for future outcomes are
classified into two categories: (1) risk; and (2) ambiguity. The risk condition is
in general associated with events that have known probabilities in regard to future
outcomes (Milliken 1987, Ellsberg 1961). In contrast, the ambiguity condition refers
to events that have unknown probabilities of the future outcomes (Milliken 1987,
Duncan 1972, Ellsberg 1961).
The existing literature on supply chain disruption distinguishes between internal
and external factors influencing supply chain disruptions (Wu et al. 2006, Wagner
and Bode 2006, Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). The probabilities for disruption re-
covery outcomes may be more likely to be estimated when a disruption caused by
internal risks such as manufacturing risk, whereas ambiguous when it caused by
external environmental factors, for example, natural disaster (Wu et al. 2006). Re-
search on experimental economics provides evidence that people are more averse to
decisions under ambiguity (unknown probabilities), as compared to decisions under
risk (known probabilities) (Holt et al. 2002, Ellsberg 1961). That is, most people
prefer a decision with known probabilities in comparison with a similar one with
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unknown probabilities. In view of this, we argue that supply chain partners may
perceive risk and ambiguous conditions differently and accordingly have differences
in their behaviour when making decisions. As a result, we take account of different
types of probabilities about future recovery outcome as our second treatment vari-
able. The focus of this uncertainty treatment is to investigate the effects of different
types of uncertainties about future recovery outcomes on supply chain partners’
decisions and reciprocal behaviour under different types of incentives.
This experimental research develops an incentive-investment game, which allows
us to study key factors influencing the supplier’s investment decisions in building
up restoration capability towards incentives by manufacturers. We use a 2 x 2 ex-
perimental design (i.e. recovery uncertainties: risk vs. ambiguity; relationships:
repeated vs. one-shot). In our design, we primarily focus on suppliers’ investment
amount per unit incentive by manufacturers, which can serve as a signal in regard
to the extent of reciprocity towards two different types of incentives by manufactur-
ers. Our results indicate that suppliers’ propensity for and the extent of reciprocity
towards manufacturers’ incentive offered are significantly increased with repeated
interactions when Direct incentive is offered. In other words, the long-term rela-
tionships and Direct incentive can combine to reinforce the supplier’s reciprocal
behaviour. Regarding the uncertainty treatment, we show that Direct incentive in-
duces higher incentive values and accordingly higher propensity to reciprocate in
the risk condition than in the ambiguity condition. In order to understand whether
subjects’ decisions in later rounds are learned from their previous experience, we
include a dummy variable for learning effects by looking at relationships between
treatment dummies and the learning variables. We find that the learning effects on
supplier’s investment decisions are diminished in repeated games, which reveals that
the long-term relationships restrain individuals’ selfish motive of maximising their
own benefits.
Our research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First,
the majority of behavioural operations studies have highlighted the significance of
long-term relationships in enhancing trustworthiness (Beer et al. 2017, Corts and
Singh 2004, O¨zer et al. 2014). This study extends the previous research by exploring
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the effects of long-term relationships on supplier reciprocal behaviour. We provide
insights by demonstrating the importance of long-term relationships in motivating
suppliers’ propensity for and also extent of reciprocity, in particular, when an uncon-
ditional incentive is offered before a disruption occurs. In addition, previous studies
on behavioural economics suggest that learning behaviour that generated through
repeated interactions may be attributed to subjects’ social norms in laboratory ex-
periments (Ga¨chter and Falk 2002, Fehr and Schmidt 2001, Andreoni 1988). We
provide consistent evidence that subjects’ behaviour is driven by reciprocity norms
that are triggered in long-term interactions rather than learning free-riding.
Second, the existing literature on behavioural economics highlights the fact that
most people are ambiguity averse (Heal and Millner 2018, Camerer and Weber 1992,
Ellsberg 1961), and thus may be less responsive to environmental uncertainty. We
contribute to the existing body of knowledge finding that, manufacturers who select
Direct incentive are likely to offer higher incentive value, under the condition that
the probability for future recovery outcomes is known with certainty.
Finally, drawing upon the investment game (also known as trust game) by Berg
et al. (1995), we provide new insights into experimental design, which allows us to
investigate the factors influencing the manufacturer-supplier social interactions (i.e.
reciprocity) by integrating endogenous and exogenous views. In reality, decision-
making is a process of selection. To our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate
categorical decision variable as being selective into the experimental design, rather
than imposing a treatment on a group of subjects. This may help to facilitate further
research in the methodology.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the experi-
mental design and procedure. In Section 3, we describe our hypotheses development.
Our results are reported in Section 4, followed by a discussion in Section 5. In Sec-
tion 6, we conclude by summarising the key findings and stating the limitations of
the study.
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3.2 Literature Review
In recent years, there has been a growing number of research papers incorporating
human emotional factors into supply chain management. Most behavioural studies
in operations management involve the investigation of the role of social preferences
in the analysis of contract-based incentive mechanism in supply chain relationships.
Katok and Pavlov (2013) show, in a laboratory setting, that fairness preferences
have played an important role in supply chain contract performance. Loch and Wu
(2008) provide experimental evidence that social preferences such as reciprocity can
significantly affect exchange parties’ decisions as well as supply chain performance.
O¨zer et al. (2011) find that reciprocity motivates cooperative forecast information
sharing and accordingly affects suppliers’ capacity investment decisions. Haitao Cui
et al. (2007) place an emphasis on the importance of firms’ fairness concerns in
supply chain coordination under a wholesale price contract.
However, in certain business circumstances, it is likely that the problem of con-
tractual incompleteness may exist in particular when future events are unforeseen.
According to Fehr et al. (1997), the involvement of reciprocity can serve as an effec-
tive tool to deal with problems arising from incomplete contracts. In other words,
people’s prosocial behaviour may be more likely to rely on intrinsic motivation in
incomplete contracts. In view of this, an unconditional incentive mechanism that
makes individuals feel out of control may be superior to the contract-based incentive
induce more voluntary cooperation when contracts are incomplete (Ga¨chter et al.
2004). In general, people’s willingness to cooperate through this is dependent on
others’ behaviour in cooperation. To better motivate such voluntary cooperation,
supply chain partners’ concerns for reciprocity must be considered. In our study,
suppliers who have reciprocal concerns are likely to invest more in restoration capa-
bility towards manufacturers’ incentive offered.
Cooperative relationships between buyers and suppliers are most often observed
in supply chains (Nyaga et al. 2010). According to Williamson (1985), the embed-
dedness of relationships can motivate both the buyer and the supplier to jointly
engage in investments in relation-specific assets, resources and capabilities so as to
generate synergy benefits. Relation-specific assets refer to assets that are specialised
3.2. Literature Review 53
or unique in developing competitive advantage between both exchange parties. With
the involvement of relational concern, both parties are willing to jointly build re-
sources and capabilities (Dyer and Singh 1998). Existing controlled laboratory ex-
periments provide evidence that the role of long-term buyer-supplier relationship
is significant in supply chain performance. For example, Loch and Wu (2008) run
an experiment that asks subjects to play with paired partners repeatedly for 15
rounds. In the relationship group, the two players are asked to communicate by
giving a short introduction before the game starts. In the control group, players
are not allowed to communicate with each other. They find that relationship-based
reciprocity motivates cooperation between the two exchange parties. Similarly, Wu
(2013) extends Loch and Wu (2008)’s study by examining the impact of long-term
relationships on various supply chain contracts. Subjects are asked to repeatedly
play with their paired partners for 100 rounds. She shows that repeated inter-
actions play an important role in reinforcing reciprocity and accordingly improve
supply chain performance.
According to Ga¨chter and Falk (2002), a gift-exchange game is designed to in-
vestigate how different types of relationship (i.e. one-shot vs. repeated) influence
reciprocal behaviour in the context of wage-effort relation. Subjects are assigned to
their treatment conditions as ‘one-shot’ and ‘repeated game’. In each treatment, the
role of subjects is assigned as ‘firms’ and ‘workers’. Firms offer workers a wage deter-
mined at w, and then workers decide whether to accept the offer or not. The workers
next have to choose an effort level e if they accept the offer and otherwise the game
will be ended. They find evidence that long-term relationship significantly induces
a higher level of reciprocity as compared to one-shot interaction. To our knowl-
edge, the effects of supply chain relationships on how incentives by manufacturers
influence supplier reciprocity have not been explored in supply chain settings. This
study provides a comparison of the effects of incentive types on reciprocal behaviour
between repeated and one-shot interactions. In addition, Ga¨chter and Falk (2002)
test whether learning behaviour in reciprocity distinguishes from spontaneous reci-
procity. They observe that rational subjects who are self-interested are more likely
to show imitation behaviour in reciprocity over repeated interactions. Over the long
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run, workers learn to behave reciprocally towards firms’ generous wage. In view of
this, long-term relationships between exchange parties can be seen to contribute to
reduced opportunistic behaviour (Corts and Singh 2004).
The existing literature on decisions about future event distinguishes between
attitudes toward risk and attitudes toward uncertainty (Camerer and Weber 1992,
Knight Frank 1921). Attitudes toward risk involve known probabilities of future out-
comes whereas attitudes toward uncertainty involve unknown or ambiguous proba-
bilities of future outcomes (Milliken 1987, Ellsberg 1961). A classical experiment by
Ellsberg (1961) examines individuals’ preference between uncertain and risk condi-
tions. In Ellsberg (1961)’s experiment, there are two urns, one contains 100 red and
black balls with unknown or ambiguous probability of each colour whereas the other
contains 100 red and black balls that are evenly split with known probability. When
subjects were asked to bet on a red (or black) ball drawing from each of urn, they
have indifference in preference between red and black. That is, p(red) = p(black)
where p(red) and p(red) interpret the probabilities that a red ball and black ball
is drawn from an urn respectively. However, when they were asked to bet on a red
(or black) ball drawing from the two urns, most of them preferred to choose from
the urn with known probability over that with unknown probability. That is to
say, p(unknownred) ≺ p(knownred) which demonstrates the existence of ambiguity
averse preferences. A similar result holds for black ball selection.
Following Ellsberg (1961)’s predictions, a significant numbers of studies includ-
ing Curley and Yates (1985), Yates and Zukowski (1976), Slovic and Tversky (1974),
Becker and Brownson (1964) provide further support for these findings. In the face
of supply chain disruptions, predictions of uncertain future recovery outcomes are
often difficult. As people in general have a preference for an event with known
probability over that with unknown probability, vague information that makes the
probabilities of disruption recovery ambiguous may motivate exchange parties to be-
have opportunistically (Williamson 1979) and accordingly decrease their willingness
to make effort in restoration capability. Thus we argue that both manufacturers
and suppliers’ decisions on restoration capability may be less other-oriented and
generous under the ambiguous condition as compared to the risky condition. To the
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best of our knowledge, supply chain parties’ attitudes or behaviours about uncertain
events have not been well studied in laboratory experiments. In this study, we aim
to investigate how different types of uncertainty influence manufacturers’ decisions
on incentivising suppliers’ restoration investment as well as suppliers’ decisions or
behaviours in response to manufacturers’ actions.
The study of reciprocity in experimental economics primarily originates from
the ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al. 1982). In the ultimatum game, the first mover
proposes an offer and then the second mover decides to accept or reject. If the second
mover accepts, both of movers are allocated with an amount as proposed. Otherwise,
they receive nothing. The result shows that the majority of first movers offer 40%
to 50% of the total money, which implies an inconsistency with the rational self-
interest assumption. Following the ultimatum game, Berg et al. (1995) developed
the investment game (i.e.trust game) that allows the second mover to send back a
certain amount to the first mover.
Drawing upon the investment game by Berg et al. (1995), this study places an
emphasis on suppliers’ reciprocal behaviour towards incentives by manufacturers in
regard to investment in restoration capability. In Berg et al’s (1995) investment
game, two players are anonymously paired. Player A plays the role of a proposer
and Player B plays the role of a responder. Player A is given an amount of X and
then decides an amount Y, between 0 and X, that A sends to Player B. After that,
the amount sent is tripled by the experimenter such that Player B who receives an
amount of 3Y has to decide the amount to return to Player A between 0 and 3Y.
They find a positive reciprocity, in which the amount offered by Player A is positively
correlated with the amount sent back by Player B. In an exchange relationship, the
existence of reciprocity is in general interpreted by an exchange party’s decision
depending on the other party’s action. A fraction of the total return f implicitly
interprets the extent to which Player B reciprocates towards Player A’s action. If
the amount returned by Player B is higher than the amount sent by Player A, the
Player B is viewed as being reciprocal towards the Player A’s action. Take the
example that Player A offers an amount of £10, the total return that Player B re-
ceives will be £30. The amount Player B returned to Player A and its remaining
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amount under different types of fraction of the total return are shown as in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: The amount returned to Player A and the net returns to Player B
f 0 1/3 1/2 2/3
Amount returned 0 10 15 20
Net return 30 20 15 10
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We conduct a laboratory experiment which observes reciprocity in an incentive-
investment setting, with a design motivated by the trust/investment game proposed
by Berg et al. (1995). We consider a two-stage game in a two-tier supply chain
involving a manufacturer (M) and a Supplier (S). The following sections describe
our experimental design and procedure in details.
3.3.1 Game Design
In our game, all players were given a background scenario, in which a manu-
facturer offers an incentive to motivate its supplier to invest in recovery capacity
aimed at mitigating disruption risks. There are three possible outcomes of recovery:
(1) full recovery; (2) partial recovery; (3) no recovery, which can lead to a highest,
medium and lowest payoff respectively. Due to the unpredictable nature of disrup-
tions, the probability of each recovery outcome can be either risky (i.e.known) or
ambiguous (i.e.unknown). Both players have the shared information and are ini-
tially endowed with the same amount E such that the difference in wealth status
regarding the prospect of disruption recovery between them can be minimized and
negative payoffs can be ruled out (Kraft et al. 2018).
The experiment includes four treatments. First, in the one-shot interaction treat-
ment, the subjects were anonymous and randomly re-matched each round. They
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were not allowed to communicate with each other and told that they would be
paired with a different player in every round. According to Bolton et al. (2005),
Loch and Wu (2008), the one-shot setting excludes possible social considerations
from repeated interactions and thereby prevents relationship-building. Second, the
relationship between both players can be reinforced through the repeated inter-
actions. In our repeated interactions treatment, both players are in a long-term
relationship. However, the paired subjects in fact did not know each other before,
we therefore make them initialize a relationship by allowing them to chat with each
other for 3 minutes. The subjects repeatedly played with the same partner over
the entire 25 rounds. Before the experiment started, participants were given a card
and were informed that they needed to find the person who has the same number
on the card. We allowed them to chat with each other for about 3 minutes. The
communication process here may help us to form a social relation that eventually
contributes to the initialization of reciprocity. After the informal conversation at
the outset, both players made their decisions individually without any further com-
munication during the game. Third, in the Ambiguity treatment, the subjects were
given a hypothetical scenario, showing that the probabilities of disruption recovery
outcomes are unknown when a disruption occurs. Based upon the hypothetical sce-
nario, the subjects were making investment decisions accordingly. In contrast, in the
Risk treatment, the subjects were given a scenario, showing that the probabilities of
disruption recovery outcomes are known, which are estimated to be 50% or greater.
This experiment considers two incentives j ∈ {1, 2} that motivate suppliers’ in-
vestment in restoration capability. Incentive j = 1 denotes Direct incentive while
j = 2 denotes Indirect incentive. In each round, the manufacturer chooses to of-
fer the supplier an incentive, either Direct (monetary-based paid upfront prior to
disruption) or Indirect (contract-based offered post-disruption), and determines an
incentive value I between 0 and E in the first stage. Then in the second stage the
supplier decides whether he would like to make an investment on capability restora-
tion to help firms recovering from a disruption, and, if so, the investment amount
F towards the incentive offered by the manufacturer. In Berg et al’s investment
game, the amount transferred by the second mover was increased by a multiplier.
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In our design, we assign a loading scaler on manufacturers incentive value offered
to determine the maximum investment amount F under different treatment condi-
tions. According to the Definition of reciprocity in Chapter 1, the loading scaler
η
i,j
> 0 that is determined by both incentive type and uncertainty type about future
recovery outcomes varies across all treatments. With each type of incentive, we set
up the loading scaler as a benchmark to value the extent of reciprocity under risky
uncertainty condition for η
R,j
and ambiguous uncertainty condition for η
A,j
.
According to Molm et al. (2007), people will have different perceptions on the ex-
tent of reciprocity depending on various scenarios. To simply capture the combined
effect of incentive type and uncertainty type on reciprocity, we first let Risk-Indirect
condition serve as a baseline representing that the supplier is not motivated to dis-
play reciprocity when the manufacturer offers Indirect incentive under known future
recovery prospects. As compared to Indirect incentive, Direct incentive represents
a more prosocial action that can reinforce reciprocity. In this view, there should
be more reciprocity when Direct incentive is offered whereas less reciprocity when
Indirect incentive is offered. In addition, due to the reason that most people prefer
a known probability of future outcomes over an unknown one, there should be a
lower degree of reciprocity under ambiguous uncertainty than under risky uncer-
tainty when Indirect incentive is offered. Based upon the baseline, we assume that
the value of Direct incentive under the risky uncertainty condition (i.e.Risk-Direct)
will be amplified by η
R,1
(i.e. η
R,1
> η
R,2
) and the value of Indirect incentive under
the ambiguous uncertainty condition (i.e.Ambiguity-Indirect) will be reduced by η
A,2
(i.e. η
A,2
< η
R,2
< η
R,1
).
Taking Direct incentive and ambiguous uncertainty together, the combined re-
ciprocal effect cannot be simply captured by the sum of scalers η
R,1
and η
A,2
, which
are in relation to these two aspects. We therefore take into account their synergy
effects since a more prosocial action taken under ambiguous uncertainty would cre-
ate more value and thus induce more additional reciprocity than the sum of their
individual values (Cao and Zhang 2011, Tanriverdi 2006). Their synergy effects
are measured by using the product of η
A,2
× η
R,1
. Accordingly, we have the over-
all reciprocity loading scaler η
A,1
on the Direct incentive and ambiguity synergy as
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η
A,2
+ η
R,1
+ η
A,2
× η
R,1
.
The total amount available for the supplier to invest is based on both the initial
endowment and the multiplied incentive value. On making an investment deci-
sion, the supplier chooses an investment amount F ranging from 1 to E + η
i,j
I.
To study the supplier’s reciprocal behaviour in decision making, the ratio of F to
E + η
i,j
I is derived as a proxy of supplier reciprocity towards incentive offered by
the manufacturer. If both players are aiming at maximising their own payoff, the
manufacturer should offer nothing to the supplier and the supplier should invest
nothing in restoration capability. When the manufacturer offers an incentive that
signals kind attitude, the manufacturer earns a payoff of pim = E − I + F if the
supplier decides to invest, or pim = E − I if the supplier does not invest. On the
other hand, if the supplier chooses to invest, he earns a payoff of pis = E+ ηR,jI−F
for risky uncertainty and pis = E + ηA,jI − F for ambiguous uncertainty. Otherwise
pis = E if he does not invest. Figure 3.1 illustrates the game sequence under different
types of uncertainty regardless of relationship type.
3.3.2 Experimental Procedure
All participants in the laboratory were not allowed to start the game before
finished reading a one-page instruction, which gives them a brief understanding of
our hypothetical scenario in a supply chain background. In our scenario, the man-
ufacturer acts first to offer a type of incentive to motivate its supplier to invest
in restoration capability. The supplier, as the second mover, responds by deciding
whether or not to invest and if so the amount to invest. To verify they had un-
derstood the instruction, they were further asked to answer five related questions.
Participants who failed to pass the manipulation check were excluded from the study.
At the beginning of the experiment, each player was endowed with 100 points,
anonymously paired and assigned to either the role of manufacturer or supplier.
In each round, the manufacturer player was asked to choose between Direct and
Indirect incentive. Following the incentive type decision, the manufacturer player
chose an incentive amount I from his/her endowment to the paired supplier. The
manufacturer then kept 100 − I. Any incentive amount offered was multiplied by
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(a) Game sequence under risky uncertainty
(b) Game sequence under ambiguous uncertainty
Figure 3.1: Game sequence under different uncertainties
the experimenter such that, for example, η
i,j
I was passed onto the supplier. In
other words, the supplier would have the amount of the endowment 100 and the
amplified incentive value η
i,j
I in total. Controlling for the types of relationships,
we manipulate the value of reciprocity loading scaler. According to the results of
numerical analysis in Chapter 1, η
R,1
and η
R,2
are valued at 3.25 and 1.40 respectively
while η
A,1
and η
A,2
are valued at 4.75 and 1.15 respectively. Next, the supplier
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decided whether to invest in restoration capability followed by the manufacturer’s
decision. If the supplier chose to invest, he/she could decide to invest partial, all or
none of the points received (0 ≤ F ≤ 100+η
i,j
I). Otherwise, the supplier would only
earn 100 points for this round, as would the manufacturer in the Indirect incentive
decision. Notably, the manufacturer that opted for the Direct incentive would earn
100 − I in this case because the prepaid incentive becomes the sunk cost if the
supplier did not invest.
We programmed the computer interface using the oTree system and uploaded
the program in the Heroku server, which can be accessed via the internet. The
experiment was conducted in June 2017. We recruited 122 students, who have stud-
ied different subjects, from the online recruitment system of Newcastle University.
Specifically, students who study psychology or economics were excluded. The ma-
jority of participants were undergraduates, and also MBA, postgraduate and PhD
students were included. These participants were randomly assigned into each treat-
ment. Each treatment had one session, which included 26 to 36 participants. In all
treatments, half the subjects played the role of manufacturers and half the role of
suppliers. The experiment consisted of 28 rounds, starting with 3 practice rounds,
followed by 25 real experimental rounds which their earnings were actually based
upon. In behavioural games, it is in common to have practice rounds to minimise
the potential bias in experimental results, which helps the participants develop fa-
miliarity with the experimental mechanism. The practice round data is excluded in
our data analysis. The participants were monetarily incentivised, and their earnings
included a £5 show-up fee and an additional compensation proportional to their
total points earned in the experiment. Subjects earned on average £9.40, and each
session lasted about 90 minutes.
3.4 Research Hypotheses
The focus of our experiment is to investigate whether and how supplier’s reci-
procity in building restoration capability is affected by the following three key as-
pects: (i) incentive offered by the manufacturer; (ii) type of relationship; (iii) uncer-
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tainty about future recovery outcomes. In all treatments, the responses of suppliers
and the incentive value offered by manufacturers should be positively dependent.
If subjects’ behaviour is motivated by concerns for reciprocity, the predictions for
their extent of reciprocity may differ in the four treatments. We next discuss our
first hypothesis about the supplier’s investment decision and reciprocity towards an
incentive value offered by the manufacturer under different types of incentive.
In some circumstances, it’s not possible to specify every single aspect of busi-
ness in a contract between manufacturers and suppliers, for instance, the suppliers’
responses to unforeseen disruptions (Beer et al. 2017). Traditional theories of eco-
nomic behaviour assume that people are self-interested and make rational choices
aimed at maximizing their own benefits. In view of this, selfish suppliers may behave
opportunistically and free ride on incentives offered by manufacturers such that they
will not choose to invest in restoration capability regardless of what the type and
value of incentive offered. However, recent studies in principal-agent relations sug-
gest that an agent’s decision can be intrinsically motivated by pro-social behaviour
when a principal makes an unconditional incentive offer (Falk and Kosfeld 2006,
Kreps 1997, Frey 1997c). A trust game experiment by McCabe et al. (2003) shows
that agents are more willing to exhibit kind actions towards principals’ uncondi-
tional decisions, as compared to conditional decisions. A study by Beer et al. (2017)
demonstrates that suppliers’ investment decisions can be intrinsically motivated by
a generous offer that induces higher propensity to act kindly. Further, Coricelli
et al. (2006) show that higher amounts offered can induce higher levels of invest-
ment. In this study, Direct incentive is more correlated with intrinsic motivation
and thus we expect that Direct incentive that signals a more generous incentive
offered by the manufacturer can motivate the supplier to reciprocate by investing,
and, if so, investing more in restoration capability. Our study identifies reciprocal
behaviour in two aspects. First, we look at the suppliers’ propensity to reciprocate
via their investment decisions towards the incentive offered by manufacturers in the
incentive-investment game. Second, we measure their extent of reciprocity based
on the return rate of investment amount relative to the amount available to invest.
Therefore, we predict the following:
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Hypothesis 1. (a) In each type of relationship and of uncertainty about future
recovery outcome, incentive value offered by manufacturers is higher in the Direct
incentive condition than in the Indirect incentive condition.
(b) In each type of relationship and uncertainty about future recovery outcome,
Direct Incentive increases suppliers’ propensity to invest and investment amount in
restoration capability as compared to Indirect Incentive.
(c) The extent of reciprocity will increase in the Direct incentive condition as
compared to the Indirect incentive condition; i.e., on average, Direct incentive in-
creases the return rate of investment amount relative to the amount available to
invest.
In general, most decisions regarding the future are made in an uncertain or
ambiguous environment. In other words, the probabilities for future outcomes in
uncertain environments are most often quite ambiguous (unknown) (Milliken 1987,
Duncan 1972). Previous studies on experimental economics suggest that the ma-
jority of subjects are ambiguity averse such that are more willing to select a choice
with known-risk probabilities than with unknown-ambiguous probabilities (Pulford
2009, Einhorn and Hogarth 1985, Ellsberg 1961). From the cognitive perspective,
decision makers with known information may behave differently from those with
ambiguous information (Curley et al. 1986), which implies that different extents of
reciprocity may be exhibited. An empirical study by Eriksson and Sharma (2003)
provides evidence that people are more willing to cooperate in a less uncertain en-
vironment. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on how these two
types of probabilities for future outcomes affect the extent of reciprocity in a labo-
ratory setting is limited. In our design, we hypothesize that suppliers who know the
likelihood of future recovery outcomes will be more ambiguity averse with greater
reciprocity than those with ambiguous likelihood. Thus, we develop the following
hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 2. (a) In each type of relationship, incentive value offered by man-
ufacturers is higher in the risk condition than in the ambiguity condition.
(b) In each type of relationship, incentives by manufacturers will induce suppli-
ers’ higher levels of investment (i.e. propensity to invest and investment amount)
in the risk condition than in the ambiguity condition.
(c) The extent of reciprocity will increase in the risk condition as compared to
the ambiguity condition; i.e., on average, risky uncertainty increases the return rate
of investment amount relative to the amount available to invest.
Our third set of hypotheses examines how the type of relationship affects sup-
pliers’ decision behaviour and reciprocity in building restoration capability. The
type of relationship that firms perceive they have with their partners may have an
influence on how they behave in that relationship. In this study, we mainly focus
on two types of relationships: repeated (i.e.long-term relationship) and one-shot
(i.e. no long-term relationship). Broadly, in reality, most supply chain transactions
between supply partners are taken place on an ongoing basis. Evidence from previ-
ous research shows that manufacturing firms tend to move away from transactional
mechanisms with many suppliers, towards long-term relational mechanisms with a
selected few suppliers (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995, Dyer and Ouchi 1993). The
long-term relationship commitments can encourage supply chain partners to jointly
invest in supply chain performance improvement initiatives (Cooper et al. 1997).
However, in a one-shot game, players interact only once, and do not know much
about each other. In this case, cooperative behaviour will be unable to be observed.
Different from one-shot interactions that exclude social considerations, repeated in-
teractions that contribute to long-term relationship development can reinforce trust
and reciprocity and thereby improve overall supply chain performance (Wu 2013,
Loch and Wu 2008).
In a long-term relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier, the manu-
facturer may be motivated to engage in prosocial behaviour with the expectation
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of a return from the supplier (Gouldner 1960). Correspondingly, the supplier who
perceives the manufacturer’s incentive as generous is likely to appreciate the manu-
facturer’s prosocial behaviour and thus respond reciprocally to the incentive offered.
Drawing upon the motivation crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001), we conjecture
that repeated interactions that serve as a signal of reciprocity may motivate the sup-
plier to invest more towards a generous incentive by the manufacturers as compared
to one-shot interactions. Specifically, we focus on the role of repeated interactions
in reciprocity under the Direct incentive which serves as a more generous incentive
offered by the manufacturer. We summarize these hypotheses in the following.
Hypothesis 3. (a) In each type of incentive, the value of incentive will be
higher in a repeated game than in a one-shot game regardless of the type of uncer-
tainty about the future recovery outcomes.
(b) In each type of uncertainty about the future recovery outcomes, incentive of-
fered by manufacturers will induce suppliers’ higher levels of investment (i.e. propen-
sity to invest and investment amount) in a repeated game than in a one-shot game.
(c) In a repeated game, Direct incentive will induce higher extent of reciprocity
than in a one-shot game; i.e., on average, repeated interaction increases the return
rate of investment amount relative to the amount available to invest if Direct incen-
tive is chosen.
During the interactions between both players, learning behaviour may cause
them to change their strategies or actions over the course of the game. As a result,
we also focus on examining the potential impact exerted by learning in decision-
making processes. Previous research on BOM provides explanations for learning
effects over repeated interactions in the context of newsvendor problem, in which
decision makers make order decisions have a tendency between the optimal quan-
tity and the mean demand (Bostian et al. 2008, Bolton and Katok 2008, Benzion
et al. 2008). Their studies demonstrate that human players’ decisions are affected
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by both the mean outcome and the last-period result so that they obtain experi-
ence to learn over time. In contrast, an experimental study by Ga¨chter and Falk
(2002) place an emphasis on the importance of learning effect in social norms such
as reciprocity, rather than in expected-profit-maximisation, when subjects are inter-
acting repeatedly. They provide evidence that participants tend to learn from their
partners’ reciprocal preference in repeated interactions. Based on this research, we
conjecture that the long-term relationship may have a diminish impact on subjects’
learning behaviour over time, which allows them to learn more from reciprocity. In
our design, subjects will be given the results of their own and partners’ previous
and current period decisions in the end of each round. As a result, we develop the
following hypothesis regarding subjects’ learning effects.
Hypothesis 4. Repeated interactions will diminish suppliers’ learning behaviour
as compared to one-shot interactions.
3.5 Experiment Results
Our 2x2 experimental design provides outcomes about supply chain partners’
decisions and reciprocity in four different treatments. We label the repeated game
‘RG treatment’, one-shot game ‘OG treatment’, risky uncertainty ‘RU treatment’,
and ambiguous uncertainty ‘AU treatment’. In our data analysis, we have 122 inde-
pendent observations which are aggregated by each individual’s 25-round decisions
over all treatments. Since reciprocal behaviour is induced from paired interactions,
the average ratio of one pair of participants is one observation for the measures of
reciprocity across all treatments. That is, we analyse the incentive value I offered
by the manufacturer and the supplier’s investment amount F at the echelon level
but the return rate of F to η
i,j
I + E in pairs. To verify our hypotheses, we use a
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, which is a nonparametric test, to com-
pare differences across all treatments.
3.5. Experiment Results 67
Table 3.2: Treatment Comparison
Treatment Incentive
Type
Selected
(%)
Incentive
Value (I )
Invest (%) Investment
Amount
(F )
1. RU-RG Direct 59.33 59.60 92.13 116.67
Indirect 40.67 50.51 78.14 52.70
Difference∗ 0.08 0.01
2. AU-RG Direct 59.69 45.72 84.02 148.52
Indirect 40.31 50.80 85.50 53.50
Difference∗ 0.23 0.01
3. RU-OG Direct 63.00 56.12 80.95 98.85
Indirect 37.00 43.13 81.08 47.63
Difference∗ < 0.01 0.01
4. AU-OG Direct 63.43 40.88 67.12 81.98
Indirect 36.57 41.58 72.66 49.55
Difference∗ 0.33 0.02
Note. Difference∗ means the p -value of a rank-sum (nonparametric) test of the
difference in incentive value, investment amount under each type of treatment.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;***p < 0.01;
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of both manufacturers and suppliers’
decisions, the average incentive value offered, and the average investment amount
under each treatment. We find the following initial observations. First, the incen-
tive decisions made by manufacturer players are identical across all treatments, in
which a greater number of participants choose to offer Direct incentive over Indirect
incentive. These results are similar to the suppliers’ investment decisions. We note
that supplier subjects’ average investment amount under Direct incentive is almost
double the amount invested under Indirect incentive across all four treatments (all
are significant with p < 0.05). This suggests that Direct incentive offered by manu-
facturers that signals a kindness can motivate suppliers to invest more in restoration
capability. Further, we observe that the differences in the average incentive value
between Direct and Indirect incentives are significantly higher in the RU treatment
than in the AU treatment (p < 0.1), regardless of the type of relationship. That
is, fewer manufacturers are willing to offer more generous incentive when the uncer-
tainty about future recovery outcomes is ambiguous, even though they have already
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selected Direct incentive. In the following sections, the hypotheses developed in
Section 3 are formally tested. We present below our findings under different types
of incentive, followed by different types of relationship and uncertainty about future
recovery outcomes.
3.5.1 Decisions and Reciprocity under Different Types of
Incentive
We first investigate whether and how manufacturers’ incentive types influence
incentive-investment decisions which can serve as a proxy of suppliers’ reciprocity
in the absence of imposed exogenous treatment variables. We start by analysing
the frequency of choosing Direct incentive which signals a prosocial attitude over 25
rounds. Our result shows that 61% of manufacturer subjects choose to offer Direct
incentive, which is 22% higher than Indirect incentive. Further, a comparison of
the frequency of choosing Direct incentive between the first 12 and the last 13
rounds confirms this result showing that 56.83 % and 65.45 % of subjects choose
to offer Direct incentive in the first 12 and last 13 rounds, respectively. Next, we
examine whether incentive values offered by manufacturers differ between the two
types of incentive. A one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms that choosing
Direct incentive increases the incentive value in comparison with Indirect incentive
(p = 0.058). This provides support for Hypothesis 1(a). We further verify this result
by regressing incentive type on incentive value, which shows that Direct incentive
offered by manufacturers has a significant positive effect on the incentive value (p <
0.05). This result provides a further support for Hypothesis 1(a). The detailed
regression results are presented in below Section 3.5.5.
To test suppliers’ responses to the choice of incentive, we initially analyse their
propensity to reciprocity by computing the probability of choosing investment. A
Chi-square test shows that there is no significant difference in the propensity to
reciprocate between Direct and Indirect incentives. Then we compare suppliers’ in-
vestment amount under Direct incentive with that under Indirect incentive. Using
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we observe that, at an individual level, the difference
in the average investment amount between the two types of incentive is statistically
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significant (p = 0.001). This result indicates that the investment amount on av-
erage under Direct incentive condition is higher than that under Indirect incentive
condition. To control for the choice of incentive type, we regress incentive type
and incentive value offered on investment amount. We confirm that there is also
a positive relationship between Direct incentive and suppliers’ investment amount
(p = 0.000). Therefore we find a partial support for hypothesis H1(b), in which the
offer of Direct incentive will induce the supplier to invest more.
Further, we examine whether and how suppliers’ extent of reciprocity differ be-
tween Direct and Indirect incentives. The results are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Comparison of means between different types of incentives
Incentive type Incentive
Value (I )
Investment
Amount (F )
Return Rate
(F /E+λI)
Direct 50.42 110.76 0.33
Indirect 46.40 51.14 0.30
Direct - Indirect 4.03 59.61 0.03
Difference∗ 0.056 0.00 0.21
Note. Difference∗ means the p -value of a rank-sum (nonparametric) test of the
difference in incentive value, investment amount, return rate between Direct and Indirect
incentive under each type of treatment.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;***p < 0.01;
Recall that we identify a reciprocity multiplier for each treatment, which is de-
fined as a fully reciprocal benchmark, to magnify the total amount available to
invest. To verify the impact of incentive types on the extent of reciprocity, we per-
form analyses of the return rate of investment amount to total amount available
under Direct and Indirect incentives. We find that there is no statistically signif-
icant difference in reciprocating behaviour between Direct and Indirect incentives,
thus Hypothesis 1(c) is not supported. However, we find a support from the result
of regressing incentive type on the return rate, in which Direct incentive is positively
correlated with the return rate.
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3.5.2 Decisions and Reciprocity under Different Types of
Uncertainty
We next examine the effect of uncertainty about future recovery outcome on
decisions of both players and suppliers’ reciprocity under the two types of incentive.
We begin by comparing the incentive value between RU and AU treatments under
Direct and Indirect incentives. A one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms that,
if Direct incentive is offered, the difference in incentive value compared to Indirect
incentive is found to be significant (p < 0.01) where the average incentive value under
the RU treatment is greater than that under the AU treatment. Thus Hypothesis
2(a) is supported. A regression of uncertainty type on incentive value shows that the
risky uncertainty has a positive impact on incentive value offered by manufacturers
(p < 0.01). This finding provides further support for Hypothesis 2(a).
In addition, we investigate how suppliers’ investment decisions differ between the
RU and AU treatments. The results indicate that 46.75% of supplier subjects select
to invest in the RU treatment as compared to that of 33.9% in the AU treatment.
A Chi-square test confirms that there are significant differences in the probability
of the decision to invest between RU and AU treatments (p = 0.000). Suppliers are
less likely to invest in restoration capability when the probability of future recover
outcome is unknown. Furthermore, we use Logistic regressions to verify the effect
of types of uncertainty on suppliers’ decision to invest. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if suppliers invest and equal to 0 otherwise. We observe
that the probability that suppliers invest is negatively dependent on the ambiguous
uncertainty. These results suggest that suppliers are more ambiguity averse, so that
the propensity to reciprocate is less salient in the condition that the probability
of recovery is unknown. Here we do find support for Hypothesis 2(b). We then
examine whether the average investment amount differs between the RU and AU
treatments under Direct and Indirect incentives. We find no significant differences if
either Direct or Indirect incentive is offered, using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Thus
these findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 2(b). Further, we investigate
suppliers’ extent of reciprocity at each incentive type across the uncertainty treat-
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ments. We also note that their extent of reciprocity does not differ between risk and
ambiguity treatments. Therefore, Hypothesis 2(c) in which the uncertainty about
future recovery outcome will have no effect on suppliers’ extent of reciprocity, is not
supported.
3.5.3 Decisions and Reciprocity under Different Types of
Relationship
In this section, a comparison of investment amount, incentive value and the ex-
tent of reciprocity between one-shot and repeated interaction games under the two
types of incentive is been made. Figure 3.2 shows the average incentive values and
investment amounts in the OG and RG treatments for each round. Several key obser-
vations are highlighted. First, the obvious result is that the incentive values offered
by manufacturers correspond to higher investment amounts within the RG and OG
treatments respectively. Second, the incentive values on average increase steadily in
the RG treatment from round 16 onwards. In addition, the investment amounts on
average are basically greater in the RG treatment than in the OG treatment. Last,
we find that suppliers’ investment amounts are significantly higher under Direct in-
centive than under Indirect incentive. These results indicate that, if Direct incentive
is offered, long-term relationships greatly motivate suppliers’ investment behaviour
such that they are more willing to invest more towards manufacturers’ prosocial
action. Further, we note similar results hold for suppliers’ extent of reciprocity (see
Figure 3.3).
At the individual level, we start by analysing the differences in incentive value of-
fered by manufacturers between the one-shot and repeated games, using a one-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We observe that, if Direct incentive is offered, the average
incentive value is not significantly different between the OG and RG treatments
(p = 0.180). But a significant difference is found across the relationship treatments
for the choice of Indirect incentive (p < 0.1). This result indicates that, if Indirect
incentive is selected, only repeated interactions induce higher incentive value offered
by manufacturer subjects. Hence, the results provide partial support for Hypothesis
3(a).
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(a) Direct incentive
(b) Indirect incentive
Figure 3.2: Incentive value and investment amount under different types of incentive
in relationship treatment
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(a) Direct incentive
(b) Indirect incentive
Figure 3.3: Rate of return under different types of incentive in relationship treatment
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Furthermore, we compare the suppliers’ responses to the incentive value offered
by manufacturers under Direct and Indirect incentives across the relationship treat-
ments. We find similar results hold for the suppliers’ propensity to reciprocate as
in the uncertainty treatments. Using a Chi-square test, we observe that the proba-
bility that suppliers invest is significantly higher in the repeated game than in the
one-shot game (p = 0.000). We also find evidence to support the positive corre-
lation between the propensity to invest and repeated interactions using a Logistic
regression. To control for interaction effects, we include an interaction term to assess
whether there is an interaction effect of relationship and incentive type on suppliers’
propensity to reciprocate. We repeat the same regression and find strong evidence
that Direct incentive that moderates the type of relationship makes suppliers more
likely to invest in a long-term relationship (p < 0.05). We further test Hypothesis
3(b) to examine the effect of investment amount in the OG and RG treatments
under Direct and Indirect incentives respectively. We find no significant difference
between the two treatments if either Direct or Indirect incentive is offered. Thus,
Hypothesis 3(b) is partially supported. In addition, we use Tobit regressions with
random effects accounting for investment amount censored at zero. Such random
effect regressions are commonly used in the experimental economics literature (Beer
et al. 2017, O¨zer et al. 2014). Interestingly, our results show that relationship inter-
acting with the type of incentive has a joint effect on suppliers’ investment amount
(p < 0.01). Specifically, we find that one-shot interaction diminishes the effect of
Direct incentive on investment amount.
Next, we examine the impact of relationship on suppliers’ extent of reciprocity
under the choice of incentive type. Hypothesis 3(c) predicts that in repeated games,
the choice of Direct incentive increases the extent of reciprocity as compared to
one-shot games. A one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms our prediction that
suppliers make significantly higher return rate of investment amount to the total
amount available to invest with manufacturers’ selection of Direct incentive when
they interact repeatedly (p = 0.067). Furthermore, a Tobit regression of return rate
on relationship dummies and relationship-type interaction term is used. The result
demonstrates that, similar to the joint effects on suppliers’ investment amount, the
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one-shot games also have a negative moderating effect on the link between Direct
incentive and supplier’ extent of reciprocity. In other words, the choice of Direct
incentive induces stronger reciprocity from suppliers in particular in the repeated
interactions. Therefore, we see that the data provides a support for Hypothesis 3(c).
3.5.4 Learning Behaviour in Incentive and Investment De-
cisions
In our experiment, each subject interacted with a different player over 25 rounds
for the one-shot game treatment whereas with a fixed partner for the repeated game
treatment. During the experiment, they may have an opportunity to adjust their
strategies in accordance with the paired players’ decisions in the previous periods.
As a result, it is possible that the subjects’ reciprocal behaviour that we observe may
be associated with learning. For example, in our aggregate-level data analysis, the
positive regression coefficient shows that higher investment amount provided in the
last-period increases manufacturers’ incentive value in the current period (p < 0.01).
To verify the impact of learning effects on our results, we employ a one-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test and include a dummy variable for learning. The variable
is equal to 0, which represents an absence of learning for the first 12 rounds and
1 otherwise. A test of learning effects on investment amount in the one-shot game
treatment indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in suppliers’
investment amount between the initial 12 and later 13 rounds (p = 0.01). The
investment amount in the initial 12 rounds is larger than that in the later 13 rounds,
which shows that the investment amount decreases over the later 13 rounds. Also,
similar results were observed for incentive value (p < 0.05). These results suggest
that both manufacturer and supplier subjects’ decisions have strong responses to
their past experiences.
Further, we test the learning effect on the extent of reciprocity in the OG treat-
ment and find that there is a significant decrease in the extent of reciprocity over
the later 13 rounds as compared to the initial 12 rounds (p = 0.056). Next, we again
use the one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test to investigate whether our main variables
change with learning under the RG treatment.
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Our result indicates that there is no significant difference in learning effects be-
tween the first 12 and the later 13 rounds when subjects were interacting repeatedly
(p = 0.498), which suggests that neither players learn to behave uncooperatively
over 25 rounds. This result is consistent with earlier studies that demonstrate that
subjects imitate reciprocity over a long-term period (Ga¨chter and Falk 2002). To
sum up, we provide evidence that suppliers’ responses to the incentive offered by
manufacturers under one-shot interactions are more selfish than under repeated in-
teractions. Long-term relationships which restrain individuals’ self-interest motive
of maximising their own benefits matter for suppliers’ reciprocity. Thus we do find
a support for Hypothesis 3(d).
3.5.5 Regression Analysis of Incentive and Investment De-
cisions
The detailed results of the regression analysis discussed above are summarized
as follows (See Tables 3.4 - 3.7). Overall, the observed results provide support
for the hypotheses. We use Tobit random effects regressions to analyse treatment
effects for three dependent variables: investment amount, incentive value and ratio
of investment amount to incentive value. The investment amount and incentive value
are censored at zero. Moreover, we use Logit regression to analyze the treatment
effect for decision on whether to invest in restoration capability or not.
In our regression model, a supplier’s decision in the current round may be influ-
enced by its manufacturer’s incentive decisions in the current round. Regarding the
learning effect, a manufacturer may make decision in the next round based on its
decision on the type of incentive in that round and the paired supplier’s investment
amount decision in the last round. In view of this, an iteration process is applicable
to regression for incentive value and thus we include initial incentive value, that is,
the first round incentive value as an independent variable.
Note that when the interaction term with respect to relationship and incentive
type is considered in the regression models, the interaction effect is statistically
significant whereas the impact of incentive type on investment amount is weakened.
In other words, manufacturer players’ decisions on incentive type is moderated by the
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type of relationship held between both parties. Repeated interaction strengthens the
link between incentive type and investment amount. Here the relationship treatment
is denoted by “Exp-relationship”. Similarly, the uncertainty treatment is denoted
by “Exp-uncertainty”.
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Table 3.4: Regressions on suppliers’ investment amount
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Table 3.5: Regressions on manufacturers’ incentive value
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Table 3.6: Regressions on reciprocity
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Table 3.7: Logit regressions on suppliers’ decision to invest
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3.6 Discussion
Following the analyses conducted in the previous section, we summarise that a
supplier’s reaction is perceived to be more kind if it is motivated by an unconditional
offer than if it is motivated by a conditional offer in the presence of supply chain
disruptions. Our experimental results show that Direct incentive offered by manu-
facturers is positively correlated with suppliers’ investment decisions. Most supplier
subjects are greatly motivated by Direct incentive and thereby respond by invest-
ing more in restoration capability. As a result, Direct incentive that is perceived
as a prosocial signal is more likely to motivate suppliers to be more cooperative.
We also find suppliers are willing to invest more if given a higher incentive value.
Surprisingly, the extent of reciprocity was not found to be significantly higher in
Direct incentive than in Indirect incentive. In our regression analyses, we observed
that this result may be caused by an interaction effect of relationship and incentive
type, in which Direct incentive strengthens the extent of reciprocity only when the
manufacturer and supplier are in long-term relationships.
We further investigate whether and how the effects of relationship on reciprocity
may vary under different types of incentive. We show that repeated interactions
significantly increase suppliers’ propensity for reciprocation. This suggests that
suppliers are more likely to cooperate to invest in restoration capability when long-
term relationships are salient. Recently, a study by Wu (2013) examined supply
chain members’ social behaviour under different types of contracts in repeated in-
teractions. Also, Loch and Wu (2008) look at the buyer-supplier social preference
in repeated interactions based on a wholesale price contract. However, little re-
search focuses on supply chain members’ social preference with consideration of
the effect of a non-contractible incentive (e.g.Direct incentive) on reciprocity in re-
peated interactions. Previous research on cognitive evaluation provides evidence
that individuals’ reciprocity can be intrinsically motivated if the external incentive
is perceived as a form of unconditional action (Ryan 1982, Deci 1971). In this pa-
per, our results highlight that repeated interactions are positively correlated with
suppliers’ extent of reciprocity only if Direct incentive is offered. If a less prosocial
incentive (i.e.Indirect incentive) is offered, we find repeated and one-shot interac-
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tions do not make any differences in the extent of reciprocity. Thus, our results
suggest that, when a manufacturer offers an incentive upfront before a disruption
occurs, long-term relationships can greatly contribute to the reinforcement of reci-
procity and accordingly enhance supply chain efficiency and mitigate supply chain
disruption risks.
Furthermore, we examine the impacts of uncertainty about future recover out-
comes on reciprocity under different types of incentive. We first discuss our settings
for the reciprocity multipliers. Our experiment assigned different multipliers (i.e.
benchmark) to examine supplier subjects’ extent of reciprocity across the uncer-
tainty treatments under Direct and Indirect incentives. The multipliers may am-
plify or shrink the total amount suppliers have available to invest such that supplier
players may value manufacturer players’ incentive decisions differently under a dif-
ferent combination of scenarios. Recall that Direct incentive condition was assigned
a larger multiplier than Indirect incentive condition due to the signalling effect of a
prosocial behaviour. In view of this, Direct incentive offered by manufacturers im-
plicitly suggests that suppliers are expected to provide a higher investment amount
and consequently produces a higher return rate of investment amount to the total
amount available to invest.
Next, we combine the multipliers of the two incentive types with the effects of un-
certainty about future recovery outcomes. Most research on uncertainty emphasises
that individuals are more ambiguity averse when the probability of future outcomes
are ambiguous. Taking Direct incentive into consideration, suppliers received proac-
tive signal may become less ambiguity averse, i.e., for a choice of Direct incentive,
they provide higher investment amount and exhibit higher extent of reciprocity in
an ambiguity environment. Thus, our design amplified the effect of ambiguity under
Direct incentive, aiming to make the offer of Direct incentive in the AU treatment
more attractive. We assigned the highest multiplier to the AU treatment with Direct
incentive. For the combination of negative signals such as Indirect-ambiguity condi-
tion, the lowest multiplier was assigned. The multipliers for the RU treatments are
valued between those two extreme conditions. Interestingly, we only observe that
suppliers’ propensity to reciprocate is significantly more strong in the condition that
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the probability of disruption recovery is known. But the result does not hold for
the ambiguity condition, even if more prosocial actions are taken by manufactur-
ers. This phenomenon may be a result of ambiguous aversion. Drawing from the
theory of reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Gouldner 1960), suppliers have
willingness to exhibit their propensity to reciprocate towards manufacturers’ proso-
cial behaviour. However, when the uncertainty of future outcomes is ambiguous,
they may feel that they are taking on more risk in investing in restoration capabil-
ity. Thus they would be more loss averse and limit their reciprocal behaviour so as
to reduce costs and mitigate the losses caused by the ambiguous uncertainty.
Our data analysis is concerned about whether the subjects have learned from
the previous rounds and strategically adjust their behaviour accordingly. Our re-
sults indicate that, in one-shot games, suppliers have a strategic motive to decrease
their extent of reciprocity over time. But, in repeated games, supplier participants
no longer decrease the extent of reciprocity. A recent experimental study by O¨zer
et al. (2014) that examines the time and experience effects on cross-country supply
chains showed that long-term relationships increase levels of trust and trustworthi-
ness for the within-country groups. Ga¨chter and Falk (2002) report that subjects’
reciprocity can be reinforced by imitating their partners’ behaviour in repeated
games. Consistent with their studies, our findings further suggest that subjects are
more relation-driven and long-term relationships matter for the motivations of reci-
procity in restoration capability investment. By contrast, the absence of long-term
relationships will drive the suppliers to exhibit opportunism and be more selfish.
3.7. Conclusion 85
3.7 Conclusion
In our study, a 2x2 experiment has been designed to examine whether and how
different types of relationship and uncertainty about future recovery outcomes affect
suppliers’ reciprocity towards an incentive offered by manufacturers in building sup-
ply chain restoration capability. We measure suppliers’ reciprocal behaviour from
aspects of the propensity for and the extent of reciprocity. We suggest that suppliers
are more likely to invest in long-term relationships and are more ambiguity averse
in their investment when the probability of future outcomes is unknown. In partic-
ular, we focus on the role of incentives specified as unconditional (Direct) as against
conditional incentives (Indirect) in motivating suppliers’ investment in disruption re-
covery from a social exchange perspective. Our experimental design is innovative in
that decisions made on the two types of incentive are selective rather than imposed,
and thus we define the type of incentive as a decision variable. We identify condi-
tions under which Direct incentive is prominent to induce suppliers’ reciprocity. The
results suggest that in repeated interactions, suppliers exhibit stronger reciprocity
when Direct incentive is offered by manufacturers. We also show that long-term
relationships discipline suppliers’ selfish behaviour such that they exhibit a lower
extent of reciprocity towards manufacturers’ generous offer.
Practically, our experimental results have important managerial implications for
the design of incentive mechanisms to motivate the supplier to invest in restoration
capability, from the perspective of social preference. Motivation of our study is arose
from the evidence that people in general display a stronger prosocial behaviour, for
example reciprocity, when they are intrinsically motivated by external incentives
(Ostrom 2014, Frey 1997c). From the results of our experiment, unconditional
pre-paid incentives ex ante disruption can be more favourable for suppliers who
anticipate a long-term relationship. As a result, supply chain managers should be
motivated to manage supply chain relationships by means of unconditional incentives
to elicit more reciprocity and thus reinforce collaboration at best.
Nonetheless, our study has a number of limitations. First of all, we employ
four full reciprocal benchmarks that derived from our previous model-based study.
In particular, the predicted multiplier is significantly higher in AU treatment with
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Direct incentive to make ambiguous uncertainty more attractive. This critical con-
dition that allows our results to hold implies that the supplier is more likely to
display reciprocal concern with ambiguity if it is incentivised by an unconditional
offer rather than via a conditional one. However, even the highest multiplier is
given, the result that against our prediction shows that suppliers are more ambigu-
ous averse when Direct incentive is offered and are likely to elicit less reciprocity.
The dynamics of the multiplier could be further explored. Second, our experiment
does not control alternative behavioural factors, for example, individuals’ justice
fairness. We attempt to address this issue by asking participants to complete a
short questionnaire regarding their general perceptions, or social attitudes. Third,
in our game design, we give the investment of production site for the supplier as one
of an example for Direct incentive according to a theoretical study by Stecke and
Kumar (2009). In the future, a field experimental study can be conducted to explore
Direct incentive that is applicable to the real world. Finally, an additional method
of statistical testing would have enabled us to take into account the the number of
round regarding the choice of incentive. Thus, a further study will look at whether
both the frequency and value aspects have an influence on suppliers’ reciprocity.
Chapter 4
How the Perceived Buyer-supplier
relationships Impacts Supplier
Reciprocal Behaviour: A Post-
experimental Survey Method
4.1 Introduction
The buyer-supplier relationship has been widely acknowledged to be significant
in supply chain management (O¨zer et al. 2014, Ambrose et al. 2010, Terpend et al.
2008). In the context of supply chain disruption, every supply chain member is
vulnerable to disruption events that involve high ambiguity regarding the ability
to recover from disruptions (Ambulkar et al. 2015). Under ambiguous environ-
mental uncertainty, the potential for decision-makers to behave opportunistically
increases (Williamson 1979) and, consequently, such action may negatively impact
relationship performance (Wathne and Heide 2000). Previous studies suggest that
transaction-based and relation-based mechanisms have provided the foundations for
the governance of the buyer-supplier relationship (Kang and Jindal 2015, Liu et al.
2009, Hawkins et al. 2008). A transaction-based mechanism emphasises the role
of opportunism in environmental uncertainty; whereas, a relation-based mechanism
highlights collaborative behaviour in buyer-supplier relationships through relational
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exchange. Both mechanisms are important in mitigating opportunism and build-
ing strong supply chain relationships, which enable firms to be more responsive to
changes in an uncertain environment (Spekman and Davis 2004).
In recent years, the importance of the buyer-supplier relationship has been high-
lighted in a controlled laboratory environment. Several researchers from behavioural
operation studies indicate that a good relationship between buyer and supplier
greatly contributes to social cooperation that underpinned by reciprocity and, ac-
cordingly, improves supply chain performance (Beer et al. 2017, O¨zer et al. 2014, Wu
2013, Loch and Wu 2008). In these laboratory settings, the relationship conditions
are imposed on each group of subjects and are manipulated by providing subjects
with instructions and orientating tasks concerned with having either communica-
tion or no communication with paired partners before the game begins. Although
these experiments provide us with reliable and valid measures of relationship effects
on reciprocity, they cannot explain how the subjects’ behavioural decisions vary
regarding the perceptions of relationships at individual levels. Evidence from social-
psychological studies suggests that individuals in general are very heterogeneous
in their perception of relationships, which is a spontaneous, unconscious thought
process (Ferguson and Bargh 2004, Fazio 1986, Snyder et al. 1977). These studies
provide explanations regarding the effects of social perception on people’s behaviour,
in which people’s behaviour is most often shaped by their perceptions.
A study by Kenny (1994) has conceptualised the perceptions of relationships
in an interpersonal context from the aspects of self- and other-perception. Self-
perception relies on the exchange party’s perceptions that are shaped personally
(Powers and Reagan 2007, Ganesan 1994, Kenny 1994, Han et al. 1993); whereas,
other-perception is associated with the exchange party’s sense of obligation to recip-
rocate that is conditioned by the behaviour of the counterpart (Kenny 1994, Heide
and John 1992, Dwyer et al. 1987). To investigate how the perceived relational fac-
tors link with individual behaviour, we argue that the need to combine experiment
data that reflects actual behaviour with non-experimental data that reflects indi-
vidual perception, for example survey-based data, is a matter of concern. Drawing
upon these studies, we classified the perceived relational factors into two dimensions:
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(1) self-perception of reciprocity-based relationship that reported by subjects; (2)
feeling of obligation to reciprocate that driven by others’ behaviours.
Research on behavioural economics has recently begun to place more emphasis
on the correlation between experimental and survey measures (Maximiano 2012,
Naef and Schupp 2009). To our knowledge, research that combines these two mea-
surement approaches is limited in the area of operations management. Instead, most
studies concerning behavioural operations management (BOM) have focused on the
deviations of human social behaviour from the theoretical predictions in a laboratory
environment (Katok and Pavlov 2013, Wu 2013, Loch and Wu 2008). Little is known
about the validity of experimental data regarding heterogeneous subjects (Naef and
Schupp 2009). Therefore, we aim to fill this gap and explore to what extent the
supplier attitudes or perceptions gathered from our post-experimental survey affect
behaviour toward incentives by manufacturers in a controlled experiment.
In past decades, social exchange theorists demonstrated that reciprocity is a
key element that exists in social relationships (Buunk and Schaufeli 1999, Gould-
ner 1960), while a lack of reciprocity may lead to failure in a stable cooperative
relationship. Evidence from experimental economics shows that the reciprocal con-
cern that contributes to the reinforcement of buyer-supplier relationships crucially
has an impact on behavioural decisions (Caliendo et al. 2012). In the supply chain
context, if suppliers perceive they have good relationships with manufacturers, it is
likely that they behave reciprocally in response to the manufacturers’ kind actions.
Thus, to gain an insight into supplier reciprocal behaviour in a supply chain rela-
tionship, it is critical to understand to what extent suppliers shape their perceptions
of relationships with manufacturers. Drawing on these two distinct perceptions, we
provide insights into the perceptions of relationships held between buyer and sup-
plier by specifically focusing on how supplier investment decisions that reflect their
reciprocity towards incentives by manufacturers are affected by suppliers’ own per-
ceptions versus those considered to have been driven by others. In other words, we
expect to examine the moderating effects of perceived relational factors on incentive-
investment decisions made by both parties through a combination of the survey and
experimental data.
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The existing understanding of buyer-supplier relationships is mostly driven by
exploring the factors that can strengthen such relationships from the perspective of,
for example, trust, information exchange, transaction-specific investment, and coop-
eration (Powers and Reagan 2007, Ganesan 1994). This study extends the existing
literature on supply chains by considering some unexplored social factors that influ-
ence the perceptions of relationships held between manufacturers and suppliers from
the perceived relational perspective. Frey and Meier (2004) provide evidence that
strong social attitudes contribute to high levels of perceived cooperative relation-
ships. Depending on prosocial attitudes, the cooperative buyer-supplier relationship
based on positive perceptions may be of significance to elicit strong prosocial be-
haviour such as positive reciprocity. By integrating the relevant underlying theories
with the scenarios of our research, we select ambiguity preference, other-regarding
preference, and perpetrator justice sensitivity as potential factors. An understand-
ing of such factors can provide insights into how the perceptions of relationships
held between manufacturers and suppliers influence reciprocal behaviour.
In an environment characterised by high uncertainty that involves ambiguity,
decision-makers may make decisions depending on ambiguity preference (Heal and
Millner 2018). Previous studies in behavioural economics have found that most
people who are ambiguity averse prefer known over unknown probabilities of events
(Camerer and Weber 1992, Ellsberg 1961). Thus, the perception of relationships
that one party in a supply chain has with their partner may operate through the
sense of ambiguous uncertainty during supply chain disruptions. Therefore, we are
interested in investigating how firms’ ambiguity preferences significantly affect the
perceptions of relationships they have with partners and, thus, their behavioural
decisions. According to Heath and Tversky (1991), ambiguity preference is shaped
by people’s own subjective perceptions concerning the judgement of probabilities of
future events. We therefore are motivated to explore the relationship specifically
between ambiguity preference and self-perception of buyer-supplier relationships.
Research on social psychology suggests that people do not always behave out
of self-interest, but also act with other-regarding behaviour (Haisley and Weber
2010, Frohlich et al. 2004, Itoh 2004). According to Cox (2002), other-regarding
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preferences are more closely related to individuals’ unconditional kindness, which is
motivated by altruism. People who have unconditional kindness in general behave
prosocially without expectation of a return from the other party (Hung et al. 2011,
Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000). In other words, people make decisions about whether
to act kindly depending on their own spontaneous perceptions, rather than being
orientated by others. Thus, we aim to investigate how other-regarding preference
relates to self-measured perception of reciprocity-based buyer-supplier relationships.
According to the theory of reciprocity, individuals with feelings of obligation
to care about others, in general, willing to reward fair behaviour and punish un-
fair behaviour (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). This theory suggests that people’s
attitudes that are conditioned by the behaviour of others depend on the level of
fairness perceived between the exchange parties. A study documented by Schmitt
et al. (2010) stresses the importance of justice sensitivity in shaping prosocial atti-
tudes/behaviour. The concept of justice sensitivity that involves individuals’ reac-
tions for perceived fairness comprises three dimensions: victim, observer and per-
petrator justice sensitivities. The first two dimensions are respectively related to
reactive and neutral reactions to unfair events. Importantly, perpetrator justice sen-
sitivity that involves an active reaction to treating others unfairly has been found
to be positively associated with positive reciprocity (Baumert et al. 2014). In other
words, it is more likely that higher levels of sensitivity to perpetrator justice can
strengthen people’s reciprocal concern as well as diminish free-riding behaviour.
Therefore, the need to investigate the link between perpetrator justice and felt obli-
gation to reciprocate within buyer-supplier relationships is a matter of concern.
In summary, the primary goal of this paper is to develop a framework for
explaining the moderating effects of perceived relational factors on the relation-
ship between manufacturer incentives and supplier reciprocal behaviour. To do
so, we initially focus on the underlying factors that influence relational percep-
tions about the reciprocity-based relationship between the manufacturer and the
supplier. We further examine the interaction between manufacturer incentives and
those two different perceived relational factors that comprise self-measured percep-
tion of reciprocity-based relationship and felt obligation to reciprocate within a rela-
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tionship. In particular, incentives by manufacturers have been categorised into two
dimensions: type and value. In this study, we distinguish between these dimensions,
which are both moderated by the perceived relational factors. More importantly,
we consider the interaction effects by integrating the post-experimental survey data
relevant to supplier perceptions or attitudes and the actual supplier reciprocal be-
haviour observed experimentally. This comparison provides insights into research
on the predictions of reciprocal behaviour through the understanding of perceptions
about the level of relationship between two parties.
Our contributions to the existing research are as follows: First, there is a limited
line of research that focuses on various perceptions of relationships in supply chains.
We contribute to the research by examining how the different types of perceptions
of the buyer-supplier relationship moderate the link between incentives offered by
manufacturers and actual reciprocal behaviour. Second, this research extends the
literature on supply chain relationships by exploring the factors that shape percep-
tions about the level of relationship between manufacturers and suppliers. Third,
we advance the existing research on psychological cognition by distinguishing the
effects of incentive value and type when they are moderated by different types of
perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationship through the lens of human cognition
mechanism. Last, in previous research, the buyer-supplier relationship condition
that drives reciprocity is mostly imposed in controlled experimental settings (Wu
2013, Loch and Wu 2008). There is limited evidence to explain the link between
survey-based measures of personal perceptions or attitudes and experimental mea-
sures of actual behaviour. This study methodologically contributes to the BOM
research by integrating the post-experimental survey and the experimental mea-
sures. Our theoretical frameworks presenting the moderated models are displayed
in Figures 4.1.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review the
relevant literature and develop frameworks that explain how the perceived buyer-
supplier relationship moderates the effects of manufacturer incentives offered regard-
ing supplier investment decisions and provide research hypotheses. In Section 3, we
present the research methodologies, followed by an introductory presentation of the
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findings and a discussion of their implications. Finally, we conclude by outlining the
limitations of the study and suggesting directions for future research.
Figure 4.1: The moderation model of perceived relational factors
4.2 Theoretical Background
The relationship between buyers and suppliers has been recognised as essential
to the success of a supply chain. With a collaborative and strong relationship, both
supply chain parties can jointly try to reduce risks and, thus, improve overall sup-
ply chain performance and competitive advantage (Cao and Zhang 2011, Paulraj
et al. 2008, Mentzer et al. 2000). In recent years, several researchers have distin-
guished between two broad categories of interaction between buyers and suppliers:
transaction-based and relation-based interactions (Liu et al. 2009, Lee and Cavusgil
2006, Yu et al. 2006, Heide 1994). From the perspective of transactional exchange,
risks of opportunism resulting from uncertainty require supply chain partners to
safeguard potential opportunistic behaviour by making a legal agreement (Poppo
and Zenger 2002, Osborn and Baughn 1990). From the relational perspective, a
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governance mechanism based on social norms, for example, reciprocity, can help to
create additional value or synergy for cooperation between buyers and suppliers (Za-
heer and Venkatraman 1995, Das and Teng 2002). We present, below, the theories
of transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET) that provide
the theoretical grounds for these two governance mechanisms.
4.2.1 Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics as a transaction-based (i.e. formal contract) gov-
ernance mechanism of inter-firm relations and assumes that exchange partners are
bounded by rationality and, therefore, may act opportunistically, particularly under
environmental uncertainty (Williamson 1979). To minimise the transaction costs
resulting from opportunism and bounded rationality, firms are required to consider
an appropriate exchange governance mechanism. According to TCE theory, inter-
organisational governance mechanisms and financial commitments can be applied
to minimise transaction costs and to mitigate the exchange partners’ opportunistic
behaviour in specific investments. A well-designed complete contract that specifies
all possible conditions can be considered a mechanism to eliminate the risks aris-
ing from opportunism (Williamson 1985). However, since future contingencies are
ambiguous and unforeseen, human-bound rationality suggests that a complete con-
tract may not be possible (Grossman and Hart 1986). Thus, unspecified contractual
conditions would provide one exchange party with the opportunity to behave op-
portunistically, and the other exchange party may not easily observe the potential
opportunistic behaviour (Klein et al. 1990). Consequently, this information asym-
metry results in an increase in the transaction costs of the exchange. Thus, we
argue that the use of a contract mechanism may, to some extent, have limitations
regarding mitigating opportunistic behaviour, especially under uncertain scenarios.
Regarding the factors that determine the governance mechanism, asset specificity
and environmental uncertainty are highlighted as key dimensions. Asset specificity
(i.e. transaction-specific investments) refers to the investments made by one party
with respect to a particular transaction (Williamson 1985). The more specific in-
vestments made, the higher the dependency between exchange parties and, thus,
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the less likely a party is to switch to alternative assets with lower opportunity costs
(Heide and John 1988). Thus, this situation may lead to increases in the potential
for opportunistic behaviour and the transaction costs of safeguarding investments.
Environmental uncertainty refers to unexpected changes resulting from external en-
vironmental factors in the exchange (Noordewier et al. 1990). According to TCE
theory, exchange parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, such that exchange parties’
risk preferences have no influence on the prospects of future outcomes. For example,
Aoki (1984) provides evidence that risk-neutral parties have no difference in expected
payoffs between certain and uncertain prospects. However, for risk-averse parties,
they always prefer certain payoffs over uncertain ones. To gain a comprehensive
understanding of attitudes to uncertainty, one must consider ambiguous prospects
also as the other dimension, in addition to risk prospects.
Despite contractual agreements contributing to protecting against transactions,
they underplay the role of value co-creation through cooperation in exchange re-
lationships (Klein et al. 2007, Williamson 1979). From the relational perspective,
TCE theory is inadequate to explain the social factors associated with a relational
governance mechanism that can help safeguard transactions and understand supply
chain exchange relationships (Klein et al. 2007, Woolthuis et al. 2005). To address
these problems, several studies have introduced the concept of relational exchange,
which relies heavily on SET (Macneil 1980b, Homans 1958). For example, reci-
procity is a typical form of social exchange that improves outcomes of cooperation.
When reciprocity is embedded in social interactions, exchange parties may be less
concerned about opportunistic behaviour, and more likely to enhance cooperative
behaviour.
4.2.2 Social Exchange Theory
In relational governance, the success of relational exchange requires a relation-
ship between exchange parties that is embedded in social norms (Heide and John
1992). Social concepts such as reciprocity and other-regarding concerns play a par-
ticularly vital role in the social exchange process. During this process, these so-
cial characteristics help to reinforce the exchange relationship that develops over
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time through repeated interactions between the exchange parties (Heide and John
1992). Social exchange theory focuses on social interactions between exchange par-
ties, highlighting the voluntary actions of individuals or organisations and providing
the theoretical grounds for the features of an exchange relationship (Blau 1968).
According to SET, individuals are more likely to take voluntary actions that are
motivated by their partners’ responses in the social exchange (Emerson 1976). A
wide number of studies underline SET in the context of interpersonal interactions.
However, a few studies indicate that SET can be successfully applied to the anal-
ysis of inter-organisational exchange relationships (Son et al. 2005). In this study,
we primarily focus on the exchange relationship between manufacturing and supply
firms.
The fundamental assumption of SET is that exchange parties become involved
in an exchange relationship to expect reciprocal benefits from the other party (Blau
1968, Homans 1958). In a buyer-supplier relationship, the exchange between the
buyer and the supplier is viewed as interdependent (Gouldner 1960). The exchange
process resembles a form of reciprocity that is driven by social exchange, in which
a response by the supply party depends on the behaviour undertaken by the manu-
facturer party. An underlying feature of reciprocity-based relationship is the other-
regarding concern, because the exchange parties with reciprocal interdependence
interact often in the expectation of making others better off (Buchan et al. 2006,
Itoh 2004). When both parties follow the norms of positive reciprocity, the manu-
facturer makes decisions with the expectation that the supplier will be rewarding.
Building on the social exchange, the supplier’s response is, to some extent, shaped
by the perception regarding how kind the manufacturer’s action is (Charness and
Haruvy 2002). The manufacturer’s behaviour is kindly rewarded when the sup-
plier perceives the manufacturer’s behaviour as kind or favourable, otherwise, the
manufacturer will be financially punished (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). Thus,
reciprocity, as a fundamental element of an exchange relationship, has an important
role in encouraging cooperative behaviour, which, in turn, reduces opportunistic
behaviour (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, Molm 1994).
Overall, social exchange theorists recognise relational mechanisms as useful tools
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to safeguard opportunistic behaviour and enhance cooperation in buyer-supplier re-
lationships. The motivation for SET is to seek rewards and avoid punishments
(Emerson 1976). Therefore, the attitudes and behaviours of supply chain parties
are determined by a trade-off between the benefits of rewards and the costs of pun-
ishments. According to SET, the relational norms built into the process of exchange
create enduring and long-lasting relationships. In the face of uncertainty, SET sug-
gests that inter-organisational exchanges that are embedded in social relations can
help to improve cooperation and, accordingly, reduce unexpected changes over time
(Thompson 2017). When two firms interact with each other, particularly in the
long-term, the extent of environmental uncertainty is reduced (Das and Teng 2002).
In other words, in the positive buyer-supplier relationship that features long-term
conditions, both parties commit to lowering the disruption risks.
4.3 Research Hypotheses
The key assumption under TCE is that people are rational and self-interested.
In social psychology, researchers have demonstrated that individuals do not always
behave out of self-interest but are motivated by social perceptions that are sponta-
neously and unconsciously activated (Ferguson and Bargh 2004). Regarding supply
chain relationships, an interesting question concerns how perceived relational fac-
tors influence the role of the manufacturer’s kind action in the supplier’s recipro-
cal response. Most studies have provided evidence that individuals’ characteristics
determine the success of a relationship and, consequently, influence behavioural re-
sponses (Beer et al. 2017, O¨zer et al. 2014, Caliendo et al. 2012). To obtain insights
into the evaluation of the relationship by each partner, we pay attention to other-
regarding and ambiguity preferences, which relate to self-reported perception, while
perpetrator sensitivity is related to felt obligation to care about others, by synthesis-
ing theories of TCE and SET. Furthermore, by incorporating the survey-measured
data into the experimental data, we provide insights into how suppliers’ perceptions
of the relationship influence the actual reciprocal behaviour based upon incentives
from manufacturers.
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4.3.1 Other-regarding Preference and Self-perception of Buyer-
Supplier Relationship
In recent research, the relationship between reciprocity and other-regarding pref-
erences has been widely discussed. A stream of literature has categorised reciprocity
as a subclass of other-regarding preferences which are conceptually similar to proso-
cial motivations for altruism (Buchan et al. 2006, Itoh 2004, Batson 1987). Other
literature has distinguished reciprocity from other-regarding preferences. For exam-
ple, research by Cox (2004, 2002) identifies the motivation for other-regarding as
unconditional; whereas, the motivation for reciprocity is conditional. Specifically,
conditional motivation refers to the type of action taken to reward the other’s kind-
ness. Unconditional motivation refers to individuals’ concern and is characterised by
altruism without expectation of reward. In this study, we follow the notion of Cox
(2004, 2002), which distinguishes between reciprocity and other-regarding prefer-
ences. Thus, we propose that the self-reported reciprocity-based relationship which
is based upon own cognition is closely related to the unconditional other-regarding
preferences.
It is generally agreed that relational norms built in supply chain interactions
greatly impact the cooperative relationship between exchange parties (Liu et al.
2009, Terpend et al. 2008, Kim 2000). Based on SET, the level of commitment to
a relationship is likely to be higher when there exist social concerns such as other-
regarding preferences (Heide and John 1992). In an exchange relationship, the more
one party is genuinely concerned about the benefits of another, the more likely
they intend to endure and maintain a relationship so as to diminish opportunism
(Cox 2004). This situation suggests that the exchange parties’ unconditional prefer-
ences are spontaneously motivated by their own pure altruism, which helps to build
a successful relationship. Thus, supply chain partners exhibiting other-regarding
preferences are more likely to perceive the relationship as kind and long-term orien-
tated, and, consequently, act using reciprocal behaviour that is necessary to build
restoration capability. In line with previously reviewed literature that documented
the benefits of unconditional other-regarding preferences and a strong buyer-supplier
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cooperative relationship, we expect that subjects will perceive strong cooperative
relationships with paired partners. Therefore, we hypothesise the following:
Hypothesis 1. Other-regarding preference is positively associated with self-perception
of the relationship between manufacturers and suppliers.
4.3.2 Ambiguity Preference and Self-perception of Buyer-
Supplier Relationship
Broadly speaking, environment ambiguous uncertainty exists when firms make
decisions (Faucheux and Froger 1995, Duncan 1972). According to TCE theory,
firms are more likely to free ride under environmental uncertainty. Environmental
uncertainty that influences firms’ decisions is, in general, related to: (1) unpre-
dictable changes in external environments (e.g. disruption events); (2) ambiguous
information regarding external environments (e.g. future recovery outcomes) (Kim
et al. 2010, Noordewier et al. 1990). A distinct feature of an ambiguous uncertain
environment concerns the probabilities of events or outcomes that are unknown.
In other words, under ambiguity uncertainty, exchange parties do not have shared
information and, therefore, one party may have difficulty predicting the intention
or behaviour of the other party. Thus, the information asymmetry that leads to
the potential for opportunistic behaviour is likely to increase transaction costs. As
discussed previously, SET suggests that costs caused by an ambiguous uncertain en-
vironment can be reduced with the help of a relational governance mechanism that
encourages firms to strengthen cooperative relationships. Literature on inter-firm
relationships provides evidence that firms are more willing to make a joint effort
to strengthen the perceived level of the relationship when ambiguous uncertainty
exists (Claro et al. 2003, Gulati 1998). Cai and Yang (2008) indicate that envi-
ronmental uncertainty positively impacts developing and maintaining cooperative
relationships. Noordewier et al. (1990) reveal that relational elements improve per-
formance in buyer-supplier relationships given environmental uncertainty. Cannon
et al. (2000) state that firms embedded in relational and social norms perform better
in a high level of uncertainty than in a low level of uncertainty.
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The effect of ambiguous uncertainty on self-perception of buyer-supplier relation-
ship is fundamentally operated through people’s preference for ambiguity. Winkler
(1991) stresses that individuals’ preferences regarding ambiguity play an impor-
tant role in their decision behaviours. Much of the research provides evidence that
decision-makers generally prefer risky prospects with known probabilities of out-
comes over ambiguous prospects with unknown probabilities of outcomes (Keren
and Gerritsen 1999, Camerer and Weber 1992, Ellsberg 1961). Considering indi-
viduals’ future expectations, decision-makers tend to exhibit increased ambiguity
aversion with pessimistic expectations when faced with an unknown probability of
future outcomes (Abdellaoui et al. 2015). This preference may be because people
with pessimistic beliefs feel less confident, and thus are more likely to make conser-
vative decisions in response to ambiguity (Pulford and Colman 2007). In contrast,
people who have higher ambiguity tolerance are more likely to display optimistic
expectations about positive future outcomes (Pulford 2009). Here, we follow the
notion of ambiguity tolerance defined as the ‘tendency to perceive ambiguous situ-
ations as desirable’ (Stanley Budner 1962) (see p.29). Therefore, we suggest that
those who hold a high degree of ambiguity tolerance with optimism may be more
confident in prosocial attitudes/behaviour than others and, thus, are willing to place
more emphasis on building a successful relationship to provide assurance against op-
portunism.
In supply chain settings, supply chain disruptions are generally unforeseen and
thereby may lead to ambiguity regarding recovery outcomes (Ambulkar et al. 2015).
Given environmental uncertainty, firms that are more ambiguity tolerant are more
confident in cooperating with others to enhance recovery outcomes (Pulford 2009).
Accordingly, such firms are likely to feel comfortable engaging in relationship im-
provement, such that they may perceive themselves having relationships with part-
ners, in particular under uncertain environments, as value added. Thus, we pro-
pose that a firm’s ambiguity preferences may play a vital role in shaping their
self-perception of the relationship.
Hypothesis 2. Ambiguous preference is positively associated with self-perception
of the relationship held between manufacturers and suppliers.
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4.3.3 Perpetrator Justice Sensitivity and Felt Obligation
within the buyer-Supplier Relationship
As mentioned previously, the feelings of obligation to reciprocate within an ex-
change relationship can motivate the supplier’s behaviours that correspond to this
obligation. Drawing upon the theory of reciprocity, which places more emphasis on
rewarding kind actions and punishing unkind ones, the obligation for reciprocity is
fulfilled by fairness. (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Buunk and Schaufeli 1999, Fehr
et al. 1997, Berg et al. 1995, Fehr et al. 1993). Some recent literature has pro-
posed dividing the theory of reciprocity into two dimensions: consequence-based
and intention-based (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Cooper and Kagel 2016). In other
words, people’s reciprocal behaviour is not purely determined by the distributional
outcome, but also by their concern for the behavioural intention. Consequence-
based reciprocity emphasises people’s evaluation of kindness towards an action as
being shaped by the distributional outcomes (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and
Schmidt 1999). On the other side, evidence from several researchers indicates that
intention is significantly related to the question of how kind the action being per-
ceived is and how strong the reciprocal response is (Falk and Fischbacher 2006,
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, McCabe et al. 2003). These scholars provide ev-
idence that a good perception that signals a positive reciprocity induces a stronger
reciprocal response.
Reciprocity within exchange relationships is motivated by the exchange parties’
perceived fairness (Das and Teng 2002). With a concern for perceived fairness,
people reward fair others but sacrifice their own money to punish unfair others
(Falk et al. 2008, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Camerer and
Thaler 1995, Gu¨th and Tietz 1990). The existing literature on organisational justice
suggests that perceptions of justice (i.e. fairness) within SET play a vital role in
prosocial behaviour (Gollwitzer et al. 2009, Schmitt et al. 2005, Fetchenhauer and
Huang 2004). In social psychology, people’s concerns for justice are expressed via
justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al. 2005). Justice sensitivity that shapes people’s be-
haviour and their reaction to perceived fairness differs between individuals (Schmitt
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et al. 2010, Lovasˇ and Wolt 2002, Schmitt et al. 1995). A 2005 study conducted by
Schmitt et al. categorised justice sensitivity into three dimensions: (1) victim sensi-
tivity; (2) observer sensitivity; (3) beneficiary sensitivity. The victim, observer and
beneficiary sensitivities respectively represent the feelings of being unfairly treated,
the feelings of observing unfair events, and the feelings of benefiting from injustice.
To differentiate between the passive and the active role of benefiting from injustice,
Schmitt et al. (2010) extended their research and developed an additional justice
construct perpetrator sensitivity as a measure of justice sensitivity. They iden-
tified beneficiary sensitivity as passive; whereas, perpetrator sensitivity is actively
benefiting from injustice.
The relationship between individual differences in justice sensitivity perspectives
and prosocial attitude/behaviour has received increased attention. Fetchenhauer
and Huang (2004) provide experimental evidence that individuals differ in making
strategic decisions subject to different dimensions of justice sensitivity. For example,
subjects with strong feelings of benefiting from injustice are more concerned about
treating others fairly; whereas, those with strong feelings of being unfairly treated
are more likely to behave selfishly. Gollwitzer et al. (2009) indicate that other-related
(observer, beneficiary and perpetrator) sensitivity has a positive relationship with
prosocial attitude/behaviour and other-regarding concerns, but self-related (victim)
sensitivity has been found to positively associate with antisocial behaviour. Baumert
et al. (2014) distinguish the effect of beneficiary sensitivity on reciprocity from that
of perpetrator sensitivity. They state that perpetrator sensitivity is significantly
associated with positive reciprocity; whereas, beneficiary sensitivity is not correlated
with it. Thus, from a social perspective, the perpetrator perspective appears to
reflect more general reciprocal concerns for justice.
According to the theory of TCE, in exchange relationships, individuals may be-
have opportunistically and thereby benefit themselves by taking an active commit-
ment to injustice (perpetrator sensitivity). In this case, individuals’ moral emotions
may link with feelings of guilt. Emotions of guilt are grouped into two aspects: one,
resulting from immoral beliefs or actions, is labelled ‘actional guilt’ (Hoffman 1984,
Gollwitzer 2004); the other, resulting from taking advantage of objective unfairness,
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is called ‘existential guilt’ (Montada et al. 1986). In decision-making processes,
individuals’ feelings of guilt may be more closely associated with actional guilt.
Subsequently, such individuals are more likely to be motivated to take prosocial ac-
tions (Konoske et al. 1979). Therefore, we hypothesise that individuals with higher
perpetrator sensitivity are more likely to have reciprocal concerns for others.
Hypothesis 3. Perpetrator justice sensitivity is positively associated with felt obli-
gation for reciprocity within the relationship between manufacturers and suppliers.
4.3.4 The Moderating Role of Perceived Relational Factors
in the relationship between Incentive and Investment
Decisions
Results from our previous experiment highlight that suppliers are more likely to
invest more in restoration capability towards a more generous incentive by manu-
facturers when they repeatedly interact. Previous studies have revealed that people
with high perception levels of relationships are more likely to engage in cooperative
relationships and to take actions that strengthen those relationships (Kim et al.
2010, Wilson 1995, Heide and John 1992). Two streams of research provide insights
into the exchange process from different perspectives. The first stream, from the
fields of supply chains, marketing and business, examines the buyer-supplier rela-
tionship through the lens of exchange parties’ self-reported measures (Ambrose et al.
2010, Powers and Reagan 2007, Narayandas and Rangan 2004). The second stream
explores the relationship between buyers and suppliers through the perspective of
social exchange (e.g. reciprocity), which is conditioned by the attitudes and be-
haviour of others (Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Cox 2004, Gouldner 1960). Based on
this literature, this study provides insights into the two perception variables as mod-
erators of the relationship between manufacturer incentives and supplier investment
decisions.
In our previous experiment, incentives offered by manufacturers consisted of two
dimensions: (1) type, (2) value. We are motivated by research on cognitive psy-
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chology to distinguish between those two constructs as independent variables when
performing a moderation analysis. Kahneman (2003) demonstrated that people
most often rely on two functions of cognitive systems, comprising intuitive and rea-
soning processing systems, when making decisions. When faced with different types
of questions, a person’s processes of decision-making may vary depending on the
cognitive system used. For example, a person may make decisions using logic and
rational systems to process information for normative questions; whereas, they may
use personal perceptions or preferences for descriptive questions (Kahneman and
Tversky 2013). Philosophically, normative questions refer to subjective statements
about how to value things, while descriptive questions refer to objective statements
about types of beliefs or preferences (Kahneman and Tversky 2013).
To answer questions such as, ‘How much incentive value would you like to offer?’,
subjects need to use methods other than intuitive judgements (Kahneman 2003).
Since the operations of analytical reasoning system are largely rational-based, indi-
viduals using this function to solve problems may be less sensitive to social attitudes
or preferences. However, with the operations of an automated intuitive system,
when only two simple choices occur to people, they are likely to use this function
to choose between the options without much effort. Intuitive judgements are more
emotion-driven and are most often governed by people’s own attitudes or prefer-
ences (Kahneman 2003). Thus, we suppose that the answer to the question, ‘Which
option would you like to choose between Direct and Indirect incentive?’ is likely to
be driven by emotion, such that individuals may behave less self-interestedly with
their bounded rationality compared with the question concerning incentive value.
Incentive Type and Incentive Value Moderated by Self-Perception of
Buyer-Supplier Relationship
As mentioned previously, the question regarding incentive type represents a sim-
ple categorical description between two options that involve the intuitive cognitive
system. Specifically, the intuitive system is similar to the operating process of
perception (Kahneman 2003). When the view of intuition is held, individuals’ pref-
erential choices occur spontaneously (Higgins 1996). According to SET, it is likely
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that individuals’ reciprocal behaviours are governed by cognitive processing in ex-
change relationships (Blau 1968). In other words, people’s internalised perceptions
are important to the exhibition of reciprocal behaviour.
Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology (Plous 1993, Anderson and Gerb-
ing 1988), the effect of incentive type on supplier investment decision that signals
reciprocity may vary given various perception levels of relationship. For exam-
ple, suppliers who perceive high levels of relationship with manufacturers are more
likely to display reciprocal behaviour when incentives by manufacturers are viewed
as prosocial (Kim et al. 2010). In contrast, suppliers with low perceptions are less
likely to be motivated to make decisions that benefit others. That is, low perceptual
more likely to be concerned with their own interests and, accordingly, choose an
option that benefits themselves. Thus, Direct incentive would have a weak effect
on reciprocal behaviour for suppliers with low perceptions of their relationship with
manufacturers. Therefore, we hypothesise that when Direct incentive is offered, the
more that suppliers perceive their relationships with manufacturers as being good,
the more likely that suppliers will exhibit reciprocal behaviour via investing more
in restoration capability.
Hypothesis 4a. Self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship moderates the re-
lationship between manufacturer incentive type offered and supplier reciprocal be-
haviour, such that the positive relationship between incentive type and reciprocal
behaviour is stronger among suppliers with high perception levels of relationship.
The cognitive system that drives human reasoning plays an important role in
asking and answering questions such as how much (Graesser et al. 1996). The
process of question-answering involves a conscious, deliberate and analytical think-
ing process (Kahneman 2003). In social exchange relationships, supplier reciprocal
behaviour may be motivated only when they perceive the incentive value offered
to be considerable, depending upon the rational cognitive processing (Blau 1968).
Therefore, we predict that the effect of incentive value offered on supplier reciprocal
behaviour may vary according to different perceived levels of the relationships the
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suppliers have with the manufacturers. Suppliers who perceive high levels of rela-
tionships with their manufacturers are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour
and, thus, may be motivated to invest more towards the manufacturers’ generous
incentive value offered. In contrast, suppliers with low perception levels of the rela-
tionships with their manufacturers may have a weak sense of cooperating and, thus,
may be less likely to invest more in restoration capability (Kim et al. 2010). Thus,
we hypothesise that the stronger suppliers perceive their relationships to be with
manufacturers, the more likely they will exhibit reciprocal behaviours towards the
manufacturers’ generous incentive value.
Hypothesis 4b. Self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship moderates the re-
lationship between manufacturer incentive value offered and supplier reciprocal be-
haviour, such that the positive relationship between incentive value and reciprocal
behaviour are stronger among suppliers with high perception levels of the relation-
ship.
As noted previously, the judgements of incentive type and incentive value have
been distinguished between two cognitive mechanisms: intuitive and deep reason-
ing. Differing from categorical questions, numerical question-answering requires the
adoption of deep reasoning and logic processes to evaluate a reasonable value to offer.
From this perspective, the judgement of the incentive value is processed with a rela-
tively slower and more conscious cognitive system. Based upon research on TCE, the
rational cognitive system is more likely to encourage self-regarding behaviour, but
less motivate prosocial behaviour (Williamson 1979). This result suggests that ana-
lytical processing that involves bound rationality motivates suppliers to deliberately
evaluate the value offered by manufacturers with less concern about others’ benefits.
In contrast, the judgement of an incentive type that adopts an unconscious, intu-
itive and heuristic thinking process most often involves emotional processing, which
is more relevant to social cognition (Evans 2008). If suppliers hold high perception
levels of the relationship with manufacturers, they are more likely to cohere with
reciprocity norms based on the manufacturers’ generous incentive offer and, accord-
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ingly, behave in prosocial ways. Taking account of social considerations, we propose
that subjects’ sense of an incentive type that involves more social cognition has a
stronger effect on reciprocal behaviour than that of an incentive value that relies
more on rational reasoning when those variables are moderated by self-perception
of buyer-supplier relationships.
Hypothesis 4c. Incentive type more strongly impacts supplier investment de-
cisions when it is moderated by self-perception of the buyer-supplier relationship
compared with that of incentive value.
Incentive Type and Incentive Value Moderated by Felt Obligation to
Reciprocity within the Buyer-Supplier Relationship
In social psychology, the understanding of attitudinal factors that influence peo-
ple’s prosocial behaviour, such as reciprocity, is very important (Ajzen 1991, Ajzen
and Fishbein 1977, 1980). A previous study supports the view that people’s be-
haviour is consistently guided by their attitudes towards the other (Kim and Hunter
1993). According to the theory of reciprocity, the attitude or behaviour of manufac-
turers is the premise of suppliers’ obligations for reciprocity, which, in turn, shape
their behaviours (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). More specifically, in buyer-supplier
relationships, suppliers respond to favourable actions by manufacturers with strong
senses of obligation to reciprocate are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviours.
Winter and Uleman (1984) provide evidence that individual preferences such as
reciprocity and altruism are not perceived per se, but formalise the social percep-
tions that may ultimately reinforce social behaviours. Thus, we predict that the felt
obligation for reciprocity that is conditioned on the other’s behaviour has a mod-
erating role in the effects of the manufacturer incentive decisions on the supplier’s
restoration investment.
Based on SET, we propose that suppliers with high felt obligations are more
likely to behave in prosocial ways and, thus, may be more responsive to manufac-
turers’ generous incentives by investing more. In contrast, suppliers with low felt
obligations may appreciate manufacturers’ generous incentives less, and, thus, are
4.4. Method 108
less likely to cohere to the reciprocity norm. Drawing on the explanations for the
moderating effect of self-perception of the buyer-supplier relationship, the moder-
ating effect of felt obligation for reciprocity on the relationship between incentive
type, incentive value and reciprocal behaviour is theoretically similar. Accordingly,
we hypothesise that the higher perception level the subjects scored, the more likely
they are to exhibit reciprocal behaviour, whether in decisions regarding incentive
type or regarding incentive value.
Hypothesis 5a. Felt obligation to reciprocate within the buyer-supplier relation-
ship moderates the relationship between manufacturer incentive type offered and sup-
plier reciprocal behaviour, such that the positive relationship between incentive type
and reciprocal behaviour is stronger among suppliers with high feelings of obligation
for reciprocity.
Hypothesis 5b. Felt obligation to reciprocate within the buyer-supplier relation-
ship moderates the relationship between manufacturer incentive value offered and
supplier reciprocal behaviour, such that the positive relationship between incentive
type and reciprocal behaviour is stronger among suppliers with high feelings of obli-
gation for reciprocity.
Hypothesis 5c. Incentive type more strongly impacts supplier investment deci-
sions when it is moderated by the felt obligation to reciprocate within the buyer-
supplier relationship compared with that of incentive value.
4.4 Method
The importance of buyer-supplier relationships has been widely explored in both
experimental and empirical studies. In experimental studies, the researcher ma-
nipulates the buyer-supplier relationship and, thus, the effects of imposed control in
buyer-supplier relationships can be ascertained. Our experimental results reveal that
long-term orientation that signals a strong buyer-supplier relationship positively im-
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pacts supplier investment decision towards the manufacturer incentive (i.e. type and
value) offered. However, we cannot observe how suppliers’ own perceptions of their
relationship with manufacturers influence their investment decisions on a subjective
level. Research on the perception-behaviour link indicates that individuals’ char-
acteristics that spontaneously elicit the social perceptions are positively associated
with prosocial behaviour (Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001, Dijksterhuis and Van Knip-
penberg 1998). Thus, we used a post-experimental survey based upon experimental
approaches to investigate how perceived buyer-supplier relationships influence the
relationship between incentives by manufacturers and supplier reciprocal behaviour.
4.4.1 Sampling and Data Collection
The hypotheses were tested using the data collected from the post-experimental
questionnaires. Both supplier and manufacturer players were asked to answer attitu-
dinal questions after finishing the main experiment. In general, a survey approach
is a typical way to understand the subjects’ attitudes or intentions on a subjec-
tive level. By testing the attitudinal questions in a survey, we can understand
whether subjects’ personal attitudes are significantly correlated with their actual
behaviours in the main experiment. In many cases, to impress others or maintain
self-image, subjects may provide a desirable answer about their attitudes that is in-
consistent with their actual behaviour. Drawing from Maximiano (2012), we use the
post-experimental survey to examine whether subjects’ answers to perception-based
questions correlate with their actual reciprocal behaviour in a controlled environ-
ment. Specifically, we investigate the individual differences in the perception levels
of the relationship with their paired partner on the link between incentives by man-
ufacturers and reciprocal behaviour and the factors influencing perceptions by each
partner. A total of 122 subjects completed the post-experimental questionnaire, half
of whom were manufacturer players and the other half supplier players. On average,
the subjects took about 10-15 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
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4.4.2 Measures
The questionnaire design was based on questions adopted in previous research
on social psychology. We covered the following five categories of questions: (1) self-
perception of relationship; (2) ambiguity preference; (3) other-regarding preference;
(4) felt obligation to reciprocate; (5) justice sensitivity. The details of the items
measured for the above constructs are in Appendix C.
To measure self-perception of the relationship between manufacturers and sup-
pliers, the subjects were asked to rate how much they agree with the statements
about their relationships with their paired partners. This question was followed by
a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely weak) to 7 (extremely strong).
The question concerning ambiguous uncertainty primarily captured subjects’ prefer-
ences for a known/unknown probability of an event. The test that we used is similar
to Erev et al. (2017)’s replicated version of Ellsberg (1961)’s measure of ambiguity
aversion. The subjects were asked to select their preference from two options: (A)
100 with probability 0.5; 0 otherwise; (B) 100 with probability ‘x’; 0 otherwise; (‘x’
is an unknown constant between 0 and 1). For other-regarding preferences that fea-
tured as procial motivations for altruism, we measured this using four items adapted
from Grant (2008). The subjects were asked to rank their level of agreement with
statements related to a question concerning, ‘Why are you motivated to do the
task?’, answering on a seven-point scale from 1 (not at all applies to me) to 7 (per-
fectly applies to me). Specifically, the statements about prosocial motivation can
be considered as alternative interpretations that underlying other-regarding prefer-
ences. The four statements assessing other-regarding preferences were: (1) ‘Because
I care about benefiting others through my work’; (2) ‘Because I want to help others
through my work’; (3) ‘Because I want to have a positive impact on others’; (4)
‘Because it is important to me to do good for others through my work’.
To assess subjects’ felt obligations to reciprocate within the buyer-supplier rela-
tionship, three items that were evaluated using scales from 1 (does not apply to me
at all) to 7 (applies to me perfectly) were adapted from Caliendo et al. (2012), for ex-
ample, the subjects were asked to rate the statement, ‘If someone does me a favour,
I am prepared to return it.’ The measure of justice sensitivity was adapted from
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Schmitt et al. (2010), who used ten-item scales for each type of justice sensitivity.
Specifically, considering the relevance of our experimental scenarios, we focused on
perpetrator justice sensitivity and adopted five items with great factor loadings from
the measure of perpetrator justice sensitivity. The subjects were asked to choose the
point that best expresses their own opinion regarding the statements (see Appendix
C for statements of all items). A six-point scale was adopted to measure the items,
with 0 representing ‘strongly disagree’, and 5 representing ‘strongly agree’.
The perceived buyer-supplier relationship in this study may be influenced by
other factors. In addition to the main variables demonstrated above, we measured
the following three control variables: experimental buyer-supplier relationship, age
and gender. The buyer-supplier relationship in the main experiment was a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the relationship is in long-term orientation, and 0 otherwise.
The relationship orientation is a good indication of how good a relationship is be-
tween two parties. In a long-term orientation, people generally have a sense of a
good relationship with their partners over time. Thus, we additionally controlled the
imposed relationship to examine whether the focal variables have the same effect on
perceptions of buyer-supplier relationships. To distinguish the main experiment from
other measures of buyer-supplier relationship, we refer to it as ‘exp-relationship’.
Table 1 illustrates the correlation matrix of all the variables. Age was a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the subject was either a young undergraduate or postgraduate
student, and 0 otherwise. As for gender variable, we assigned the variable as male
subjects being equal to 1, and female subjects being equal to 0.
4.4.3 Data Analysis
To test the overall fitness of the measurement model, the reliability and validity
of all the constructs relevant to our study have been assessed. Specifically, self-
perception of relationship and ambiguity preference are measured using only single-
item measures. The statistics related to other three constructs that contain multiple
items are shown in Table 4.1, which include the factor loading of each item, the
Cronbach’s α and composite reliability of each construct and the value of average
variance extracted (AVE).
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Table 4.1: Reliability and validity of constructs
Cronbach’s α over 0.7 is considered to be an acceptable threshold of internal
consistency for each variable (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). In our study, the
Cronbach’s α of each multi-item scale exceeds the acceptable value of 0.7, indicating
high internal consistency and reliability of the variables. In addition, we conducted
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the validity of the multi-item focal
variables including ‘felt obligation for reciprocity’, ‘justice perpetrator’, and ‘other-
regarding preference’. According to the CFA results, we have a good fit of model for
the data (χ2 = 62.07, df = 51, p = 0.14, GFI = 0.93, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04).
The estimates of squared multiple correlation for each item were between 0.30 and
0.90, and all factor loadings were significant at p < 0.01. These results support the
convergent validity and unidimensionality of the constructs (Anderson and Gerbing
1988). Furthermore, an assessment of discriminant validity of each construct was
conducted to examine the constructive distinctiveness of the variables used in this
study. As indicated in Table 4.2, all constructs’ square root of AVE values are higher
than the inter-construct correlations, which provides support for the discriminant
validity of the measured variables (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
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Table 4.2: Discriminant validity assessment
Variables 1 2 3
1 Self-perception relationship 0.71
2 Felt obligation for reciprocity 0.37 0.76
3 Other-regarding preference 0.24 0.21 0.88
Notes: Square root of AVE of each construct is shown on the diagonal; the values of inter-
construct correlations are presented below the diagonal.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N =122)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Self-perception relationship 1
2 Felt obligation for reciprocity 0.17** 1
3 Other-regarding preference 0.20∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 1
4 Ambiguity preference 0.16** 0.06 -0.11 1
5 Justice perpetrator 0.04 0.37∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ -0.07 1
6 Exp-relationship 0.29∗∗∗ 0.12 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.08 0.12 1
7 Gender 0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.09 1
8 Age 0.10 0.10 0.11 -0.02 0.17 -0.08 0.15 1
Mean 3.78 5.98 5.03 0.32 3.76 0.51 0.35 1.14
S.D. 1.54 0.87 1.33 0.47 0.97 0.5 0.48 0.35
1 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
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Table 4.3 above presents descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all the
variables including both focal and control variables. Notably, the self-perception
of buyer-supplier relationship was significantly related to other-regarding preference
(r=0.20, p < 0.05) and ambiuity preference (r=0.16, p < 0.05). The felt obligation
for reciprocity was significantly related to perpetrator justice sensitivity (r=0.37,
p < 0.01).
4.4.4 Hypotheses Testing
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested using multiple regression analysis. The re-
gression model captures the dependent variable ‘self-perception of buyer-supplier
relationship’ as a function of other-regarding preference, ambiguity preference and
control variables. In addition, we conducted tests for multicollinearity by using
the variance inflation factor (VIF). All tolerance values were above 0.85 and VIF
values were below 10, indicating acceptable levels of multicollinearity (Neter et al.
1996). Table 4.4 displays the results of the regression analyses that were conducted
to examine these hypotheses.
Table 4.4: Regression analysis for self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship
Independent Variables Standardized t Sig.
Multicollinearity
Coefficients (β) Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 1.26 0.21
Other-regarding preference 0.29 3.32 0.00∗∗∗ 0.85 1.17
Ambiguity preference 0.17 2.02 0.05∗∗ 0.98 1.02
Exp-relationship 0.36 4.16 0.00∗∗∗ 0.90 1.12
Gender 0.04 0.43 0.67 0.95 1.05
Age 0.09 1.09 0.28 0.96 1.04
R2 = 0.20
1 Dependent Variable: Self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship;
2 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
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To examine the determinants of felt obligations for reciprocity, the regression
model was developed to capture the dependent variable ‘felt obligation for reci-
procity’ as a function of justice perpetrator and the control variables. We show the
results of regression for Hypothesis 3 in Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5: Regression analysis for felt obligation for reciprocity within the buyer-
supplier relationship
Independent Variables Standardized
Coefficients
Beta (β)
t Sig.
(Constant) 12.41 0.00
Justice Perpetrator 0.38 4.34 0.00∗∗∗
Exp-relationship 0.09 1.04 0.30
Gender 0.16 1.06 0.06
Age 0.02 0.20 0.85
R2 = 0.17
F-value = 6.03∗∗∗
1 Dependent Variable: Felt obligation for reciprocity;
2 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
Taking together the survey-based and experimental measures of reciprocity, we
first tested whether the data regarding subjects’ self-reported measures of buyer-
supplier relationship and felt obligations for reciprocity in the survey correlate with
experimentally observed reciprocal behaviour data. We measured the subjects’ ex-
tent of reciprocity, which was observed from the experiment by aggregating the re-
turn rate of investment amount to incentive value at an individual level. We call this
extent ‘exp-reciprocity’ in the interpretation of results. Table 4.6 presents the cor-
relation matrix of felt obligation for reciprocity, exp-reciprocity and self-perception
of relationship.
In order to test Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c, we develop the regression model to
capture investment amount (F ), signalling reciprocal behaviour and obtained in the
previous experimental study, as the dependent variable. Preferential incentive type
and value (I) (also experimentally obtained), self-perception of buyer-supplier rela-
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Table 4.6: Correlation matrix for the survey and experiment data
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3
1 Felt obligation for reciprocity 5.97 0.91 1
2 Exp-reciprocity 0.33 0.18 0.18∗∗ 1
3 Self-perception 3.79 1.54 0.11 0.33∗∗∗ 1
1 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
tionship, the interaction variables of self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship,
incentive type or incentive value, and the imposed exp-relationship as independent
variables. In this study, the moderation effect of self-perception of buyer-supplier
relationship is modelled using an interaction variable in the regression equation.
With the moderation effect, the relationship between incentive type or value offered
by manufacturers and supplier investment amounts varies according to perceptions
about the level of the buyer-supplier relationship. The results of the regression
analyses are displayed in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: The moderation effect of incentive type on investment amount
Independent Variables Standardized
Coefficients
Beta (β)
t Sig.
Incentive value 0.02 20.50 0.00∗∗∗
Incentive type 0.54 9.48 0.00∗∗∗
Self-perception relationship 0.08 1.07 0.29
Incentive value × Self-perception 0.00 1.78 0.08
Incentive type × Self-perception 0.10 2.47 0.01∗∗
Exp-relationship 0.16 2.75 0.01∗∗∗
R2 = 0.35
F-value = 105.88∗∗∗
1 Dependent Variable: Investment amount;
2 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
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To examine Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c, the regression model was further devel-
oped to replace self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship with the felt obligation
to reciprocate within buyer-supplier relationship as independent variables. Similar
to self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship, the moderation effect of the felt
obligation for reciprocity is modelled using the interaction variable in the regression
equation. With the moderation effect, felt obligation for reciprocity modifies the
relationship between incentive type or value offered by manufacturers and supplier
investment amounts. The results of regression for Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c are in
Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: The moderation effect of incentive value on investment amount
Independent Variables Standardized
Coefficients
Beta (β)
t Sig.
Incentive value 0.02 19.86 0.00∗∗∗
Incentive type 0.54 9.43 0.00∗∗∗
Felt obligation for reciprocity 0.06 1.31 0.19
Incentive value × Felt obligation for reciprocity 0.00 1.06 0.29
Incentive type × Felt obligation for reciprocity 0.16 2.67 0.01∗∗∗
Exp-relationship 0.26 4.63 0.01∗∗∗
R2 = 0.35
F-value = 107.36∗∗∗
1 Dependent Variable: Investment amount;
2 **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;
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As is evident from Table 4.4, other-regarding preferences (β = 0.27, p < 0.01)
and ambiguity preferences (β = 0.17, p < 0.1) exert significant and positive effects
on self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are
supported. The results of the regression on felt obligation for reciprocity within the
buyer-supplier relationship indicate that justice perpetrator (β = 0.33, p = 0.00)
had positive and significant relationships with the felt obligation for reciprocity,
supporting Hypothesis 3. The interaction effects between incentive type and self-
perception of buyer-supplier relationship (β = 0.11, p < 0.05), and between incentive
value and self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship (β = 0.001, p = 0.05), on
supplier investment amount were positive and significant. These results support
Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Consistent with our expectation, the effect of incentive
type moderated by self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship was stronger than
that of incentive type moderated by self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship.
This result supports Hypothesis 4c. Combining the subjects’ felt obligation for
reciprocity with actual reciprocal behaviour in the experiments, their feelings of
obligation to reciprocate positively strengthens the relationship between incentive
type or incentive value and investment decisions, as predicted in Hypotheses 5a
and 5b. Furthermore, we found a stronger relationship between incentive type and
investment amount than between incentive value and investment amount when felt
obligation for reciprocity is considered as a moderator, supporting Hypothesis 5c.
Regarding the type of relationship imposed in the experiment (i.e. exp-relationship),
we controlled this variable in our moderator analyses. It was found to be positive
and significantly related to self-perceptions of buyer-supplier relationship and felt
obligations for reciprocity (β = 0.35, p < 0.01). This result confirms the important
role of the types of buyer-supplier relationship on self-perceptions regarding how
good the relationships subjects have with their partners are.
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4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Summary of Results
Our motivation for this study was to investigate how differences in the percep-
tions of the relationship between manufacturers and suppliers correlate with actually
observed reciprocal behaviour in incentive-investment experimental games. To pro-
vide insights into the effects of incentive type or value offered by manufacturers
on supplier investment amount, we used the lens of two distinct perceptions of the
buyer-supplier relationship that serve as moderator variables. We distinguish be-
tween the self-perception of the relationship, which reflects people’s own internal
perceptions, and, on the other hand, the felt obligation to reciprocate within the
relationship, which is conditioned by the attitude or behaviour of others through
social exchanges.
Three key findings are illustrated. First, our results confirm that the relation-
ships between manufacturer incentive type, value, and supplier reciprocal behaviour
are moderated by perceived relational factors. The results indicate that high self-
perception levels of a buyer-supplier relationship significantly strengthen the link
between those relationships. In other words, suppliers who perceive the relationship
with their manufacturers to be strong are more likely to be motivated to invest more
towards the manufacturers’ decisions for either type or value of incentive offered. In
addition, we found that the results for the moderation effects of the felt obligation
for reciprocity on the link between incentives and reciprocal behaviour are similar
to those for self-perception of buyer-supplier relationship.
Second, we distinguished the effects of incentive type and value on supplier recip-
rocal behaviour when moderated by perceived relational factors. Our results reveal
that incentive type has a stronger effect on investment amount than incentive value
when they are moderated by either self- or other- perception of buyer-supplier rela-
tionship. In line with Kahneman (2003), the preferential choice of incentive type as
a simple description may spontaneously occur to suppliers, and, thus, involves more
social cognition in their investment decisions. In contrast, responding to questions
of incentive value requires suppliers to adopt a logic cognitive system to evaluate
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whether the incentive value offered is acceptable and, thus, there may be fewer social
considerations involved.
Third, at individual levels, our findings suggest that a high self-perception level
of the buyer-supplier relationship is closely related to ambiguity preference and
unconditional other-regarding preference. In addition, we demonstrated that strong
feelings of perpetrator justice sensitivity are associated with high felt obligations for
reciprocity within the buyer-supplier relationship.
4.5.2 Theoretical Contributions
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we ad-
vance the existing research on behavioural operations by analysing the data with
respect to subjects’ personal attitudes or perceptions and providing evidence for the
correlation between post-experimental survey-based measures of perception-based
buyer-supplier relationships and actual reciprocal behaviour observed in a controlled
experiment. Most previous research on behavioural operations provides experimen-
tal evidence on the effects of reciprocity on supply chain performances in supply
chain relationships (Wu 2013, Loch and Wu 2008). However, supply chain partners
have differences in perceptions about the level of buyer-supplier relationships, and
thereby may have different behavioural responses to the relationships (Ambrose et al.
2010). These differences led to us addressing the question of the extent to which the
subjectively perceived buyer-supplier relationships can explain the effect of incen-
tives offered by manufacturers on supplier reciprocal behaviour from dimensions of
perceived relational factors. We provide evidence that suppliers who perceive high
levels of buyer-supplier relationships are more likely to exhibit reciprocal behaviour
towards manufacturers’ generous actions.
Second, we make a methodological contribution to the research on BOM through
the development of combined experimental and survey-based approaches applicable
to supply chain relationships. Our previous experimental results suggest that the re-
lationships between manufacturers and suppliers play an important role in supplier
reciprocal behaviour towards different types of incentives offered by manufactur-
ers. To understand the moderating role of subjects’ perceptions of the strength of
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buyer-supplier relationships on the link between incentives by manufacturers and
supplier reciprocal behaviour, we methodologically correlated the survey measures
of self-reported buyer-supplier relationships with the observed behavioural decisions
in the experiment. We found that the survey-based measures consistently confirm
the experimental measures of the role of buyer-supplier relationships in motivating
supplier reciprocity for restoration capability investment.
Third, our study provides new insights into the research on psychological cogni-
tion by comparing the effects of incentive value and type when they are moderated
by various types of perceptions of buyer-supplier relationships through the lens of
human cognitive processing systems (Kahneman 2003). We advance the existing
literature by revealing that suppliers who perceive a high level of buyer-supplier re-
lationship are more responsive to incentive type, which allows them to behave more
reciprocally compared with incentive value.
Finally, we extend the research on buyer-supplier relationships by providing in-
sights into the understanding of determinants of various types of perceived buyer-
supplier relationships, which complements previous relationship literature regarding
supply chains. Specifically, we contribute to the line of research on justice and social
preference by examining the role of perpetrator justice sensitivity in the felt obliga-
tion to reciprocate. Our results align with the findings in the literature (Baumert
et al. 2014, Gollwitzer et al. 2009), which emphasises the importance of perpetrator
justice in reciprocal behaviour. In addition, we extend this line of research by syn-
thesising TCE theory and SET, which strengthens our understanding of the role of
the perceptions of buyer-supplier relationships when buyers and suppliers interact.
4.5.3 Managerial Implications
Our findings have several managerial implications in supply chain relationship
management. First, both the type and the value of incentives are revealed to be
positively associated with supplier reciprocal behaviour. Comparison of incentive
type and value indicated that suppliers with a high perception level of the buyer-
supplier relationship are more responsive to an incentive type that provides a sense
of confidence in the manufacturers’ incentive decisions by exhibiting reciprocal be-
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haviour. Thus, managers of manufacturing firms should place more emphasis on the
patterns of incentives, which allows changing investment decisions by suppliers.
Second, an effective interaction is desirable for both parties in a supply chain.
Our findings suggest that manufacturing firms can benefit from insights into per-
ceived relational factors, which contribute to the reinforcement of reciprocal be-
haviour. Suppliers with a high level of relationship perceptions are more likely to
follow the reciprocity norm and, thus, may behave more prosocially. For manufac-
turers, those who place more emphasis on relationship-building can be more effective
in motivating supplier reciprocal behaviour. Therefore, the advantage of how rela-
tionship partners perceive the relationship allows managers to develop more effective
supply chain collaborative strategies.
Finally, the comprehensive understanding of self-aware and other-related percep-
tions of the buyer-supplier relationship is key for driving relationship success. We
suggested that the ambiguity preference and other-regarding preference are posi-
tively related to self-perception of the buyer-supplier relationship; whereas, perpe-
trator justice sensitivity is positively related to the felt obligation for reciprocity.
Thus, there is a need for supply chain partners to focus on the characteristics of
these two types of perception regarding the relationship between them. Both manu-
facturers and suppliers should pay attention to the other’s preferences, which allows
the cultivation of a strong buyer-supplier relationship.
4.5.4 Limitations and Future Research
This study has some limitations. First, several issues regarding sampling should
be addressed for future research. Due to time and cost constraints, we used a
post-experimental survey to measure differences in the perceptions of relationships
between manufacturers and suppliers in a laboratory environment. To enhance the
external validity of our findings, further research should focus on field experiments
and investigate whether the findings based on laboratory experiments are the same
in the real world. Also, our subject pool was limited to students as participants
due to resource constraints. Although the existing research on subject-pool effects
supports the use of students as participants when examining social preferences in
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lab experiments, such a sample still has limited generalisability (Falk et al. 2013).
A comparison of the behaviour of student and nonstudent participants in the ex-
periment should be performed. In addition, our sample in the experiment is UK
based. Future studies should emphasise sampling from multiple countries, which
would contribute to a wider generalisation of the findings.
Second, our experimental design’s primary focus was on supplier reciprocal be-
haviour. As such, the effect of perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationship on the
link between manufacturer incentives and supplier reciprocal behaviour was only
measured through the lens of suppliers. Future research should explore the perpet-
ual differences between manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, we suggest that
future studies focus on the prosocial behaviour of manufacturers. For manufactur-
ers, their decisions regarding incentives may be motivated by trust attitudes. Thus,
future research could extend investigations on the effect of the perceptions of the
relationship on trust behaviour from the perspective of manufacturers.
Third, one limitation in the conceptual model is concerning. We measured sub-
jects’ self-perceptions of the relationship with paired partners by asking them about
their perceptions of the strength of the relationship directly. In contrast, the felt
obligations for reciprocity was measured by drawing upon a valid survey developed
by Caliendo et al. (2012), which allows for a measure of positive reciprocity through
three measurement items. Future research should explore the measurement items
underlying the self-perception of relationships, which would allow for a compre-
hensive comparison between these two perceived relational factors. Moreover, the
determinants used for the perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationship were con-
strained by the context of our study. For example, we only predicted perpetrator
justice sensitivity that involves a two-sided nature of perception as a characteristic
of the felt obligation to reciprocate in a dyadic relationship. We suggest that a
broader range of factors applicable to a wider generalisation should be explored in
the future.
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4.6 Conclusions
This paper examined the effects of survey-measured perceived relational factors
on the link between experimentally observed manufacturer incentives and supplier
investment decisions. Regarding manufacturer incentive decisions, we specifically
distinguished between incentive type and incentive value to explain the moderating
roles. Taken together, both perceived relational factors were revealed to positively
moderate the relationship between incentives by manufacturers and supplier re-
ciprocal behaviour. In particular, suppliers who are more responsive to incentive
type, rather than incentive value, are more likely to exhibit reciprocal behaviour.
In addition, we provide evidence that although the experimental relationship was
manipulated to reflect long-term and short-term conditions, the survey-measured
perceptions of the buyer-supplier relationship nevertheless confirm the influence of
these perceptions on the relationship between manufacturers’ incentive and sup-
pliers’ investment decisions. We further provide insights into an understanding of
the underlying determinants that drive the perceived relational factors within an
exchange relationship.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Conclusions
This thesis contributes to the field of BOM by incorporating the theory of reci-
procity into supply-chain disruption contexts to study how reciprocity impacts sup-
ply chain decisions. Supply chain disruptions are unpredictable and, most often,
have detrimental economic consequences on supply-chain performance. When a dis-
ruption occurs, the manufacturer generally suffers greatly. Thus, building a cooper-
ative relationship between supply-chain partners is critical to strengthen restoration
capability and, thus, improve supply-chain recovery outcomes and efficiency. Induc-
ing the supplier to jointly contribute to restoration capability investment raises the
question of under what circumstances can incentives play a more effective role. We
are interested in how the incentives offered by the manufacturer can motivate sup-
plier reciprocity when making investment decisions regarding capability restoration.
In our setting, both the manufacturer and the supplier are decision-makers. The
manufacturer decides the type and value of incentive offered; whereas, the supplier
decides whether or not to invest in restoration capability depending on the manu-
facturer’s decisions, and, if so, what amount to invest. In this thesis, we begin by
analytically interpreting the processes and consequences of their decisions in the con-
text of supply chain disruption through treemaps. Using our analytical results, we
investigate whether the subjects’ behaviour deviates from the theoretical predictions
in a laboratory environment. Following the experiment, we evaluate the subjects’
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own perceptions of relationships in supply chains by employing a post-experiment
survey approach.
In Chapter 2, we develop analytical models to investigate the effects of two in-
centive mechanisms on supplier restoration-capability investment that signals their
concerns for reciprocity. In a traditional economy, decision-makers are assumed to
be self-interested. Based on this assumption, suppliers are likely to free ride when
manufacturers make decisions that benefit them. However, behavioural studies in
economics have revealed that people have concerns about others’ benefits in addi-
tion to their own interests. Thus, the need for emotion-based incentives is a matter
of concern also. Compared with a conditional incentive that is realised after a dis-
ruption, an unconditional incentive offered prior to disruption is recognised as more
generous and pragmatic. Assuming both incentives are economically equivalent,
the unconditional incentive that involves the proactive and unconditional attributes
serves as a more effective mechanism to induce higher levels of investment by sup-
pliers. In addition to the types of incentive, the modelling of reciprocal behaviour is
also based on the types of uncertainty about future recovery outcomes. The proba-
bilities of disruption recovery outcomes are classified into two categories: known and
unknown. Recent studies in behavioural economics indicate that people differ re-
garding future decisions based on subjective attitudes towards future outcomes. We
discuss four types of beliefs based upon different degrees of recovery outcomes, in-
cluding optimistic, pessimistic, most likely and neutral. However, the unconditional
incentive mechanism is more effective at motivating reciprocity, especially when an
ambiguous prospect for recovery outcomes is anticipated with less optimism.
Following Chapter 2, we further investigate supplier investment decisions that
reflect reciprocal behaviour towards the incentives offered by the manufacturer in a
laboratory environment. The experimental study refers to an incentive-investment
sequential move game that involves two human players. Our design of decision-
variables is innovative, in which we give each group of manufacturer-players an
option to select between the two incentive types, rather than imposing a treatment
on them. We observe that a Direct incentive condition strengthens the supplier’s in-
vestment level towards a higher incentive offered by the manufacturer. In addition,
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our design involves a further two manipulations: the types of manufacturer-supplier
relationship and the uncertainty regarding future recovery outcomes. In a long-term
exchange relationship that strengthens the preference for reciprocity, offering an un-
conditional incentive prior to disruption can lead to a synergistic effect in motivating
the supplier’s desire to reciprocate, and, thus, invest more in restoration capability.
Moreover, in repeated interactions, people in labour relations tend to imitate reci-
procity (Ga¨chter and Falk 2002). Our results echo the arguments that supply-chain
parties adjust their strategies when they repeatedly interact. The parties learn to
adjust their behaviours towards equilibrium outcomes that are motivated by their in-
trinsic reciprocity. Accordingly, the parties’ selfish motives of maximising their own
benefits can be restrained. The results of our investigations on subjects’ behaviour
under known vs. unknown uncertainties provide evidence that manufacturer-players
who choose Direct incentive are ambiguity averse to offering the incentive value when
the probability of the future recovery outcome is unknown.
In fact, reciprocity is interpreted as a process of exchange relationship. Our
experimental study emphasises the importance of successful relationships in social
interactions. Using our experimental design, the relationship treatment is delib-
erately imposed on subjects. However, people are psychologically revealed to be
heterogeneous in relationship perceptions and, accordingly, their decisions may vary
with their own perceptions or attitudes towards the other party’s behaviour. Thus,
the understanding of the subjects’ own perceptions of the relationship plays a vital
role. In a laboratory environment, we failed to obtain further insights into how sub-
jects’ own perceptions of the relationship affect their emotion-based behaviour and
decision-making. To address this problem, each subject was asked a set of questions
regarding emotional characteristics at the end of the main experiment. Chapter 4
furthers the experimental study by considering the subjects’ individual differences
about relationship perceptions, as well as the factors influencing their perceptions.
We incorporate the experimental data into the post-experiment survey data and
investigate the moderating roles of these buyer-supplier relationship perceptions in
the relationship between manufacturer incentive and supplier investment decisions.
The survey-based measure provides some perceptive insights by distinguishing be-
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tween the roles of self- and other-perceptions of buyer-supplier relationships in the
relationship between behavioural decisions made by both parties. We illustrate that
both moderators strengthen the effects of an unconditional incentive mechanism on
supplier investment decisions regarding restoration capability.
We further advance the existing research on social psychology by extending the
understanding of the factors that affect subjects’ perceptions of a successful buyer-
supplier relationship. Under an environmental uncertainty, people with higher am-
biguity tolerance are more likely to have optimistic expectations of future outcomes
and, accordingly, are more willing to contribute to a successful buyer-supplier rela-
tionship. An explanation for the role of other-regarding motivation, which interprets
subjects’ altruism in benefiting others, can serve as a signal of spontaneous motiva-
tion for a strong buyer-supplier relationship. However, these factors are more related
to subjects’ self-perception. On the other hand, subjects’ relationship perceptions
are closely tied to other-perception, in which the subjects shape their perceptions
by observing others. The other-perception that involves a two-sided interaction
provides an explanation for positive reciprocity that governs social relationships.
To achieve a better understanding of exchange parties’ sense of positive reciprocity
in supply-chain relationships, the reactions that both parties present after having
perceived fairness is important to investigate. We highlight the importance of perpe-
trator justice sensitivity, which interprets people’s sensitivity to benefit from treating
others unfairly in shaping relationship perceptions.
5.2 Future Research
This thesis provides a number of directions for future research. First, in our
model development, for simplicity, we follow a study by Hu et al. (2013) that as-
sumes that market demand is determinant. In fact, an uncertain demand may be
closer to the practice. Therefore, a future study could employ stochastic demand
to investigate how the uncertainty of order quantity affects both the manufacturer’s
and the supplier’s decisions and social behaviour. Regarding the assumptions of
market price and order quantity, we set the same values before and after disrup-
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tions. In a future study, we could relax this assumption and further investigate
supplier reciprocity towards the manufacturer’s incentive offered with the changes
of price and quantity.
Second, the existing research on the reciprocity factor has no universal measure-
ment. In our experiment, we assigned a set of various multipliers for reciprocity
to capture supplier reciprocal behaviour under different treatment conditions. In
particular, we assigned ambiguous uncertainty with an unconditional incentive the
highest multiplier. Nevertheless, the experimental results provide evidence for the
opposite, that suppliers continue to be ambiguity- averse and, accordingly, exhibit
less reciprocity when an unconditional incentive is offered. Thus, a future study
could explore the dynamics of the multiplier towards different scenarios.
Third, we could extend our experiment conducted in a laboratory environment
by testing whether the results can be applied in the field. In this experimental study,
we used student pools as our subjects due to time and cost constraints. Although
the use of student subject pools has been widely acknowledged in most experimental
studies, such pools may not be representative for the entire population. Thus, the
extent to which experimental results from student subject pools can be generalised
to non-student pools is important to consider. A further study should contain non-
students from different backgrounds as the subject pools. Also, the sample of this
study is UK based. As O¨zer et al. (2014) documented, individuals from different
countries have different patterns of trust behaviour regarding information-sharing
in supply chains. This observation suggests that, for a future study, samples from
different countries should be incorporated.
Methodologically, we used the Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare results be-
tween two independent groups with the data at an individual level. However, this
method is insufficient to consider both the number of rounds and choice of incen-
tive offered. A future study should focus on how the frequency of the incentive
type chosen impacts supplier reciprocity. In our experimental design, we offered the
manufacturer-player a choice of incentive type, rather than treat the incentive type
as an extraneous variable. Further investigations on how reciprocity works for sup-
pliers under imposed incentive conditions should provide a clear contrast between
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these two treatment designs.
Finally, this thesis primarily focused on supplier reciprocal behaviour following
the manufacturer’s incentive offer. Manufacturer behaviour, such as trust and trust-
worthiness, also exert an important role in eliciting supplier reciprocity. Thus, it
would be worthwhile to study social behaviour from the perspectives of both the
manufacturer and the supplier. Also, the existing literature classified reciprocity
into two categories: positive and negative. This thesis emphasises supplier positive
reciprocity more. In our experimental design, we mainly focused on the aspect of
positive reciprocity. Specifically, we considered supplier reciprocity to be positive
if they invest towards the manufacturer incentive. However, it may be likely that,
under an incomplete contract, the supplier would free ride on the manufacturer’s
offered incentive. A possible punishment for supplier opportunistic behaviour could
be considered in future study.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Figures for Chapter 2
A.1 Decision approach description
A.1.1 Manufacturer’s decision
In the Manufacturer’s Decision Tree (See Figure 2.2), the primary decision is
to determine whether to provide an incentive prior to or after disruptions. The
‘Direct incentive’ branch is denoted by S1, while the ‘Indirect incentive’ branch is
denoted by S2. Following the initial stage decision, there are two possible sequential
outcomes for restoration capability investment: ‘Invest’ and ‘Do not invest’. These
two possibilities are decisions made by the supplier, while for the manufacturer they
are chance events. For both choices, two states are then considered: Normal Status
and Disrupted Status. If the supplier chooses to invest, the manufacturer faces
three possible recovery outcomes: full recovery, partial recovery, no recovery. The
probability of each recovery outcome can be either known or unknown. With regard
to the beliefs about either known or unknown likelihood of recovery outcomes, there
exist four possible scenarios which refer to pessimistic, optimistic, most likely and
neutral.
A.1.2 Supplier’s decision
Following the manufacturer’s first stage decision, the supplier needs to decide
whether to invest in restoration capability or not. In the Supplier’s Decision Tree
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(See Figure 2.3), ‘Invest’ or ‘Do not invest’ in restoration capability are considered
as decision events, while in the Manufacturer’s Decision Tree they are considered
as chance events. From the social preference perspective, the supplier’s decision to
invest in restoration capability and the cost of the investment F can be considered as
a proxy of reciprocity exerted by the supplier. The reciprocity is either not straight-
forwardly observable or, even if it can be observed, it is difficult to measure per se.
To better understand how the supplier’s reciprocal behaviour works, this study mea-
sures it by comparing the supplier’s investment value in restoration capability to the
manufacturer’s incentive offered. We use a Bayesian approach to demonstrate how
the supplier’s investment decision influences the outcomes of supply chain disruption
recovery.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
As shown in (8) above, the manufacturer’s total expected value under Direct
incentive ΠDm is equal to the difference between the weighted sum of Π
D
1 and Π
D
2
by αD and the incentive value ID. Under Direct incentive, the profit function of
‘Do invest in restoration capability’, ΠD1 , is the weighted sum of ΠN and pi
D
E by the
disruption probability, β, where
ΠD1 = (1− β)ΠN + βpiDE
The profit function of ‘Do not invest in restoration capability’, ΠD2 , is represented
as
ΠD2 = (1− β)ΠN + βL
In the Manufacturer’s Decision Tree, the monetary values of the branches marked
‘Normal Status’ are
ΠN = (p1 − w1)q1
The expected value of the branch marked ‘Disrupted Status’ under Direct incen-
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tive is given as
piDE =
N∑
i=1
µipi
b
i = µ1(p2 − w1)q1 + θµ2(p2 − w1)q1 − µ3(p2 − w1)q1

pib1 = (p2 − w1)q1 full recovery
pib2 = θ(p2 − w1)q1 (0 < θ < 1) partial recovery
pib3 = −(p2 − w1)q1 no recovery
Let K = µ1 + θµ2 − µ3, the the above equation can be written as piDE =
K · (p2 − w1)q1.
Under Indirect incentive, as shown in (5), the manufacturer’s total expected
value is calculated in the same way as in the Direct incentive condition. Likewise,
the profit function of ‘Do invest in restoration capability’ under Indirect incentive,
ΠI1, is the weighted sum of ΠN and pi
I
E by the disruption probability, β, where
ΠI1 = (1− β)ΠN + βpiIE
The profit function of ‘Do not invest in restoration capability’,Π2I , is represented
as
ΠI2 = (1− β)ΠN + βL
The expected value of the branch marked ‘Disrupted Status’ under indirect in-
centive is given as
piIE =
N∑
i=1
µipi
b′
i = µ1(p2 − w2)q2 + θµ2(p2 − w2)q2 − µ3(p2 − w2)q2

pib
′
1 = (p2 − w2)q2 full recovery
pib
′
2 = θ(p2 − w2)q2 (0 < θ < 1) partial recovery
pib
′
3 = −(p2 − w2)q2 no recovery
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Likewise, the equation can be simplified as ΠI,d1 = K · (p2−w2)q2. The manufac-
turer’s total expected payoff under Indirect incentive is calculated in terms of the
below equation:
ΠIm = α
IΠI1 + (1− αI)ΠI2 (A.2.1)
We substitute above mentioned (1) into (17), then we have the following expan-
sion equation.
ΠIm = Kβα
IM2q2 −KβαIq22 −KβαIw2q2 + (1− β)(p1 − w1)q1 + (1− αI)βL
Taking the derivative of the manufacturer’s payoff under Indirect incentive ΠIm
with respect to q2, it gives
∂ΠIm
∂q2
= KβαIM2 − 2KβαIq2 −KβαIw2 = 0
q∗2 =
M2 − w2
2
We can further obtain that
p∗2 =
M2 + w2
2
Next, let us substitute (20) into (13) it gives
ΠIs = (1− β)Π′N +
1
2
Kβ(M2w2 −M2c2 − w22 + w2c2)
Taking the derivative of the supplier’s payoff under Indirect incentive ΠIs with respect
to w2, it gives
∂ΠIs
∂w2
=
1
2
KβM2 −Kβw2 +
1
2
Kβc2
w∗2 =
M2 + c2
2
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Based on the proof of lemma 1, the manufacturer’s total expected payoff under
Direct incentive can be expressed as
ΠDm = α
DΠD1 + (1− αI)ΠD2
To simplify the Inequality ΠDm > Π
I
m, it can yield the result that
0 < ID < β[αD(
N∑
i=1
µipi
b
i − L)− αI(
N∑
i=1
µipi
b′
i − L)]
It is clear that the upper value of ID must follow ID > 0, which induces the rela-
tionship between αD and αI through a comparison between
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i and
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i .
If αD > αI, the sizes of
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i and
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i depend on the value of wi and qi,
for i = 1, 2. When q2 > q1, w1 = w2, then we have
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i >
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i . When
q2 = q1, w2 > w1, then it follows
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i <
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i . When q2 > q1, w2 > w1,
the relationship of
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i and
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i depends on the product value of wiqi.
To sum up, we see that the upper value of ID can be satisfied without restricted
comparison in boundary between
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i and
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i . By contrast, if α
D < αI,
it suggests that
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i
< 1 and thereby satisfying ID > 0.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
When Direct and Indirect incentives are economically equivalent for the man-
ufacturer, the less incentive value offered the more efficient for the corresponding
incentive type. We make a comparison between Direct and Indirect incentive. The
comparative value ratio depends on the loss suffered by the manufacturer in case
the supplier does not invest.
Θ =
IˆD
IˆI
=
β[αD(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i − L)− αI(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i − L)]
(w2q2 − w1q1)
Let Θ < 1, the loss value that satisfying ID < II can be categorised into three
different conditions:
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(a) if αD > αI, then
β(αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i−αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i )−II
β(αD−αI) < L < 0;
(b) if αD < αI, then
αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i −αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i
αI−αD < L < 0;
(c) if αD = αI, then the loss value L has no effect on Θ.
As for the condition that αD > αI, we see that the denominator β(αD−αI) > 0.
Thus, to satisfy L < 0 it requires β(αD
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b
i − αI
∑
N
i=1 µipi
b′
i ) − II > 0. Then
we have β < I
I
αD
∑N
i=1 µipi
b
i−αI
∑N
i=1 µipi
b′
i
.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
The supplier’s upper value of FD and F I is the difference in payoff between
two investment decisions under Direct and Indirect incentive, respectively, with
risky certainty, while the upper value of FD
′
and F I
′
denote those with ambiguous
uncertainty.

FˆD = ΠD
′
1 − ΠD′2 + λID − ID
Fˆ I = ΠI
′
1 − ΠI′2
FˆD′ = ΠD
′′
1 − ΠD′2 + λID − ID
Fˆ I′ = ΠI
′′
1 − ΠI′2
The profit function of ‘Do invest in restoration capability’ under Direct incentive
with risky certainty, ΠD
′
1 , is the weighted sum of Π
′
N and pi
D′
E by the disruption
probability, β, where
ΠD
′
1 = (1− β)Π′N + βpiD
′
E
The profit function of ‘Do not invest in restoration capability’ under Direct
incentive, ΠD
′
2 , is represented as
ΠD
′
2 = (1− β)Π′N + βL
While under Indirect incentive, the above profit functions are expressed respec-
tively as
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ΠI
′
1 = (1− β)Π′N + βpiI
′
E
ΠI
′
2 = Π
D′
2
In the Supplier’s Decision Tree, the monetary values of the branches marked
‘Normal Status’ are the same where,
Π′N = (w1 − c1)q1
If the supplier invests, the expected payoff when disruption occurs under Direct
incentive with risky certainty is
piD
′
E =
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i
The payoff under Direct incentive with ambiguous uncertainty is
piD
′′
E =
N∑
i=1
δµipi
s
i
Specifically, the expected payoffs of the three types of disruption recovery degree
are respectively represented as

pis1 = (w1 − c2)q1
pis2 = θ · (w1 − c2)q1 (0 < θ < 1)
pis3 = −(w1 − c2)q1
Likewise, the expected payoff of working with the contractual supplier under
Indirect incentive is
piI
′
E =
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i
The payoff under Indirect incentive with ambiguous uncertainty is
piI
′′
E =
N∑
i=1
δµipi
s′
i
In this case, the expected payoffs of the three types of disruption recovery degree
are respectively expressed as
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
pis
′
1 = (w2 − c2)q2
pis
′
2 = θ · (w2 − c2)q2 (0 < θ < 1)
pis
′
3 = −(w2 − c2)q2
The supplier’s upper investment value under each of four situations can be sim-
plified as

FˆD = β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i − L) + (λ− 1)ID
FˆD′ = β(δλ
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i − L) + (λ+ δ − 1)ID
Fˆ I = β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i − L)
Fˆ I′ = β(δ
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i − L)
Notably, in the case that the profit functions of the supplier’s decision to invest
are negative, we limit the value of FD and F I to 0.
By considering the impact of ambiguous uncertainty on the supplier reciprocity,
we derive the parameter δ which satisfies F
D′
ID
> F
I′
II
. Let ID = II, then we have the
following result
β(δλ
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i − L) + (λ+ δ − 1)ID > β(δ
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i − L)
Accordingly, we can obtain a lower bound of δ
δ ≡ (1− λ)I
D
β(λ
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i ) + I
D
< δ < 1
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Based on the lower bound δ, we see that δ needs to satisfy 0 < δ < 1. When
δ < 1, we have the below result:
(1− λ)ID < β(λ
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i −
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i ) + I
D
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Accordingly, we can derive a lower bound of λ as follows
λ >
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i
β
∑
N
i=1µipi
s
i + I
D
On the other hand, taking account of the supplier reciprocity in incentive type
dimension, we derive another lower bound of λ that satisfies FD > F I by letting
ID = II.That is
β(
N∑
i=1
µipi
s
i − L) + (λ− 1)ID > β(
N∑
i=1
µipi
s′
i − L)
Thus another lower bound of λ is
λ >
β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i )
ID
+ 1
We compare the two lower bounds of λ and find that the latter bound clearly
supports our assumption that λ > 1. Thus the latter one is used as the lower bound
of λ in Theorem 2.
Refer back to the lower bound of δ, let δ > 0, as λ > 1, it requires to simultane-
ously meet
 (1− λ)ID < 0β(λ∑Ni=1 µipisi −∑Ni=1 µipis′i ) + ID < 0
Accordingly, we can derive a range of λ
β(
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i −
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i )
ID
+ 1 < λ <
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s′
i − ID
β
∑
N
i=1 µipi
s
i
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A.7 Notation
Table A.1: Notation of parameters in Manufacturer’s Decision Tree
ΠDm Manufacturer’s expected payoff under Direct incentive
ΠIm Manufacturer’s expected payoff under Indirect incentive
ID direct incentive value
II indirect incentive value
ΠD1 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under Di-
rect incentive
ΠD2 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of ‘Do not Invest’ in restoration capability
under Direct incentive
ΠI1 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under In-
direct Incentive
ΠI2 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of ‘Do not Invest’ in restoration capability
under Indirect incentive
αD Probability of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under Direct incentive
αI Probability of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under Indirect incentive
β Disruption probability
L loss arising from ‘Not Invest’ in restoration capability
ΠN Manufacturer’s expected payoff when no disruption occurs
piDE Manufacturer’s expected payoff of working with the existing supplier under
Direct incentive
piIE Manufacturer’s expected payoff of working with the existing supplier under
Indirect incentive
pib1 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of full disruption recovery under Direct incen-
tive
pib2 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of partial disruption recovery under Direct
incentive
pib3 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of no recovery under Direct incentive
pib
′
1 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of full disruption recovery under Indirect in-
centive
pib
′
2 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of partial disruption recovery under Indirect
incentive
pib
′
3 Manufacturer’s expected payoff of no recovery under Indirect incentive
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Table A.2: Notation of parameters in Supplier’s Decision Tree
ΠDs Supplier’s expected payoff under Direct incentive
ΠIs Supplier’s expected payoff under Indirect incentive
FD Value of investment in restoration capability under Direct incentive
F I Value of investment in restoration capability under Indirect incentive
ΠD
′
1 Supplier’s expected payoff of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under Direct
incentive
ΠD
′
2 Supplier’s expected payoff of ‘Do not Invest’ in restoration capability under
Direct incentive
ΠI
′
1 Supplier’s expected payoff of ‘Invest’ in restoration capability under Indirect
incentive
ΠI
′
2 Supplier’s expected payoff of ‘Do not Invest’ in restoration capability under
Indirect incentive
ΠN′ Supplier’s expected payoff when no disruption occurs
piD
′
E Supplier’s expected payoff of working with contractual supplier under Direct
incentive
piI
′
E Supplier’s expected payoff of working with contractual supplier under Direct
incentive
pis1 Supplier’s expected payoff of full disruption recovery under Direct incentive
pis2 Supplier’s expected payoff of partial disruption recovery under Direct incentive
pis3 Supplier’s expected payoff of no recovery under Direct incentive
pis
′
1 Supplier’s expected payoff of full disruption recovery under Indirect incentive
pis
′
2 Supplier’s expected payoff of partial disruption recovery under Indirect incen-
tive
pis
′
3 Supplier’s expected payoff of no recovery under Indirect incentive
µ1 Probability of full disruption recovery under Direct incentive
µ2 Probability of partial disruption recovery under Direct incentive
µ3 Probability of no recovery under Direct incentive
θ Proportion of partial disruption recovery
λ Reciprocity loading factor for the type of incentive offered
δ Reciprocity loading factor for the type of uncertainty about future recovery
outcomes
w1 Regular wholesale price
w2 Disruption wholesale price
q1 Regular order quantity
q2 Disruption order quantity
p1 Marketing price with no disruption
p2 Marketing price with disruption
c1 Regular production cost
c2 Disruption production cost
Appendix B
Experimental Design, Figures and
Tables for Chapter 3
B.1 Experimental Instructions
Welcome to the Experimental Laboratory! Please make sure your mobile phone
and all other electronic devices are turned off now! This is an experiment regarding
business decision-making between a Manufacturer and a Supplier. Depending on
the decisions you made, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of money
which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. You will be given
5GBP show-up fee. During the experiment, your earnings are given in Points. At
the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted to CASH value based
on the exchange rate, where 1GBP = 1,000 points. It is important that you are
strictly not allowed to communicate during the experiments. Please raise your hand
if you have any question, an experimenter will come to help you. Non-compliance
with this rule will lead to an exclusion from the experiment and your cash earnings
will be 0. This experiment consists of 28 rounds, starting with 3 practice rounds
to help you get familiar with the experimental mechanism, followed by 25 rounds
where your earning will be actually based upon. After the experiment, you will be
asked to complete a short questionnaire. It may help you to understand the decision
situation if you carefully think about the following scenario. You will then be asked
a couple of control questions to make sure you understand the instruction.
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B.2 Questions for Manipulation Check
The following control questions are only designed to test subjects’ understanding
of the experiment as described in the previous instructions.
1. The manufacturer can offer an incentive from two options. Which one is the
unconditional incentive?
(a) Direct incentive
(b) Indirect incentive
2. Which one is the promise-based incentive that is effective only if the supplier
invests in recovery capability?
(a) Direct incentive
(b) Indirect incentive
3. Do you play with each round?
(a) a fixed player
(b) a different player
4. How likely is the supply chain recoverable with the supplier’s investment in
recovery capability ?
(a) Above 50
(b) It is likely but unsure about probability
5. Both the manufacturer and the supplier initially have 100 points endowment.
For example the manufacturer has offered the supplier the Direct incentive
with 50 points. Now the supplier has 375 points in total and the supplier
decides to invest 190 points. Please calculate payoffs of the manufacturer and
the supplier. [Payoff Manufacturer = Endowment - Incentive value offered
+ Supplier’s investment amount; Payoff Supplier = Supplier’s total amount
available - Investment amount].
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(a) Manufacturer: 240 points; Supplier: 185 points
(b) Manufacturer: 185 points; Supplier: 240 points
B.3 The Incentive-Investment Game
In the following, we give a specific example to illustrate how the two players
are interacted in the game. We take RU-RG treatment as an example. If the
manufacturer offers a Direct incentive with 50 points under risk condition in a long-
term relationship, the supplier will receive 375 points in total. The contexts shown
on manufacturer and supplier players’ screens are described as follows.
B.3.1 Manufacturer Screen
Round No.: 1. You are paired with a fixed player.
You are the Manufacturer. Your company, competing in high technology industry,
produces mobile phone with the high capacity requirements. Due to a fire accident
in the past, you are unable to fulfil the order placed by your customers such that you
have suffered great financial and reputation losses. You are aware of the importance
of securing your supplier’s capacity to ensure the uninterrupted flow of production
to serve the end customers. Thus you consider offering an incentive to motivate
your supplier to invest in a new production site that can be used as a contingency
plan to recover capacity from future disruptions (if any). In this experiment, you
can choose between Direct incentive and Indirect incentive. The Direct incentive
is paid upfront before a disruption occurs without any condition while the Indirect
incentive is a promise-based contract which becomes effective only if the supplier
invests in recovery capability, via increasing the wholesale price. Depending on the
nature of the disruption event, there are three possible outcomes of recovery: (1)
full recovery (i.e. leads to highest payoff); (2) partial recovery (i.e. leads to medium
payoff); (3) no recovery (i.e. leads to lowest payoff). If your supplier decides to
invest in recovery capacity, above 50% chance the supply chain is recoverable. You
have 100 points endowment with which you can offer an incentive.
Below are the formulas for payoff calculations:
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Manufacturer Payoff = Endowment - Incentive value offered + Supplier’s in-
vestment amount
Supplier Payoff = Supplier’s total amount available - Investment amount
1. Which type of incentive would you like to offer?
(a) Direct incentive
(b) Indirect incentive
2. How much would you like to offer? Please enter an integer number from 0 to
100: points
B.3.2 Supplier Screen
Round No.: 1. You are paired with a fixed player.
You are the key Supplier for a mobile phone manufacturer. Due to a fire accident
in the past, you are unable to supply products required by your manufacturer such
that both of you have suffered great financial and reputation losses. Facing the
possibility of disruption risk (i.e. a risk that unable to supply), your manufacturer
tries to encourage you to invest in a new production site as a backup capacity plan.
Currently, your manufacturer considers offering you one type of incentive, either
Direct or Indirect. The Direct incentive is paid upfront before a disruption occurs
without any condition while the Indirect incentive is a promise-based contract which
becomes effective only if the supplier invests in recovery capability, via increasing
the wholesale price. After the incentive offered, you then decide whether to invest in
recovery capability. Depending on the nature of the disruption event, there are three
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possible outcomes of recovery: (1) full recovery (i.e. leads to highest payoff); (2)
partial recovery (i.e. leads to medium payoff); (3) no recovery (i.e. leads to lowest
payoff). If you decide to invest, above 50% chance the supply chain is recoverable.
The manufacturer has offered you the Direct Incentive with 50 points. Now you
will have 375 points and you can decide to invest some, all or none of your points
to build up restoration capability.
Below are the formulas for payoff calculations:
Manufacturer Payoff = Endowment - Incentive value offered + Supplier’s in-
vestment amount
Supplier Payoff = Supplier’s total amount available - Investment amount
1. Would you like to invest in restoration capability?
(a) Invest
(b) Not Invest
2. Please choose your investment amount with an integer number between 0 and
100 points (not include 0): points
Appendix C
Post-experimental Survey for
Chapter 3
C.1 Post-experimental Survery
Please fill out this questionnaire completely
Your ID: (as shown on your desk)
1. What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
2. What is your age?
 17-21  22-26  27-31  32-36  37-41
3. Which country are you from?
4. What’s your programme and subject?
5. Please rank on the following scale how much you have a good relationship with
your partner in the experiment? [Please rate on a scale of 1’extremely weak’
to 7 ’extremely strong’]
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
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6. Please select option ’A’ or option ’B’
 A: 100 with probability 0.5; 0 otherwise;
 B: 100 with probability ’x’; 0 otherwise; (’x’ is an unknown constant)
7. Why are you motivated to do the task? Please rate the reasons on each of
the following items: [Please rate on a scale of 1 ’not at all apply to me’ to 5
’perfectly apply to me’]
Because I care about benefiting others through my work.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Because I want to help others through my work.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Because I want to have positive impact on others.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Because it is important to me to do good for others through my work.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
8. Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 ’does not apply to me at
all’ to 7 ’applies to me perfectly’.
If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
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9. Please respond to each of the following statements by circling the number
which best expresses your own opinion regarding that statement. [Please rate
on a scale of 0 strongly disagree’ to 5 ’strongly agree’]
It makes me angry when others receive a reward that I have earned.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I cannot easily bear it when others profit unilaterally from me.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I ruminate for a long time when other people are treated better than me.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
It burdens me to be criticized for things that are overlooked in others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
It makes me angry when I am treated worse than others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I have a bad conscience when I receive a reward that someone else has earned.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I cannot easily bear it to unilaterally profit from others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I ruminate for a long time about being treated nicer than others for no reason.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
It bothers me when someone tolerates things with me that other people are
being criticize for.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I feel guilty when I treat someone worse than others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
It gets me down when I take something from someone else that I don’t deserve.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I cannot stand the feeling of exploiting someone.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
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It takes me a long time to forget when I allow myself to be careless at the
expense of someone else.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
I feel guilty when I treat someone worse than others.
 0  1  2  3  4  5
